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7ii. Preface
For a long time, the EU seemed to deliver. Prosperity continued to rise, and 
the blessings of the expanding social protection systems gave citizens a 
 feeling of personal security and well-being that they had never known  before. 
So why make a fuss about Brussels?
This picture has changed. With global competition intensifying, the 
 pressure on labour markets in Europe had already increased, darkening the 
prospects of the lower-middle class and less-skilled workers. Then, the 
 contraction of the economy that followed in the wake of the global financial 
crisis brought some EU member states to the brink of collapse and left 
 millions jobless. These days, a whole generation of young people –  especially 
in southern Europe – seems to be deprived of a viable future. And if that 
weren’t already enough, the EU is no longer being spared from the deterio-
rating security situation around it, and Islamist-inspired terrorism has 
 severely unsettled its member states. What’s more, the many conflicts and 
wars in Europe’s neighbourhood have led millions to flee their homes. At 
the peak of the crisis in 2015, more than a million people illegally overran 
the EU’s external border.
A deep feeling of insecurity and losing control has taken hold. At the same 
time, more and more people have started viewing the EU as an epitome of 
accelerating globalisation rather than the solution to it. In reality, this 
 ongoing trend is testing the governance of the nation-state as much as that 
of the EU. Nevertheless, whether they are unaware of or neglecting this fact, 
people have been far too eager to follow populists who have branded the EU 
as evil and promised to turn back the clock on globalisation.
The following study is an attempt to set the record straight by demon-
strating that the European Union is actually in tune with the citizens of its 
member states. It can deliver the public goods they need most. Given the 
many threats and challenges, we asked ourselves one very simple question: 
Who could do better, the EU or the member states? Accordingly, our research 
focused on how an evidence-based distribution of competences and powers 
could make the EU a stronger, more efficient and more accepted union. The 
methodology was unbiased because it tested whether a national solution – and, 
in some instances, a reallocation of (currently EU) responsibilities to the 
member states – would bring about better results than a federal solution.
Our research shows clearly where and how citizens would profit from a 
new distribution of competences and powers – and where they wouldn’t. Not 
surprisingly, we could prove that some of the tasks currently taken care of 
in all states at the national level (e.g. development aid, defence policy and 
asylum policy) would create better results if responsibilities were transferred 
to the European level. In turn, we could also provide evidence indicating that 
it would be better to renationalise agricultural policy than to continue on 
with the Common Agricultural Policy, which takes up a whopping 38 per cent 
of the EU’s budget.
However, our research wasn’t solely aimed at testing the optimal distri-
bution of tasks in the fields we analysed. Instead, we also wish to offer our 
colleagues in the think-tank world and the European Commission a new 
methodology for determining where to expect better outputs regardless of 
the particular policy field being put to the test. We believe this  methodology 
has great potential for generating fresh insights when testing the  subsidiarity 
principle that governs the EU. Furthermore, we think it could strengthen the 
 
8case for designing the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF) in 
a way that would help channel funding to where the real challenges lie.
With this kind of truly quantitative impact assessment, we are  continuing 
the evidence-based research approach that we adopted in 2013 with our 
 exploratory study on how to calculate the European added value of EU 
 spending. We know that it will ultimately need both output and input 
 legitimation if it is to win over the hearts and minds of EU citizens for the 
European  integration project. But if the EU cannot provide outputs superior 
to those achieved at the member-state level, arguments in favour of the EU 
will  ultimately be lost. Likewise, an EU that overreaches with its regulatory 
 power and interferes with the policies that national and even subnational 
bodies are better equipped to deal with by themselves will eventually  estrange 
its citizens.
We thank the Mannheim-based Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) for being our partner in this endeavour to find out what the right 
 balance in the allocation of competences would look alike. Given the 
 complexity of the matter, we owe a lot to the dedication and stamina of the 
ZEW’s project team led by Friedrich Heinemann. Furthermore, we would 
 never have arrived at these results without the support of the members of 
our advisory board and the many additional experts we were able to consult 
with to obtain first-hand insights into the different policy fields we  examined.
Aart De Geus
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Bertelsmann Stiftung
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9iii. Abstract
This study aims to give guidance for a better-performing EU through an 
 improved allocation of competences between the European Union and its 
member states. The study analyses eight specific policies from a wide range 
of fields with respect to their preferable assignment. The analysis applies a 
unified quantified approach and is precise in its definition of  ‘counterfactuals’. 
These counterfactuals are understood as conceptual alternatives to the 
 allocation of competences under the status quo. As such, they either relate 
to a new European competence (if the policy is currently a national 
 responsibility) or a new national competence (if the policy is currently 
 assigned to the EU). The comprehensive, quantification-based assessments 
indicate that it would be preferable to have responsibility for higher  education 
and providing farmers with income support at the national level.  Conversely, 
a shift of competences to the EU level would be advantageous when it comes 
to asylum policies, defence, corporate taxation, development aid and a 
 (complementary) unemployment insurance scheme in the euro area. For one 
policy – railway freight transport – the findings are indeterminate. Overall, 
the study recommends a differentiated integration strategy comprising both 
new European policies and a roll-back of EU competences in other fields.
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iv. Key Findings
1. This study was written in the context of Europe’s multiple crises. In the eyes 
of many voters, the performance of the EU has been disappointing in the 
aftermath of the economic and euro area debt crisis. The decision of the 
United Kingdom to leave the Union drastically demonstrates this dissatis-
faction. Against this background, this study aims to provide guidance for a 
better-performing EU through an improved allocation of competences 
between the European Union and its member states.
2. The study analyses eight specific policies with respect to their preferable 
assignment. These eight specific policies cover a wide range of policy fields. 
The study applies a unified quantified approach. Moreover, it is precise in 
the definition of ‘counterfactuals’. These counterfactuals are understood as 
conceptual alternatives to the allocation of competences under the status 
quo. As such, they either relate to a new European competence (if the policy 
is currently a national responsibility) or a new national competence (if the 
policy is currently assigned to the EU). Thus, the study’s design excludes any 
prior judgment regarding the desirable allocation.
3. The testing applies the following criteria to judge the appropriate assign-
ment: free riding of member states on public goods provided by others, econ-
omies of scale through European provision, preference heterogeneity of voters 
across member states, the merits of intra-jurisdictional competition, and the 
interplay of competence allocation with the functioning of the European 
internal market. The wealth of detailed analyses along these criteria is trans-
parently condensed by using a weighted scoring method.
4. For Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), we concentrate on direct payments to 
farmers. We compare the current EU responsibility with a national counter-
factual in which income support is the responsibility of the national welfare 
system. Our results point to significant free riding under the current Euro-
pean arrangement and massively excessive costs resulting from ill-targeted 
income support. According to our results, income protection through CAP 
exceeds the level defined by national minimum income support in 21 member 
states. Overall, we find that having national responsibility is clearly prefer-
able to the current assignment.
5. For asylum and refugee policy, the status quo entails de jure a mixed division 
of responsibilities. De facto, however, member states largely decide their 
own policies. We compare this arrangement to a counterfactual featuring a 
truly European provision of harmonised asylum services. Our analysis 
concludes that European responsibility would be clearly superior, as it would 
reduce massive free riding on the reception efforts of other member states. 
In addition, annual cost savings of between €5 billion and €12 billion (given 
refugee numbers like those experienced in 2015) appear realistic as a result 
of economies of scale.
6. Since Europe largely lacks responsibilities for direct taxation, the study 
focuses on corporate taxation for that policy field. The specific counterfac-
tual scenario involves both a harmonised corporate tax base definition and 
an apportionment of corporate profits among member states according to a 
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formula. The competence of tax-rate setting would remain at the national 
level. Taken together, the criteria indicate that there are disadvantages to 
having this remain a national prerogative. In addition to reducing inefficien-
cies in tax base competition, the European counterfactual would enable 
substantial cost savings in tax compliance. For example, tax compliance costs 
for a company with up to five foreign affiliates are currently 2.5 times larger 
than those of a purely domestic company. A uniform tax base could cut back 
this costs disadvantage.
7. For defence policy, the study lends support to current political initiatives for 
more Europe in defence. Our counterfactual is a fully integrated European 
army with unified decision-making and a centralised provision of military 
equipment financed from the EU budget. The analysis finds a large number 
of indications that the current fragmentation results in significant disecon-
omies of scale. For example, the armies of the EU member states currently 
deploy 89 different major weapon systems, while US forces utilise just 27. 
Moreover, the quantitative analysis of benefit- and burden-sharing shows 
the superiority of a European competence, as it would much better align 
benefits and costs for member states and thereby decrease the extent of free 
riding. Furthermore, a European army would also give a boost to the internal 
market for defence goods.
8. Development policies are currently a shared responsibility. We contrast this 
situation with a far-reaching European counterfactual in which development 
aid is fully financed and managed by the EU. As with defence and asylum 
policies, having development aid financed from the EU budget would reduce 
free riding on the efforts of other member states. Substantive economies of 
scale can be achieved by cutting back high administrative costs and reducing 
other inefficiencies associated with the current aid fragmentation. Moreover, 
voter preferences appear to be particularly homogeneous across member states. 
9. The results of our study indicate that it would be more advantageous to have 
responsibility for higher education remain at the national level. The Euro-
pean counterfactual to the current national responsibility is a model of EU 
financing that is decentrally implemented by autonomous universities 
(‘money follows students’). There is no evidence of European economies of 
scale. Free riding would increase compared to the status quo, under which 
national costs and benefits are largely aligned. Overall, the current approach 
of having the EU concentrate on mutual recognition of qualifications and 
fostering student mobility appears to be appropriate.
10. Results for railway freight transport are indeterminate. The study compares the 
current shared competences with a European counterfactual of a single 
 EU-financed railway system without technical or operational barriers. Three 
criteria – economies of scale, preference heterogeneity and internal market 
consistency – weakly point to the advantages of a more European approach. 
However, European financing schemes would loosen the link between national 
costs and benefits, thereby increasing problems of free riding.
11. For stabilisation policies in the European Monetary Union, we screen the 
potential merits of a European unemployment insurance scheme. Here, instead 
of considering a counterfactual in which the competence of this policy field 
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is relocated, we consider a new European scheme that complements existing 
national unemployment protection in the euro area countries. The current 
protection may cause free riding by other countries, which also benefit from 
the general stabilisation effects of such national insurances. The results 
confirm that this problem, which may lead to under-provisions of unem-
ployment insurances, could be resolved within a European scheme. Further-
more, the current unemployment insurance schemes are similar across 
countries with regard to basic design issues. Thus, no major preference asym-
metry would preclude a partial Europeanisation. 
12. Overall, we conclude (see table below) that our comprehensive, quantification- 
based assessment points to a desirable shift of competences to the EU level in 
five out of the eight policies covered by the study. While our findings are 
ambiguous for one policy (railway freight transport), we see better  potentials 
for education and agriculture policy with a national responsibility.
Policies Optimal allocation
asylum & refugee policy EU
defence policy (European army) EU
corporate taxation (harmonised tax base) EU
development aid EU
Unemployment insurance EU
railway freight transport indifferent
agricultural policy (income protection) national
post-secondary & tertiary education national
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v. Introduction
This study aims to provide guidance on the future allocation of policy compe-
tences between the European Union and its member states. The research has 
been undertaken in a time when a whole series of crises have shattered the 
long-standing consensus that there is no alternative but to be a member of 
the European Union.
Doubtless, the concentration of policy crises which Europe has seen since 
the beginning of the decade is unique: A financial crisis shocked the global 
economy in 2008/09 and led to a prolonged phase of financial and economic 
instability for the euro area. This acute economic crisis and the systemic insta-
bilities have so far only been contained by a highly active – and, for many 
observers, excessively active – European Central Bank. The destabilisation of 
the Middle East triggered the flight of unprecedented numbers of refugees to 
Europe, which in turn sparked severe political clashes between the member 
states on the appropriate way to deal with this challenge. Moreover, the debate 
on appropriate refugee policies is increasingly indicating that there are different 
understandings of the fundamental values on which the Union is built. In 
addition, many more challenges related to security issues – both internal (e.g. 
terrorism) and external (e.g. the deterioration in relations with Russia and 
Turkey) – have given rise to ample disputes within the Union.
Among the current political reactions to Europe’s multiple crises, two  polar 
answers have emerged. On the one side of the spectrum, the answer is ‘more 
Europe’. According to this perspective, all crises have demonstrated the inability 
of the national level to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, such as 
globalisation, digitalisation, migration and demographic change. This answer 
is also given in different variants, including the frequent pleas for a vague polit-
ical union or a fiscal union that completes the monetary union. The other side 
of the spectrum sees the European crisis as the result of over-centralisation 
and therefore calls for competences to be returned to member states on a large 
scale. This position is represented by eurosceptical movements, which have 
enjoyed a major increase in public support. The desire to regain this kind of 
sovereignty was even a factor behind the UK’s decision to exit the EU.
Crises should offer a welcome occasion for European policies and institu-
tions to prove their value. A key argument in favour of European integration 
has always been that integration enables the old continent to cope with the 
challenges of economic and political globalisation. But, in this respect, the 
EU’s performance over recent years has been disappointing in the eyes of many 
voters. The rise of euroscepticism indicates that the EU has not convincingly 
shown that it is providing added value to citizens in excess of what member 
states could provide using their own national means. 
The current crisis of EU acceptance is clearly related to both input and output 
legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, 2006). EU policies and crisis decisions are increasingly 
perceived as being insufficiently responsive to voter  preferences (‘input legiti-
macy’). The narrative of the ‘detached elites’ is typical for a lack of input legit-
imacy. Moreover, Europe does not convincingly deliver what it had promised in 
terms of policy results and the common good (‘output  legitimacy’).
This study contributes to the reflection on strategies for coping with this 
crisis of acceptance, placing a clear emphasis on one particular dimension of 
output legitimacy which focuses on good results as a consequence of an appro-
priate division of labour between jurisdictions. We aim to provide guidance for 
a better allocation of competences between the European and the national 
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ployment insurances, could be resolved within a European scheme. Further-
more, the current unemployment insurance schemes are similar across 
countries with regard to basic design issues. Thus, no major preference asym-
metry would preclude a partial Europeanisation. 
12. Overall, we conclude (see table below) that our comprehensive, quantification- 
based assessment points to a desirable shift of competences to the EU level in 
five out of the eight policies covered by the study. While our findings are 
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level. In this study’s understanding, ‘better’ is based on clear criteria which 
incorporate the idea of mutual benefit for all member states and their popula-
tions. Hence, our study does not address the ‘altruistic European’ who is willing 
to sacrifice short-run material objectives merely for the sake of integration. 
Instead, we ask which allocation of competences will be more efficient and 
therefore advantageous because, for example, it may save money through a 
more cost-efficient provision of public services or it reduces spillover effects 
arising from specific policies. In other words, we consider the idea of a ‘union 
of results’ in which continuously adjusting the mix of competences results in 
steadily improving policy performance to the advantage of the people and to 
thereby increasing their acceptance of the European project. 
Our study applies concepts of fiscal federalism. In this literature, there are 
two main types of considerations relevant for optimum competence-sharing: 
The first generation fiscal federalism analyses the optimal allocation of tasks 
under the assumption that governments act as benevolent social planers (see, 
e.g., Boadway and Tremblay 2012; Oates 1972; Oates 2007; Tiebout 1956). The 
most important arguments in this context are cross-border spillover effects, 
economies of scale, and preference heterogeneity in line with a provision of 
(non-divisible) public goods. Spillover effects account for potential free riding 
of some member states on the goods or services provided by other member 
states. Preference heterogeneity analyses the homogeneity of European citizens’ 
preferences regarding the execution of specific policies, while economies of 
scale refer to potential cost-saving advantages of larger entities that are, for 
instance, based on fixed cost degression.
The second generation fiscal federalism shifts the focus to politicians (see, 
e.g., Oates 2005). This literature criticises the assumption of welfare-maxim-
ising politicians and views policymakers as individuals following their own 
agenda. It thus adds insights from the public-choice perspective and focuses 
particularly on political incentives and the role of competition (Weingast 2009). 
On this basis, additional criteria for the optimal assignment of tasks in a feder-
ation emerge which, for example, relate to the role of intra-jurisdictional 
competition as a disciplining device for political agents or the importance of 
the internal market and current obstacles to this principle (for a detailed 
description of all indicators, see the next section).
With this theoretical basis, our study is in the tradition of earlier approaches 
applying fiscal federalism concepts. Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005) 
analyse the main EU policy areas and ask whether this competence allocation 
is in line with normative reasoning. They base their judgment on various 
measures of political intensity, such as the number of regulations, directives 
and decisions as well as on court cases or spending decisions. Furthermore, 
the Eurobarometer questionnaire is evaluated to analyse citizens’ preferences 
regarding a competence reallocation. However, Alesina, Angeloni and 
Schuknecht (2005) do not ask whether national competences at that time should 
be reallocated to the EU level and only focus on the assessment of EU compe-
tences. Similarly, a study from a research consortium led by ECORYS (ECORYS, 
CPB and IFO 2008) uses the EU budget of that time as a starting point for an 
assessment of which policy fields should be located on the national or the 
European level. In total, 14 policy areas with various subordinate policies are 
analysed. The judgment is mainly based on qualitative deliberations and lacks 
(autonomous) empirical analyses.
We go beyond these analyses in several respects. First, instead of orienting 
our analyses to the current EU budget, we select the case study policies 
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irrespective of whether the policy is currently located on the national or the 
EU level. The main selection criteria for these analyses are whether the policy 
is important with respect to current and future challenges emerging from 
globalisation, for example, and whether the policy is important with respect 
to the represented policy field.
Second, our policy-specific approach avoids generalisations (e.g. ‘more or 
less Europe in taxation’) and zooms in on specific, well-defined policies. Thus, 
we hope to offer more specific advice for the ongoing reform debate in Europe, 
which needs more operational suggestions regarding very specific competence 
allocations instead of generalised preconceptions that are always suspected 
of being purely ideological statements.
Third, and related to the second point, the study is precise about its ‘counter-
factual’. This counterfactual is the conceptual alternative to the allocation of 
competences under the status quo. We do not just compare the current national 
(or European) responsibility with a European (or national) responsibility, but 
also make this conceptual alternative precise. For example, we specify the 
European counterfactual in asylum-policy responsibility as a model with a 
European Asylum Agency which takes over responsibility for the acceptance 
of refugees (until a decision has been made on the asylum application) and for 
the conduct of the asylum process throughout the territory of the Union. This 
specification offers a conceptually precise reference point for conducting a 
meaningful comparison.
Fourth, it is the ambition of the analysis to be evidence-based and to rely 
on quantified indicators as much as possible. For that purpose, we have further 
developed and operationalised the existing fiscal federalism criteria towards 
a uniform applicability across very different policy fields and specific policies. 
In particular, the indicators ‘spillover effects’ and ‘preference heterogeneity’ 
follow an identical quantification and assessment procedure. The analysis of 
the latter indicator is also a distinct feature compared to the studies by Alesina, 
Angeloni and Schuknecht (2005), ECORYS, CPB and IFO (2008), and Ederveen, 
Gelauff and Pelkmans (2008). In contrast to these studies, we do not investi-
gate the preferences of European citizens for a specific competence allocation 
at the national or the European level, but rather investigate the citizens’ prefer-
ences for the execution of the specific policy. Only if these preferences are 
sufficiently homogenous can the policy be centrally managed by the EU.
In choosing which policies to scrutinise, we have been led by a double objec-
tive. On the one hand, we want to cover a broad range of policy fields repre-
senting the most important dimensions of governmental tasks. On the other 
hand, meaningful quantifications can only be applied to specific, well-defined 
policies. We solved this double objective by choosing a specific policy for each 
of the main governmental policy fields. The latter are compiled on the basis 
of the UN classification of the functions of government (COFOG)1 in line with 
the distribution of government tasks presented by Watts (2008) (see Table 1 
for an overview of the selected policy fields). For each of these policy fields, 
we chose a policy that is 1) characterised by an overall importance in terms of 
current and future challenges for both the member states and the EU, and 2) 
a matter of generic importance with respect to the represented policy field to 
the extent deemed possible.
1
  See  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?cl=4.
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Table 1: 
Policy fields and chosen policies
Policy field Chosen policy
international relations 1) defence policy: national armies vs. a European army
2) development aid: national development aid vs. development aid 
allocated and financed by the EU
Justice and home affairs 3) asylum and refugee policy: national asylum and refugee policies vs. a 
European asylum agency
Finance and fiscal relations 4) corporate taxation: national corporate taxation policies vs. a common 
consolidated corporate Tax Base (cccTB)
Transportation, communications  
and regional development
5) railway freight transport policy: national railway systems vs. a  
 EU-financed railway system without technical or operational barriers
agriculture 6) agricultural policy: national policies for agriculture subsidies vs. the 
common agricultural policy (income protection)
European Monetary Union 7) Unemployment insurance: national (short-term) unemployment 
insurance policies vs. a European Unemployment insurance (EUi)
culture 8) post-secondary and tertiary education: national financing of higher 
education policies vs. a European financing approach
 
For each policy, we contrast the status quo with the counterfactual situa-
tion. In doing so, we rely on a clear distinction between national and supra-
national competences. However, as most policies are characterised by mixed 
competences (i.e. the EU and the member states share responsibilities), we 
decide in a first step whether the primary competence is on the national or 
the European level (this decision is taken after carefully evaluating current 
national and European legislation). In a second step, we base our quantifi-
cations on the respective counterfactual situation.
Following this procedure, various forms of cooperation between the EU 
and its member states are left out of consideration. While we do not argue 
that only a purely national or a purely European competence must be effec-
tive, a meaningful analysis of all possible forms of cooperation is beyond 
the scope of this project. We therefore interpret our results in terms of 
guiding tendency: If the current competence allocation is rather national 
and our results point towards a clearly European competence, reinforced 
cooperation can be seen as the first step towards increased efficiency.
Furthermore, when comparing the status quo and the counterfactual, we 
do not account for possible changes in the member states’ financial net-payer 
and net-receiver positions. While one could argue that the ‘spillover effects’ 
indicator already provides such an analysis, the results of this indicator 
must be interpreted in terms of a general cost-benefit comparison rather 
than with respect to actual payment flows. In contrast, since the main focus 
of this study lies on overall efficiency, we argue that if the latter is increased 
due to an efficiency-increasing competence reallocation, it should be easier 
for member states to negotiate compensation schemes that account for 
potential losers from the competence reallocation.
Finally, the analysis will result in recommendations on the allocation of 
competences for the specific policies we have selected. These recommen-
dations must not be (mis)understood as statements on the broader policy 
fields in general. Take, for example, the policy field ‘finance and fiscal 
relations’ with the policy ‘corporate taxation’. In this case, if we recom-
mend a European approach to the determination of the corporate tax base, 
the same conclusion does not necessarily apply for any other type of tax 
without further scrutiny. Nevertheless, the selected policy should offer 
guidance for the policy field as a whole in terms of possible arguments and 
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methods, which must be included in any meaningful testing in a specific 
policy context.
The structure of this report is as follows: In the next section, we present 
its method and explain our indicators. This also includes a detailed descrip-
tion of the assessment procedure for each indicator. The results of our 
analyses are presented in the subsequent section. Based on this outcome, 
we supply detailed policy conclusions for all policies. Finally, the report 
closes with a presentation of the investigated case studies.
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vi. Method and indicator description
WeighteD SCoRing methoD
We use indicators capturing arguments from both the first and second gener-
ation of fiscal federalism, and combine these indicators quantitatively by 
applying the weighted scoring method. The latter is a decision-making tech-
nique that allows for an assessment of both qualitative and quantitative indi-
cators, which can be weighed against each other and are finally summarised 
in a decision score for each policy field. Accordingly, the decision on which 
policies should be allocated to the national or the European level is based on 
a comprehensible procedure with similar criteria and identical weightings 
for all policy fields.
In a nutshell, the method’s procedure is as follows: First, we need to 
identify the relevant criteria. Second, the criteria are evaluated for each policy 
field using an identical scale. Third, the individual criteria are weighted 
against each other. And, fourth, a final score based on a weighted average is 
calculated for each policy field. 
For each criterion and policy, we assign scores on a scale ranging from 1 
to 5, with a score equal to 3 indicating an indifferent position. That is, based 
on this criterion, neither a national nor a European competence is preferable. 
Scores smaller than 3 point towards a national allocation of the policy (a 
score of 2 indicates a weakly national preference, while a score of 1 points 
towards a clearly national allocation). On the other hand, scores larger than 
3 indicate that the policy field should be located on the European level (again, 
a score of 4 indicates a weakly European preference, while a score of 5 points 
towards a clearly European competence allocation; see Figure 1).
Figure 1:  
Indicator scoring for the allocation of competences
1 2 3 4 5
clearly 
national
weakly 
national
indifferent
weakly 
European
clearly 
European
Below, we explain the indicators and the general procedure for their assess-
ment in the context of the weighted scoring method. For each indicator, we 
first explain the theoretical reasoning and then define its assessment. 
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Indicator description
To answer the question of the optimal division of competences between the 
EU and its member states, we examine public goods and investigate whether 
they should be provided at the national or the European level. An inherent 
property of public goods is non-excludability – that is, depending on the type 
of public good, it is only possible to exclude citizens from consumption (at 
least to a certain degree (Samuelson 1954, 1955)). These properties might cause 
externalities (costs or benefits that affect a market participant who did not 
choose to incur that cost or benefit) which may result in free riding, as those 
who benefit from goods or services do not (adequately) pay for them.
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Without loss of generality, for instance, assume two governments (A and B) 
with identical citizens. In the case of a private good with perfect excluda-
bility (i.e. citizens not willing to pay for the good can be excluded from 
consumption; examples are food, clothing, cinemas and private parks), each 
government would provide the good as long as its marginal utility to citizens 
exceeds the marginal costs of provision. 
In the case of a public good, however, the governments must consider that 
providing the public good affects not only the utility to its own citizens, but 
also the utility to the citizens of other jurisdictions. For instance, if Govern-
ment A provides the optimal amount of the public good for its own citizens, 
Government B could free ride by contributing nothing to the provision of the 
public good by Government A but still use the benefits arising from the 
provided public good for its own citizens. It is reasonable to assume that both 
governments are aware of the free-riding possibility so that both assume 
that the other government will provide the public good in the optimal amount 
(note that an inherent property of public goods is that once the public good 
is provided, all citizens can use the public good irrespective of their individual 
contribution). The result would be underprovision of the public good, meaning 
that it will be provided less than in a socially optimal scenario. The worst 
case would be zero provision in the case of full non-excludability and great 
externalities (Stiglitz 1988). That is, each government would refuse to provide 
the public good because other governments can free ride on its provision.
Possible solutions to the detriment of the citizens in need of this kind of 
public good would be compensation payments for the providing government, 
coordination between governments for the provision of the public good or, 
in the case of a federal system, central provision of the public good. 
The more recent literature on fiscal federalism also stresses the role of 
incentive effects as an important yardstick for measuring the allocation of 
competences in a federation. According to the correspondence principle in 
public finance, the federal level that benefits from a public good should be 
identical with the level that finances this good and that takes the decision 
to provide it (Kornai 1979). In contrast, if a certain federal level decides on 
the provision of a public good but does not have to bear the (full) costs of its 
provision, incentives for overprovision and thus free riding increase. This 
problem is growing larger with increasing centralisation, as subordinate 
levels often at least partially contribute to the provision of public goods.
The abovementioned problems arise in the context of the EU, as well. For 
instance, in case of a national competence for a specific policy with large 
externalities (i.e. the specific member state’s decision also affects all other 
member states), the incentive to free ride on the provision of other member 
states is high. However, free riding might also be present in the case of an 
exclusively European competence. As the member states finance large parts 
of the EU budget and thus contribute to the policy even if it is provided by the 
EU, the member states’ individual benefit from the centrally provided public 
good might deviate from the member states’ individual contributions.
We aim therefore at identifying free riding both under the status quo and 
in a counterfactual situation, and analyse whether a reallocation of compe-
tences can help to reduce free riding.
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Procedure
The assessment procedure comprises two steps: First, we investigate the 
specific character of the respective policy field to assess whether cross-ju-
risdictional spillover effects might be possible and economically meaningful. 
For instance, there is a clear case for meaningful spillover effects in the 
provision of national security or combatting environmental pollution. We 
therefore only conduct a quantitative free-riding analysis if the qualitative 
assessment of the first stage suggests that spillover effects are prevalent and 
meaningful. When this is the case, we compare contributions and payoffs 
for each member state under both the status quo and in the counterfactual 
situation. We aim at identifying net-contributor and net-receiver states as 
well as the amount of net payments and net contributions in both situations, 
and at assessing how the burden-sharing changes when moving from the 
status quo to the counterfactual situation. 
While the analysis is calibrated for each policy field, which especially holds 
true for the quantitative assessment of payoff structures, the following general 
procedures are applied to measure the member states’ contributions:
•	 In the case of national provision, we use the member states’ national share 
in the sum of all member states’ expenditures or other contributions in 
this policy field as an indicator for the contributions of individual member 
states.2 However, this procedure is only possible in the case of a national 
status quo.
•	 In the case of supranational provision, we use the member states’ financing 
share in the EU budget as an indicator for a member state’s contribution.
Since both benefits and contributions are measured in per cent relative to 
the sum of the member states’ benefits and contributions, the resulting net 
position of a member state is also measured in per cent. We then compare 
how the distribution of net-receiver and net-contributor positions changes 
when moving from a national to a supranational provision. For instance, if 
a European solution leads to a higher correlation between member states’ 
shares in benefits and burdens, and thus reduces free riding compared to a 
national competence, a European competence should be preferred to the 
national solution.3
Score assessment and caveats
We focus on the difference in the distribution of free riding under the status 
quo and in the counterfactual situation by measuring the change in the 
standard deviation4 of net benefits. A high standard deviation means that 
some countries have high burdens and relatively low benefits, while other 
countries have high benefits and relatively low burdens. The latter implies 
free riding, which is reduced if the transition from the national to the 
2  we do not focus solely on expenditures because sometimes other indicators might offer better approaches 
(e.g. the number of hosted refugees in the case of asylum and refugee policy, or railway kilometres in the case 
of railway freight transport policy).
3  note that, due to the fact that we compare differences of percentage figures, the mean is always close to zero, 
implying that a more equal distribution reduces the overall amount of free riding. 
4  The standard deviation quantifies the variation of data points around the mean. a standard deviation close 
to zero indicates that the data points on average tend to be very close to the mean, while a high standard 
deviation indicates that the data points on average are spread out over a wider range of values.
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European responsibility reduces the standard deviation. In contrast, if the 
standard deviation increases due to a change from a national to a European 
responsibility, the extent of free riding increases and the policy field should 
be located on the national level. 
The scores for the weighted scoring method are determined as shown in 
Figure 2. The scoring decisions are based on the distribution of realised heter-
ogeneity scores in the various case studies. The minimum and maximum 
figures of a percentage change in the standard deviation are -70 per cent and 
57 per cent, respectively. The remaining realised values are rather equally 
distributed between these extremums. We therefore assign an indifferent 
score if the standard deviation changes within a bandwidth of ± 15 per cent 
around zero. Changes larger than 15 per cent but smaller than 45 per cent 
indicate a weakly national competence allocation. Finally, there is a clear 
case for a national provision if the change in the standard deviation is greater 
than 45 per cent (the opposite holds true for negative figures). Note that a 
change of 45 per cent already marks a non-negligible shift pointing towards 
efficiency gains from a reallocation of competences.
Figure 2: 
Scoring decision for spillover effects
Change in standard deviation when moving from a national to a European responsibility is:
> 45% 15% < × ≤ 45% −15% ≤ × ≤ 15% −45% ≤ × < -15% < −45%
1 2 3 4 5
clearly 
national
weakly 
national
indifferent
weakly
European
clearly 
European
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that an unequal distribution might be 
the result not only of potential free-riding behaviour, but also of diverging 
preferences. For instance, some countries could host more refugees than 
others due to philanthropic preferences (as is discussed in the case study on 
asylum and refugee policy), or defence expenditures in some countries might 
be particularly low due to a high share of pacifistic citizens (as is discussed 
in the case study on defence policy). It is thus important to reflect the results 
in combination with our preference indicators. 
eConomieS oF SCAle
Indicator description
Economies of scale are the cost advantages of larger entities (e.g. enterprises 
or countries) in providing a specific good or service; in other words, a larger 
entity is able to produce the good with lower per-unit costs. Transferred to the 
public sector and its production of public goods and services, economies of 
scale refer to decreasing costs per capita. 
If economies of scale are present in the provision of public goods and services, 
there is a strong case for a central – or, in our case, European – provision.
Procedure
The assessment procedure comprises two steps: First, we investigate the 
specific character of the respective policy field to assess whether cross-ju-
risdictional spillover effects might be possible and economically meaningful. 
For instance, there is a clear case for meaningful spillover effects in the 
provision of national security or combatting environmental pollution. We 
therefore only conduct a quantitative free-riding analysis if the qualitative 
assessment of the first stage suggests that spillover effects are prevalent and 
meaningful. When this is the case, we compare contributions and payoffs 
for each member state under both the status quo and in the counterfactual 
situation. We aim at identifying net-contributor and net-receiver states as 
well as the amount of net payments and net contributions in both situations, 
and at assessing how the burden-sharing changes when moving from the 
status quo to the counterfactual situation. 
While the analysis is calibrated for each policy field, which especially holds 
true for the quantitative assessment of payoff structures, the following general 
procedures are applied to measure the member states’ contributions:
•	 In the case of national provision, we use the member states’ national share 
in the sum of all member states’ expenditures or other contributions in 
this policy field as an indicator for the contributions of individual member 
states.2 However, this procedure is only possible in the case of a national 
status quo.
•	 In the case of supranational provision, we use the member states’ financing 
share in the EU budget as an indicator for a member state’s contribution.
Since both benefits and contributions are measured in per cent relative to 
the sum of the member states’ benefits and contributions, the resulting net 
position of a member state is also measured in per cent. We then compare 
how the distribution of net-receiver and net-contributor positions changes 
when moving from a national to a supranational provision. For instance, if 
a European solution leads to a higher correlation between member states’ 
shares in benefits and burdens, and thus reduces free riding compared to a 
national competence, a European competence should be preferred to the 
national solution.3
Score assessment and caveats
We focus on the difference in the distribution of free riding under the status 
quo and in the counterfactual situation by measuring the change in the 
standard deviation4 of net benefits. A high standard deviation means that 
some countries have high burdens and relatively low benefits, while other 
countries have high benefits and relatively low burdens. The latter implies 
free riding, which is reduced if the transition from the national to the 
2  we do not focus solely on expenditures because sometimes other indicators might offer better approaches 
(e.g. the number of hosted refugees in the case of asylum and refugee policy, or railway kilometres in the case 
of railway freight transport policy).
3  note that, due to the fact that we compare differences of percentage figures, the mean is always close to zero, 
implying that a more equal distribution reduces the overall amount of free riding. 
4  The standard deviation quantifies the variation of data points around the mean. a standard deviation close 
to zero indicates that the data points on average tend to be very close to the mean, while a high standard 
deviation indicates that the data points on average are spread out over a wider range of values.
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Procedure and caveats
Input-oriented indicators
The estimation of a cost function based, for instance, on the costs per capita 
relative to the absolute size of a country is one possibility for detecting econ-
omies of scale. Using this calculation and extrapolating the results towards 
the total population of the EU can give a first hint about how per capita costs 
would evolve if the EU were in charge of providing the specific service. Other 
examples refer to the share of administration or transaction costs relative to 
the respective member state’s total costs for providing the policy.
However, the calculation of a cost function refers only to the input side 
(i.e. factors that are used in the production process to produce output). The 
necessary assumption in this case is that output levels (i.e. the amount of 
produced public goods or services) do not vary and are comparable between 
large and small countries. If this is not the case – for instance, if expendi-
ture per capita is decreasing with population size but output levels differ 
between different countries – the interpretation is meaningless because it 
is not obvious whether the cost advantage results from economies of scale 
or from differing levels of public good provision. Additionally, in most cases, 
the relationship between per capita costs and population may be positive 
because smaller countries, in particular, provide fewer services. Such a 
comparison would then falsely result in the conclusion of diseconomies of 
scale. Finally, step fixed costs5 and increasing output levels of larger units 
might be a problem for the estimation of a cost function because some public 
goods or services might only be provided by larger jurisdictions (e.g. Oates 
(1988) refers to the so-called ‘zoo effect’ , meaning that only large cities 
provide public services like a zoo). In this case, unit costs do not decrease at 
all or decrease only slightly, which results in inappropriate conclusions based 
on the estimated cost function.
A careful selection of the comparison countries offers a possible solution 
to these problems. Instead of comparing all EU member states or using infor-
mation from the national level, one could also use subsamples. For instance, 
if we compare unit costs of German states, the analysis does not suffer from 
biases resulting from varying institutional environments, as is the case when 
comparing EU member states. Or, put differently, the distortions arising from 
varying environmental surroundings in the case of an intra-country compar-
ison are less severe than in the case of an inter-country comparison. This kind 
of investigation, however, comes at the cost of limited external validity – that 
is, we have to discuss whether and how the results of a subnational/national 
comparison can be transferred to the national/supranational level.
Output-oriented indicators
Another possibility for detecting economies of scale refers to the output side (i.e. 
the quantity of goods or services produced in a given time period). This compar-
ison of output per capita and population represents the other side of the coin 
because economies of scale are also present if larger entities provide a dispro-
portionally increasing output per capita. In the extreme, it could even be possible 
5  Step fixed costs are constant over a low-level shift in activity but change incrementally when the activity 
shifts substantially.
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that a national provision has not only a cost disadvantage over a supranational 
provision, but would not even be possible in the case of certain services – espe-
cially in case of small member states. This is a variant of the economies of scale 
criterion, which assumes a discontinuity in the cost structure resulting in a lack 
of problem-solving capacities at the subnational or national level. 
To assess this criterion, a production function is estimated instead of a cost 
function.6 However, again, the assumptions must be comparable. One has to 
ensure that the underlying preferences towards the amount of output provided 
are comparable across countries. If this is not the case, some countries might 
have higher output levels per capita that only reflect the countries’ specific 
circumstances. For instance, output levels in the field of defence policy differ 
between EU member states owing to different perceptions of foreign threats 
(e.g. the Greek-Turkish conflict over borders in the Aegean Sea) or a country’s 
international role (e.g. the UK’s permanent membership in the UN Security 
Council and the ties to its former empire).
Input-output indicators
Combining both indicators offers a solution to the abovementioned caveats. 
Instead of using input or output indicators only, one could calculate the ratio 
of output and input indicators. The result gives information on the provided 
amount of output for a comparable amount of input (or, vice versa, the amount 
of input for a comparable amount of output). However, the application of this 
indicator depends on the availability of sufficient data/information. 
Score assessment
The scores are derived from the slopes of the estimated cost or production 
functions, which represent the abovementioned input and output indicators. 
For instance, if we know for sure that output levels are comparable or can 
directly control the amount of output provided, a disproportional decreasing 
slope of the cost function would result in a clearly European score equal to 5. 
In contrast, if neither the cost-function estimation nor the recent literature 
or qualitative deliberations indicate the presence of economies of scale, we 
assign a clearly national score equal to 1. In addition, qualitative assess-
ments – such as step fixed costs, higher problem-solving capacities or under-
lying output levels – are used to determine the scores.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Indicator description
Voters and elected politicians may have different views about whether respon-
sibility for a certain policy field should be placed in the national or the 
European sphere. However, these preference analyses on the preferred 
division of competences are (emphatically) not part of this study.
6  while the assumption of economies of scale in the production of public services basically results in a convex 
production function, it is also possible that efficiency gains can only be realised for a subset of population 
figures. For instance, if the underlying production function is of a classic nature (i.e. first positive increasing 
marginal returns, then positive decreasing marginal returns and, finally, negative marginal returns), a maxi-
mum production is reached, implying that crossing the maximum results in negative production effects.
Procedure and caveats
Input-oriented indicators
The estimation of a cost function based, for instance, on the costs per capita 
relative to the absolute size of a country is one possibility for detecting econ-
omies of scale. Using this calculation and extrapolating the results towards 
the total population of the EU can give a first hint about how per capita costs 
would evolve if the EU were in charge of providing the specific service. Other 
examples refer to the share of administration or transaction costs relative to 
the respective member state’s total costs for providing the policy.
However, the calculation of a cost function refers only to the input side 
(i.e. factors that are used in the production process to produce output). The 
necessary assumption in this case is that output levels (i.e. the amount of 
produced public goods or services) do not vary and are comparable between 
large and small countries. If this is not the case – for instance, if expendi-
ture per capita is decreasing with population size but output levels differ 
between different countries – the interpretation is meaningless because it 
is not obvious whether the cost advantage results from economies of scale 
or from differing levels of public good provision. Additionally, in most cases, 
the relationship between per capita costs and population may be positive 
because smaller countries, in particular, provide fewer services. Such a 
comparison would then falsely result in the conclusion of diseconomies of 
scale. Finally, step fixed costs5 and increasing output levels of larger units 
might be a problem for the estimation of a cost function because some public 
goods or services might only be provided by larger jurisdictions (e.g. Oates 
(1988) refers to the so-called ‘zoo effect’ , meaning that only large cities 
provide public services like a zoo). In this case, unit costs do not decrease at 
all or decrease only slightly, which results in inappropriate conclusions based 
on the estimated cost function.
A careful selection of the comparison countries offers a possible solution 
to these problems. Instead of comparing all EU member states or using infor-
mation from the national level, one could also use subsamples. For instance, 
if we compare unit costs of German states, the analysis does not suffer from 
biases resulting from varying institutional environments, as is the case when 
comparing EU member states. Or, put differently, the distortions arising from 
varying environmental surroundings in the case of an intra-country compar-
ison are less severe than in the case of an inter-country comparison. This kind 
of investigation, however, comes at the cost of limited external validity – that 
is, we have to discuss whether and how the results of a subnational/national 
comparison can be transferred to the national/supranational level.
Output-oriented indicators
Another possibility for detecting economies of scale refers to the output side (i.e. 
the quantity of goods or services produced in a given time period). This compar-
ison of output per capita and population represents the other side of the coin 
because economies of scale are also present if larger entities provide a dispro-
portionally increasing output per capita. In the extreme, it could even be possible 
5  Step fixed costs are constant over a low-level shift in activity but change incrementally when the activity 
shifts substantially.
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In contrast, we analyse a different type of preference heterogeneity: the 
heterogeneity of views among the member states’ citizens with respect to a 
desirable character and intensity of a certain policy (e.g. the desired level of 
redistribution and insurance through the welfare state). If there is no 
consensus in favour of a specific policy across EU countries but a broad 
consensus within countries, the policy field should be located at the national 
level because a sub-central autonomy allows policies to be tailored to the 
differing preferences of voters.7 In contrast, if there is a strong consensus 
about the way the policy should be adapted, the EU could decide about the 
policy without welfare losses.8
Procedure
For assessing the preference heterogeneity of European citizens with respect 
to various policy fields, we aim at using the Eurobarometer questionnaire 
whenever possible. This questionnaire consists of regular questionnaires 
(Standard Eurobarometer), which have two waves per year, and non-regular 
questionnaires (Special Eurobarometer), which are based on in-depth 
thematic studies carried out for various services of the European Commis-
sion or other EU institutions. Each survey consists of approximately 1,000 
face-to-face interviews per country.
It is important to stress that we are not primarily interested in mean 
answers. In other words, for the purpose of this indicator, it is not impor-
tant to know whether respondents are in favour of or against a specific 
policy or want to have more or less policy intervention. Rather, we are 
specifically interested in the distribution of answers across countries. We 
want to know whether the preferences of European citizens are aligned 
(again, regardless of whether they are aligned in favour of or against specific 
measures) or highly diverse. 
Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, such evidence directly points 
towards an assignment of the specific policy field to the national or the 
European level. If preferences are highly diverse, a one-size-fits-all policy 
decided on the supranational level is rather detrimental. If, in contrast, 
preferences are highly aligned, a European authority is able to decide on a 
policy intervention with relatively small welfare losses.
To quantify the distribution of citizens’ preferences, we focus on the 
standard deviation. A standard deviation close to zero indicates a low heter-
ogeneity, while a high standard deviation indicates a high heterogeneity.
A major drawback of using this indicator is that the standard deviation does 
not allow for a comparison of distributions with varying scales. For instance, 
one cannot directly compare a standard error of 0.3 on a scale ranging from 
0 to 1 with a standard error of 3 resulting from a scale ranging from 1 to 6, 
as the underlying scales affect the size of the standard error. However, in 
the context of this project and by using Eurobarometer questionnaires, we 
can always express answer categories on an identical scale ranging from 0 
7  in the fiscal federalism literature, this assumption is discussed as the ‘uniformity constraint’ of central public 
good provision. The argument is that political, legal and information issues may prevent a central level from 
offering services which differ across regions.
8  it is important to stress that we do not focus on diverging preferences for single countries but on the overall con-
sensus. if some countries deviate from the overall consensus, it should be easier to compensate these countries 
in the political process than it would be in the case in which the member states’ opinions are completely divided.
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to 100 per cent. This allows us to compare the standard deviation across 
various case studies and Eurobarometer questions, and to use this measure 
as the basis for the quantification of this indicator. 
As a result of the identical scale ranging from 0 to 100, the extreme values 
of the standard deviation are 0 (all answers are equal to the mean) and 50 
(half of the answers are located on the left border and half on the right 
border). This is also graphically illustrated by Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 in 
Figure 3 and Figure 4. In Scenario 1, a low heterogeneity of preferences is 
presented – that is, all answers are very close to the mean – resulting in a 
very small standard deviation (see Figure 3).9
Figure 3:  
example of very low heterogeneity
Scenario 1: very low heterogeneity
Sample question with very low heterogeneity, i.e. agreement is highly aligned.
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Figure  3:
Example of very low heterogeneity
Median 50
Std. Dev. (σ) 5
Heterogeneity 10 %
In contrast, Scenario 2 is the example for the maximum heterogeneity of 
preferences – that is, half of the answers are equal to zero and half of the 
answers are equal to one – which results in a standard deviation that is equal 
to the mean (i.e. the standard deviation is equal to 50; see Figure 4). 
Since we know the maximum standard deviation, it is possible to express 
the actual standard deviation as a percentage of this extremum. This ratio 
(actual standard deviation/maximum standard deviation) is defined as our 
indicator of preference heterogeneity, with ‘Heterogeneity’ having a scale 
between 0 and 100 per cent (see Figure 3 and Figure 4, as an example).
9  note that this result is unaffected by the mean itself, meaning that it is possible to shift the complete 
 distribution to the left or to right without changing the standard deviation.
In contrast, we analyse a different type of preference heterogeneity: the 
heterogeneity of views among the member states’ citizens with respect to a 
desirable character and intensity of a certain policy (e.g. the desired level of 
redistribution and insurance through the welfare state). If there is no 
consensus in favour of a specific policy across EU countries but a broad 
consensus within countries, the policy field should be located at the national 
level because a sub-central autonomy allows policies to be tailored to the 
differing preferences of voters.7 In contrast, if there is a strong consensus 
about the way the policy should be adapted, the EU could decide about the 
policy without welfare losses.8
Procedure
For assessing the preference heterogeneity of European citizens with respect 
to various policy fields, we aim at using the Eurobarometer questionnaire 
whenever possible. This questionnaire consists of regular questionnaires 
(Standard Eurobarometer), which have two waves per year, and non-regular 
questionnaires (Special Eurobarometer), which are based on in-depth 
thematic studies carried out for various services of the European Commis-
sion or other EU institutions. Each survey consists of approximately 1,000 
face-to-face interviews per country.
It is important to stress that we are not primarily interested in mean 
answers. In other words, for the purpose of this indicator, it is not impor-
tant to know whether respondents are in favour of or against a specific 
policy or want to have more or less policy intervention. Rather, we are 
specifically interested in the distribution of answers across countries. We 
want to know whether the preferences of European citizens are aligned 
(again, regardless of whether they are aligned in favour of or against specific 
measures) or highly diverse. 
Based on the theory of fiscal federalism, such evidence directly points 
towards an assignment of the specific policy field to the national or the 
European level. If preferences are highly diverse, a one-size-fits-all policy 
decided on the supranational level is rather detrimental. If, in contrast, 
preferences are highly aligned, a European authority is able to decide on a 
policy intervention with relatively small welfare losses.
To quantify the distribution of citizens’ preferences, we focus on the 
standard deviation. A standard deviation close to zero indicates a low heter-
ogeneity, while a high standard deviation indicates a high heterogeneity.
A major drawback of using this indicator is that the standard deviation does 
not allow for a comparison of distributions with varying scales. For instance, 
one cannot directly compare a standard error of 0.3 on a scale ranging from 
0 to 1 with a standard error of 3 resulting from a scale ranging from 1 to 6, 
as the underlying scales affect the size of the standard error. However, in 
the context of this project and by using Eurobarometer questionnaires, we 
can always express answer categories on an identical scale ranging from 0 
7  in the fiscal federalism literature, this assumption is discussed as the ‘uniformity constraint’ of central public 
good provision. The argument is that political, legal and information issues may prevent a central level from 
offering services which differ across regions.
8  it is important to stress that we do not focus on diverging preferences for single countries but on the overall con-
sensus. if some countries deviate from the overall consensus, it should be easier to compensate these countries 
in the political process than it would be in the case in which the member states’ opinions are completely divided.
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Figure 4:  
example of maximum heterogeneity
Scenario 2: maximum heterogeneity
Sample question with maximum heterogeneity, i.e. agreement is split into two extremes.
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Figure  4:
Example of maximum heterogeneity
Median 50
Std. Dev. (σ) 50
Heterogeneity 100 %
In the baseline scenarios, all statistics are calculated without weighting. This 
implies that regardless of the size or political power of a member state, all 
countries are treated equally. 
To check for the robustness of our heterogeneity indicator, the standard 
deviation is recalculated by using the population size in 2014 as the weight. 
All countries obtain a weight according to their population size, with weights 
summing up to 100 per cent. As a result, for example, the weighted opinion 
in Germany counts 9.5 times as much as the opinion in Austria.
Such a weighting affects the interpretation. In other words, in contrast 
to the unweighted baseline results, the weighted results take political power 
into account. For example, if the preferences in the largest member states 
(e.g. France, Germany, Italy and the UK) are highly aligned but deviate from 
the preferences in smaller member states (e.g. Luxembourg and Malta), 
there is only little variation and the resulting heterogeneity index is rather 
small. In contrast, if Germany’s preferences are highly aligned with prefer-
ences in Luxembourg and Malta, but preferences in France, Italy and the UK 
deviate from the German position, the resulting heterogeneity indicator is 
comparatively high.
Score assessment
Our primary assessment is based on the unweighted heterogeneity indices.10 
The scores are determined as shown in Figure 5. As we cannot expect to detect 
extremum results, such as a complete equal or unequal distribution, we apply 
a range stretching from 20 to 80 per cent. As for the cut-off in case of spill-
over effects, this spectrum already covers a non-negligible range of prefer-
ence heterogeneity among the citizens of the member states.
10  The weighted results will be included in the case studies’ output figures.
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Figure 5:  
Scoring decision for preference heterogeneity
heterogeneity score in per cent is in the interval:
[80,68] [68,56] [56,44] [44,32] [32,20]
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inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
Indicator description
This criterion is based on the assumption that the internal market is an 
indispensable element of European integration no matter how other compe-
tences of the EU may develop. Taking this as a starting point, it is essential 
that the division of competences between the EU and the national level is 
consistent with the principles of the internal market (e.g. the guarantee of 
identical rules and basic freedoms). To the extent that national policy compe-
tences endanger these principles, this could be a specific argument for 
centralisation. 
Procedure, score assessment and caveats
To assess this criterion, we undertake a comprehensive stocktaking of the 
status quo and how a shift in policy competences away from or to the EU 
would affect the internal market. If a renewal of competences is neutral to 
the internal market – that is, if there is no difference between national and 
supranational provision – we assign a neutral score equal to 3, which serves 
as a benchmark. If a location on the supranational level is more beneficial 
to the internal market than a location on the national/subnational level, a 
higher score is assigned. The opposite holds true if a location on the national 
level has a rather beneficial effect.
However, the indicator partly suffers from a potential pro-centralisation 
bias, meaning that it is rather conceivable that a shift of competences from 
the national level to the European level would be beneficial to the internal 
market, whereas it is difficult to imagine that a policy reallocation from the 
European level to the national level would benefit the internal market. We 
therefore base our analysis mainly on current exceptions from the internal 
market, and ask whether these exceptions would be resolved if the compe-
tence were shifted to the EU. However, if the public good or service is decen-
trally provided but there are no obstacles to the internal market, a neutral 
score will be assigned. Furthermore, the caveat applies that instead of central-
ising the policy field, alternative measures (e.g. better coordination) may be 
sufficient for tackling related problems.
Figure 4:  
example of maximum heterogeneity
Scenario 2: maximum heterogeneity
Sample question with maximum heterogeneity, i.e. agreement is split into two extremes.
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Figure  4:
Example of maximum heterogeneity
Median 50
Std. Dev. (σ) 50
Heterogeneity 100 %
In the baseline scenarios, all statistics are calculated without weighting. This 
implies that regardless of the size or political power of a member state, all 
countries are treated equally. 
To check for the robustness of our heterogeneity indicator, the standard 
deviation is recalculated by using the population size in 2014 as the weight. 
All countries obtain a weight according to their population size, with weights 
summing up to 100 per cent. As a result, for example, the weighted opinion 
in Germany counts 9.5 times as much as the opinion in Austria.
Such a weighting affects the interpretation. In other words, in contrast 
to the unweighted baseline results, the weighted results take political power 
into account. For example, if the preferences in the largest member states 
(e.g. France, Germany, Italy and the UK) are highly aligned but deviate from 
the preferences in smaller member states (e.g. Luxembourg and Malta), 
there is only little variation and the resulting heterogeneity index is rather 
small. In contrast, if Germany’s preferences are highly aligned with prefer-
ences in Luxembourg and Malta, but preferences in France, Italy and the UK 
deviate from the German position, the resulting heterogeneity indicator is 
comparatively high.
Score assessment
Our primary assessment is based on the unweighted heterogeneity indices.10 
The scores are determined as shown in Figure 5. As we cannot expect to detect 
extremum results, such as a complete equal or unequal distribution, we apply 
a range stretching from 20 to 80 per cent. As for the cut-off in case of spill-
over effects, this spectrum already covers a non-negligible range of prefer-
ence heterogeneity among the citizens of the member states.
10  The weighted results will be included in the case studies’ output figures.
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ComPetition
Indicator description
The importance of competition for an optimal allocation of policy fields is 
stressed by authors of the second generation of fiscal federalism (e.g. Oates 
2005; Weingast 2009). There are two contrasting views: On the one hand, 
Oates (1999) stresses the merits of decentralised policymaking since it offers 
the chance for policy innovations (‘yardstick competition’). In other words, 
as Oates (1999: 1132) puts it, “in a setting of imperfect information with learn-
ing-by-doing, there are potential gains from experimentation with a variety 
of policies for addressing social and economic problems” when different 
jurisdictions compete on best practice solutions. In this sense, a decentral-
ised allocation of competences functions as an innovation laboratory on best 
practises. Examples refer, for instance, to unemployment insurance policies 
or emission trading systems in the US, which were first implemented by the 
states and only later adopted on the national level, and to the introduction 
of a federal ‘debt brake’ in Switzerland, which also affected a debt brake 
reform in Germany. On the other hand, there is the threat of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ , that is, that efficient standards may erode as a result of increasing 
competition. This argument can be most easily explained for taxation-re-
lated decisions. For instance, if competing jurisdictions are allowed to choose 
their own tax rates, the competition between the different jurisdictions for 
more or less mobile individuals and firms can incentivise jurisdictions to 
attract consumers by reducing tax rates. In the end, however, negative spill-
over effects can result in tax rates that are too small overall compared to an 
efficient level (Wilson 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986).
Procedure, score assessment and caveats
We aim at a qualitative, evidence-based assessment of this criterion. In other 
words, for each policy field, both sides of the coin – possible merits from 
‘yardstick competition’ and possible drawbacks from a threat of a ‘race to the 
bottom’ , – are investigated and contrasted. The analysis covers both best 
practice examples in the case of ‘yardstick competition’ as well as examples 
of eroding standards due to a ‘race to the bottom’. We then assess the rela-
tive strength of positive and negative aspects to assess whether decentral 
competition is more beneficial or detrimental.
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vii. Case Study 1: 
 Agricultural policy
Current and future challenges
European farms are characterised by their small average unit sizes11; the fact 
that they are predominantly family-operated businesses; their widespread 
locations even in exposed areas, such as the Alps or Lapland (European Parlia-
ment 2014); and their adaptation to heterogeneous economic, social and 
climatic conditions (see, e.g., Brouwer 2006). As a result, production costs for 
agricultural commodities in Europe tend to be higher than in other regions 
of the world. With increasing global economic integration and the reduction 
or even abolishment of import tariffs on agricultural products, European 
farmers have had to and continue to adjust to global market prices which 
have been lower than EU market prices (Anania 2009).
Besides increased price pressure and general technological progress, high 
costs for farm machinery and socioeconomic factors (e.g. declining attrac-
tiveness of the countryside due to a reduction in rural infrastructure) have 
led to a decrease in the number of farmers and a consolidation of farms in 
the EU (European Parliament 2015b). Figure 1 shows the development of the 
EU farming structure since 1990. In the EU-12, the number of farms shrank 
by 43 per cent between 1990 and 2013, from 7.3 million to 4.1 million. In the 
same time horizon, total utilised agricultural area in the EU-12 remained 
constant, at between 115 and 120 million hectares. The same pattern of 
consolidation can also be found in the EU-27 (i.e. before the accession of 
Croatia). With the accession of 10 Eastern European member states in 2004, 
the number of farms rose to 14.5 million, though this figure fell to 10.7 million 
farms within a decade. The utilised agricultural area in the EU-27 is stagnating 
at 172 million hectares. Hence, fewer farms utilise the same area of land, 
meaning that the average size of European farms has increased and has 
continued to increase, especially in recent years.
11  according to Eurostat, the average farm size in the EU in 2013 was 16.1 hectares. compared, e.g., with the 
average size of US farms (ca. 176 hectares) (USda 2014:8),  European farms can be classified as small-scale. 
However, compared with those in asia or africa, European farms are big (see, e.g., Masters et al. 2013).
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Figure 1:
Development of farming structure in the EU
More important for assessing the vitality of the European agricultural sector 
is its performance. In Figure 2, we show the self-sufficiency ratios for agri-
cultural products in 2013. A ratio of 100 per cent implies that domestic demand 
for items of this agricultural commodity group can be theoretically met by 
domestic supply. If the self-sufficiency ratio is greater than 100 per cent, it 
means that production of items in this product group exceeds domestic 
demand within the EU. If the self-sufficiency ratio is lower than 100 per cent, 
it means that domestic demand for these agricultural products could not have 
been met without imports. For roughly half of the agricultural product groups, 
the self-sufficiency index exceeded 100 per cent; for the other half, it was 
clearly below 100 per cent. However, when looking at the self-sufficiency 
ratios of single items, significant heterogeneity within a product group can 
be found. For example, the product category ‘fruits’ had a self-sufficiency 
ratio of 77 per cent in 2013. But when looking at single fruits, the self-suf-
ficiency ratio for apples and grapes was close to 100 per cent, while the 
self-sufficiency ratio for oranges and mandarins respectively for bananas 
was 61 respectively 9 per cent.
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Taken together, the demand for agricultural prod-
ucts within the EU is hardly met by domestic 
production. This can also be seen when looking at 
the international trade in agricultural commodities. 
Figure 3 presents the development of international 
trade in agricultural commodities between 2002 and 
2013. Since 2002, the EU has steadily been in a 
net-importing position, that is, agricultural imports 
exceed agricultural exports in value and tonnage.12 
However, Figure 3 also reveals two other remark-
able aspects: First, the level of imports is stagnating 
at around 1.2 million tonnes, while the value of the 
imports is rising. Hence, each unit of import became 
more and more expensive. Second, EU member 
states increased their exports of agricultural 
commodities from less than 600 million tonnes to 
almost 1 billion tonnes. This led to a significant 
reduction in the net-imported position, which 
implies a relative increase in productivity and effi-
ciency in the European farming sector. However, 
despite narrowing the gap between imports and 
exports, the EU was still the largest importer and 
the second-largest exporter of agricultural products 
worldwide in 2013 (European Commission 2014).
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of 
the oldest policies located on the EU level. Since its 
establishment, demand for the CAP has clearly 
changed. For instance, the initial idea of a self-suf-
ficient European agricultural sector has generally 
become less important due to ever-increasing free 
trade since the establishment of the CAP. In 
addition, the diets of European citizens have 
changed, and they now contain substantial shares 
of exotic food. This conflicts with the idea of 
self-sufficiency of agricultural commodities 
(Boulanger and Messerlin 2010). Hence, self-suffi-
ciency or targeting balanced trade in agricultural 
commodities would not only result in omitted 
welfare gains from trade, but would also directly 
impact the utility to European citizens negatively.
 
Currently and in the short run, food security is and will be guaranteed by 
European farmers and imports. Developments in recent years, such as a 
declining trade deficit for agricultural commodities, show that the European 
agricultural sector is competitive overall. Hence, sufficient food supply and 
reasonable prices are expected to continue.
12  in 2014, coffee was the highest-ranking single import item, with a share of 7.2 per cent of total agricultural 
commodity imports. Exotic fruit accounted for about 17 per cent of all imports (European commission 2014).
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However, the European agricultural sector is challenged by structural changes 
in the overall agricultural sector and increasing competition for farmers increas-
ingly participating in the global agricultural market (Anania 2009). In the long 
run, agricultural policy in the EU and beyond will primarily be confronted with 
an increase in demand for agricultural commodities, climate change and limi-
tations on natural resources (European Environment Agency 2012; OECD 2011b). 
The global increase in demand for agricultural commodities is mainly driven 
by global population growth,13 which dampens excess supply and thereby leads 
to price increases as well as income growth in less developed parts of the world, 
which in turn leads to higher demand for quality food (Boulanger and Messerlin 
2010). The effects of climate change on agriculture are unclear, but farming 
needs to adapt to changing climate conditions (Anania 2009). Climate change 
will also affect the availability of natural resources; but even without climate 
change, intensified farming influences the availability of natural resources, 
such as soil (Wall 2012) and water (Sakadevan and Nguyen 2015).
In addition, funding for the policy field agriculture faces increasing 
pressure in the EU as challenges in other policy areas emerge and gain in 
importance. With a limited amount of total funds, retaining the status quo 
of current funding for agriculture will become more and more difficult 
(Roederer-Rynning 2010).
Status quo
From a budgetary perspective, agriculture is the most prominent policy field 
located on the European level. Established in 1962 by the EU-6 (European 
Commission 2012), the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
defined in Article 39 (TFEU) are to increase productivity and efficiency in the 
farming sector, ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, stabilise markets, 
13  while significant population growth is projected for developing countries, in particular, the EU’s population is 
expected to stagnate or even shrink (United nations 2015).
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Figure  3:
Development of agricultural imports and exports in the EU
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assure the availability of supplies, and ensure the supply for EU citizens at 
reasonable prices (see also Burrell 2009; European Commission 2012). Initially 
intended to balance power between what were then industry-focused Germany 
and agriculture-focused France, the CAP gradually evolved as its policy design 
and implicit policy objectives were adapted several times (Tangermann and 
von Cramon-Taubadel 2013).
When introduced, the CAP aimed to harmonise commodity prices with 
price support, including export subsidies. This resulted not only in mismatches 
in demand and supply – including infamous excess supply of certain commod-
ities, such as milk and butter14 – but also in international criticism. In the 
course of the negotiations for the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the incompatibility between free trade and the old CAP design 
clearly emerged (see, e.g., Weyerbrock 1998). This resulted in several reforms 
of the CAP aimed at aligning it with market economy principles and improving 
the efficiency of its policy design. The most notable reforms were the 
MacSharry reform implemented in 1992, the Agenda 2000 introduced in 1999, 
and the Fischler reform which became effective in 2003 (see, e.g, Ackrill 
2000; Burrell 2009; Greer 2013; OECD 2011a).
With the MacSharry reform, the internal market for agricultural commod-
ities was fully established, as tariffs on imports were abolished, price support 
was cut, and quotas for suppliers were phased out. Instead of efficiency-dis-
torting market interventions, the CAP’s focus was shifted to direct payments 
to compensate farmers for income losses. In addition, the CAP’s scope was 
intensified in rural development. With the Agenda 2000 proposal, the focus on 
rural development was strengthened and expanded. The Fischler reform ceased 
product support almost completely15 and has installed a decoupled system of 
direct payments as income support for farmers, which is independent from the 
type and amount of commodity farmed. Figure 4 shows the migration of the 
focus away from price support towards direct payments. While the majority of 
CAP funding was price support until 1994, it was decreased over time and finally 
almost completely abolished in 2013.16 In its stead, direct payments were intro-
duced in 1992 and increased in importance soon thereafter.
14  This had led to the infamous ‘butter mountains’ and ‘milk lakes’. For a detailed explanation of economic mech-
anisms behind this result, see, e.g., corron, He and westerhoff (2007).
15  a longer transition period was granted for some quotas. For example, the milk quota was only abolished for 
dairy farmers in 2015 (Sorrentino, Henke and Severini 2016), and the sugar beet quota will remain in place 
until 30 September 2017 (European commission 2016a).
16  Since 2013, market interventions have been reduced to a negligible share of 5 per cent of total expenditures. 
Market interventions are now only exceptionally used in time of crisis (European commission 2013b).
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Figure  4:
Development of composition of CAP expenditures
Today, the CAP consists of two pillars (European Commission 2013b). About 
three-quarters of CAP funding is dedicated to the production-orientated Pillar 
One, which in turn is predominantly composed of decoupled direct payments 
to farmers. Since the latest amendment of the CAP, in 2013, 30 per cent of the 
direct payments have been dedicated to so-called ‘greening’ , which implies 
environmental efforts aimed at accentuating the public good character of 
farming (European Commission 2013b; European Environment Agency 2012; 
Matthews 2013).17 Pillar Two targets rural development and, unlike Pillar One, 
is co-financed by both the EU and its member states (Cantore, Kennan and 
Page 2011). In addition, member states are free to transfer up to 15 per cent of 
Pillar One funding to Pillar Two (‘modulation’) and vice versa (OECD 2011a).
The CAP is administered at both the EU and national levels (European 
Parliament 2015a). While the allocation of total funding per member state is 
decided at the EU level, each member state distributes subsidies to its farmers 
according to national allocation schemes.18 The current configuration implies 
double bureaucracy due to the involvement of both EU and national admin-
istrations (Niemi and Kola 2005). Also, due to the heterogeneous national 
agricultural sectors and the different negotiation powers of member states, 
the CAP has been the cause of special rulings for some member states on 
several occasions, with the UK’s rebate being the most prominent example 
(Ackrill 2000; Cantore, Kennan and Page 2011).19
17  various scholars argue that the current greening system is not very effective for different reasons, including 
weak standards and limited scope; see, e.g., Matthews (2013).
18  national allocation schemes have to be approved by the European commission (European parliament 2015a).
19  in 1985, when the UK rebate was introduced the first time, the cap’s share of the EU budget was about 70 
per cent and the UK had a relatively small agricultural sector, which gave the UK strong negotiation power.
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In the analysis to follow, we focus on direct payments, which are the main 
element of Pillar One and exclusively of EU concern at present. Direct 
payments have two functions (European Commission 2011b). First, they are 
used to subsidise the income of farmers, which implies a social welfare 
purpose. Second, they serve as remuneration for farmers for providing 
agriculture-related local public goods, such as landscape preservation or 
biodiversity enhancement. As the European Commission (2011b) notes, these 
two functions are interdependent and cannot be separated. For this reason, 
in what follows, we will analyse direct payments and their associated agricul-
ture-related local public goods.
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we assume a system in which direct payments 
to farmers are integrated into existing national social welfare programmes 
of the member states, and in which financing is of national concern.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
1 we analyse spillover effects arising from local public goods farmers provide by contrasting the current EU direct payments with a possible national financing of related public goods. we find that a 
national financing of agriculture-related local public goods would align national costs much better 
with national benefits and, hence, limit spillover effects and free riding.
Economies of scale
1 By investigating the difference between hourly compensation of farmers and national low-income wages, we find significant diseconomies of scale due to an inaccurate targeting of direct payments 
from a welfare perspective. integrating income support for farmers into existing national social 
welfare programmes would improve the efficiency of the allocation of direct payments to farmers 
and reduce duplications.
Preference heterogeneity
3 we analyse the opinion of citizens about an increase in financial support for farmers in the next 10 years (Special Eurobarometer 440, Qc11). we find modest variance in the opinion of citizens 
among member states, and therefore assign an indifferent score for preference heterogeneity.
Internal market consistency
3 The end of cap market interventions has largely eliminated market distortions. Decentralising agricultural policy is not expected to create any new distortions or obstacles for the internal 
market. Hence, we find that internal market consistency is unaffected by the location of agricultural 
policy, which leads to an indifferent score.
Competition
2 Under the status quo, we find a lack of incentives for optimising the existing income-subsidy system, which leads to an absence of positive yardstick competition. a national competence for 
farmers’ income support would trigger competition, but mainly between agricultural policy and 
other policy fields with a national focus. The result would be more efficient policy mixes on the 
national level.
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Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data sources
Currently, the aim of the direct payments is twofold. First, it compensates 
farmers for low commodity supplier prices. Second, it explicitly pays farmers 
for providing the public goods ‘preservation of the landscape’ , ‘contributions 
to biodiversity’ and ‘ecological focus areas’ (European Commission 2011a). 
These goods exhibit externalities for nearby industries and populations. For 
instance, beautiful landscapes are a prerequisite for tourism, but also provide 
utility for the local population. Crop rotation enables biodiversity and estab-
lishes habitats for animals and plants (see Cooper, Hart and Baldock 2009).
For determining potential spillover effects in the field of agricultural policy, 
we focus on the externalities arising from local public goods provided by 
farmers. We analyse the benefits and burdens resulting from greening 
measures. The starting point is the calculation of the benefit shares for each 
member state arising from agriculture-related local public goods. We approx-
imate the benefit share for each member state by quantifying the three main 
goals of greening: maintenance of permanent grassland, ecological focus 
areas and crop diversification (European Commission 2013b). The benefit 
stemming from the maintenance of permanent grassland can be measured 
by the member state’s share of the EU’s total permanent grassland. The 
benefit resulting from ecological focus areas can be measured by each member 
state’s share of the EU’s total arable land.20 The benefit of crop diversifica-
tion, however, is hard to quantify since it is a qualitative measure interfering 
with the first two goals. Crop diversification means that farmers must culti-
vate multiple types of crops in their fields, which affects all farmers equally 
and is best measured in terms of the share of total permanent grassland and 
the share of total arable land. Hence, we construct the benefit share for each 
member state as the unweighted sum of its share of total permanent grass-
land and its share of total arable land. We assume that the benefit share for 
each member state is constant regardless of whether the agriculture-related 
local public goods are provided at the EU or the national level.
The burden share for each member state in the current situation of an EU 
competence is calculated by its contribution share of the EU budget. For the 
counterfactual scenario with a decentralised competence for burden-sharing, 
we apply a two-step procedure (described in detail in the Appendix). In a 
nutshell, we start with current total EU greening expenditures, which we 
allocate to member states according to their shares of total utilised land in 
the EU. To allow for heterogeneity in national agricultural policy goals, we 
adjust the previously calculated preliminary allocation using a multidimen-
sional factor. The idea of the multidimensional factor is to capture the charac-
teristics of national agricultural sectors and national preferences for 
agriculture in order to approximate the outcome of national decisions on the 
size for agriculture-related local public goods. It aims to take into account 
revealed preferences indicated by six proxies, which control for the impor-
tance of the national agricultural sector, national ecological awareness and 
20  Five per cent of arable land must be reserved for ecological focus areas (European commission 2013b).
In the analysis to follow, we focus on direct payments, which are the main 
element of Pillar One and exclusively of EU concern at present. Direct 
payments have two functions (European Commission 2011b). First, they are 
used to subsidise the income of farmers, which implies a social welfare 
purpose. Second, they serve as remuneration for farmers for providing 
agriculture-related local public goods, such as landscape preservation or 
biodiversity enhancement. As the European Commission (2011b) notes, these 
two functions are interdependent and cannot be separated. For this reason, 
in what follows, we will analyse direct payments and their associated agricul-
ture-related local public goods.
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we assume a system in which direct payments 
to farmers are integrated into existing national social welfare programmes 
of the member states, and in which financing is of national concern.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
1 we analyse spillover effects arising from local public goods farmers provide by contrasting the current EU direct payments with a possible national financing of related public goods. we find that a 
national financing of agriculture-related local public goods would align national costs much better 
with national benefits and, hence, limit spillover effects and free riding.
Economies of scale
1 By investigating the difference between hourly compensation of farmers and national low-income wages, we find significant diseconomies of scale due to an inaccurate targeting of direct payments 
from a welfare perspective. integrating income support for farmers into existing national social 
welfare programmes would improve the efficiency of the allocation of direct payments to farmers 
and reduce duplications.
Preference heterogeneity
3 we analyse the opinion of citizens about an increase in financial support for farmers in the next 10 years (Special Eurobarometer 440, Qc11). we find modest variance in the opinion of citizens 
among member states, and therefore assign an indifferent score for preference heterogeneity.
Internal market consistency
3 The end of cap market interventions has largely eliminated market distortions. Decentralising agricultural policy is not expected to create any new distortions or obstacles for the internal 
market. Hence, we find that internal market consistency is unaffected by the location of agricultural 
policy, which leads to an indifferent score.
Competition
2 Under the status quo, we find a lack of incentives for optimising the existing income-subsidy system, which leads to an absence of positive yardstick competition. a national competence for 
farmers’ income support would trigger competition, but mainly between agricultural policy and 
other policy fields with a national focus. The result would be more efficient policy mixes on the 
national level.
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positive externalities stemming from greening.21 After applying this adjust-
ment scheme, we calculate burden shares for a scenario of national financing 
of agriculture-related local public goods. We compute the net benefits by 
subtracting the burden share from the benefit share for each member state 
for the current (EU) and hypothetical counterfactual (national) scenarios. 
Results
The results are presented in Figure 5 (the precise values for the benefit and 
burden shares are given in Table 3 in the Appendix). Under the status quo, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are the biggest net-payer countries, 
meaning that their contributions to their agriculture-related local public 
goods exceed their received benefits the most. On the other hand, Poland, 
Romania and Spain exhibit the highest degree of net benefits, meaning that 
the burden share for these countries is relatively small compared to their 
benefit share under the current regime of supranational funding of 
agriculture- related local public goods.
In a scenario with responsibilities for funding the provision of agricul-
ture-related local public goods being a national concern, the results change 
significantly. For instance, the burden share for Germany would be reduced 
21  More specifically, the six proxies employed are: national agricultural expenditures (percentage share of Gdp), 
agricultural share of total value added, national environmental expenditures, declared ecological focus areas’ 
share of national arable land, share of population living in rural areas, and overnight stays per 1,000 inhabitants.
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by more than two-thirds, and Romania would become a net-payer country. 
Interestingly, Italy and the United Kingdom would be almost unaffected by 
a shift to national responsibility, which implies that the current funding 
system coincides with the preferences of these countries.
To sum up, transferring the responsibility for financing agriculture-related 
local public goods from the EU to its member states reduces extreme values. 
Overall, the standard deviation in the current situation of EU financing is 3.50. 
In the counterfactual situation with national funding, the standard deviation 
of net benefits would be significantly reduced, to 1.39. Hence, the degree of 
free riding can be lowered by 60.26 per cent, which results in a score equal to 1. 
This clearly speaks in favour of national competence. In other words, member 
states are more capable than the EU of aligning their benefits with the burdens 
stemming from agriculture-related local public goods.
eConomieS oF SCAle
Data source
We analyse potential economies of scale with regard to the allocation of the 
direct payment system by employing the Farm Accounting Data Network 
(FADN) database operated by the European Commission (DG Agriculture). The 
FADN database aims to capture the financial situation as well as the key 
characteristics of European farms on a harmonised basis. Data on 80,000 
farms is collected overall, which are a representative sample for about 
5,000,000 farms and about 90 per cent of the total utilised agricultural area 
in the EU (European Commission 2010b).22 To the best of our knowledge, this 
data source is the most comprehensive one regarding European farms. In 
addition, we use data on national low incomes (defined as 66 per cent of 
national median income) on an hourly basis provided by Eurostat.23
Methodology
Direct payments represent the major share of CAP expenditures, and were 
originally introduced to compensate farmers for reductions in support prices. 
However, the effect of direct payments is that of subsidising farmers’ income 
(European Commission 2011b).
We investigate potential economies of scale with regard to the allocation 
of the direct payment system. Essentially, income support for farmers can 
be implemented at the national level as part of a national transfer system or 
remain at the EU level. Sticking to the subsidiarity principle,24 a national 
agenda should only be moved to the EU level if the EU can provide the service 
more efficiently. Currently, the agenda of direct payments is regulated at the 
EU level. Hence, we analyse whether there are economies of scale that result 
22  The considered farms are representative since they are stratified according to region, economic size and type of 
farming. Farms below certain country-specific economic size thresholds are considered non-commercial and not 
included in the Fadn database. Hence, the average Fadn farm is bigger than the average farm in the EU. in the 
following, this leads to overestimations of the average direct payments and fictional national payments per farm. 
Since the Fadn database is the best data source available, we use it for our analysis nonetheless.
23  Since national low incomes are only available before taxes, we subtract the average tax wage (income tax and 
social security contributions) for low-income earners to get hourly net low income, which is comparable with 
implied hourly compensation for farmers.
24  The subsidiarity principle is implemented in article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.
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from the current handling of direct payments. Economies of scale arise in 
this specific context if a centralised solution is able to provide direct payments 
with similar accuracy at a lower cost than a decentralised solution.
If centralisation leads to significant efficiency losses due to a  non-targeted 
distribution of direct payments, potential gains of centralising the admin-
istration are outweighed. This assumes that administration expenditures for 
direct payments are about 6 per cent, as for the total EU budget (European 
Commission 2010a), and therefore of minor importance regardless of where 
the policy field is located.25
We determine whether there are economies of scale by contrasting the 
current situation of EU responsibility with a situation in which member states 
compensate farmers for their realised low market incomes. To be more 
specific, for the counterfactual situation, we assume that member states 
would subsidise farmers’ hourly net income up to the national low-income 
threshold net of taxes.26 If farmers’ hourly income is higher than the national 
low-income threshold, member states would abstain from subsidies due to 
the political infeasibility of such a policy.
The FADN database contains information about revenues, expenditures, 
the resulting income and labour input for farms. The farm’s net income is 
defined as gross profit minus subsidies and taxes before unpaid labour 
25  Hence, we are interested in the net effect of centralisation, which consists of cost savings due to reductions 
in duplications and extra costs arising from the creation of inaccuracies using a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution.
26  national low income is defined as hourly earnings that are less than two-thirds of national median hourly 
earnings (Eurostat definition).
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input,27 meaning that the labour provided by the farmers should be compen-
sated with farm net income.
To compare farming income with national low-income levels, we calcu-
late the hourly compensation of farmers by dividing farm net income without 
direct payments by the number of work hours. The difference between the 
hourly compensation of farmers and the national low-income threshold is 
the wage gap, which we assume will be narrowed by the member states in 
the counterfactual situation. Hence, in the counterfactual situation, the 
subsidy for the average farm is the wage gap multiplied by the amount of 
unpaid labour input.
Results
Figure 6 illustrates the implied hourly compensation for farmers across EU 
member states in the absence of subsidies, and compares it to national 
low-income threshold. The resulting difference is the wage gap (i.e. the 
difference between hourly compensation of farmers and hourly wages in 
manual industries). The wage gap differs significantly between member states. 
On average, the wage gap is €7.96 for the EU-28, but varies between €114.44 
in Slovakia28 to minus €8.58 in the Netherlands (negative values mean that 
hourly compensation of farmers exceeds national low-income hourly wages). 
In six of the member states, the hourly compensation of farmers without 
subsidies exceeds national low-income wages.
Figure 7 presents the results for the average farm in each member state. 
Currently, the average farm in Slovakia receives by far the highest amount 
of subsidies per year (€155,583). In contrast, annual payments for the average 
farm in Romania are €1,858. In a national counterfactual scenario in which 
the member states focus on the wage gap, only 21 member states would 
continue subsidising the income of their farmers. Since the implied hourly 
compensation for farmers in the other member states exceeds the national 
low-income threshold, these member states can refrain from providing 
income support to their farmers. Notably, the fit between current payments 
and hypothetical national subsidies can be classified as rather poor. Besides 
the cessation of income subsidies for farmers in six member states, farmers 
in 15 member states would receive lower subsidies than in the current situa-
tion, and national subsidies would be higher than today’s payments in six 
member states.29
27  Gross profit consists of all earnings a farm makes in the agricultural sector and beyond (e.g. it also includes 
earnings from agricultural tourism). Own consumption is not reflected as income in kind, which may lead 
to some underestimation of farmers’ income in countries with low income levels. For details regarding the 
methodology of the Fadn, see European commission (2010b).
28  Slovakia is the only country in the Fadn for which the average farm reports negative farm income in the 
current system of direct payments.
29  Since there is no data available on the low-income threshold for Greece, this country is excluded from the 
analysis.
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Hence, our results suggest that the current allocation of the direct payments 
system to the EU level is not efficient. For the majority of member states, 
direct payments for the average farm are either too high or too low. This is 
an implication of the current system of decoupled payments, which is 
primarily based on the amount of utilised land while neglecting heteroge-
neity in farm structures and national labour markets. It follows that the 
current system of direct payments is inaccurate and therefore underper-
forming in terms of the CAP’s objective of enabling a fair standard of living 
for farmers across the EU. To overcome inaccuracy, the EU level would need 
an enormous amount of information on each farmer, which is hardly feasible. 
In addition, such a specified system would establish duplications since 
member states already apply functioning social welfare programmes specif-
ically designed for their country-specific situation.
To sum up, the current system of handling direct payments does not create 
economies of scale due to inaccuracy in closing the wage gap of farmers. If 
anything, under the current system, diseconomies of scale are created due 
to the inefficient distribution of decoupled payments. National provision of 
direct payments would increase efficiency in terms of accuracy. Economies 
of scale can be exploited by integrating direct payments into existing national 
social welfare programmes. Hence, we assign a score of 1 for this indicator, 
meaning that there are no economies of scale for farm subsidies.
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
To investigate preference heterogeneity of Europeans regarding farm subsidies, 
we rely on data from the Special Eurobarometer 440 on ‘European, Agriculture 
and the CAP’ , which was published in October 2015 for the third time. In 
particular, we use QC11: “And over the next 10 years, would you like to see an 
increase, decrease or no change in the EU financial support to farmers?” People 
were asked to answer this question by choosing ‘increase’ , ‘decrease’ or ‘no 
change’. In addition, respondents were offered the fourth option of ‘don’t know’.
Methodology
We focus on the item ‘increase’ to analyse preference heterogeneity since 
the majority of people in most countries chose this item.30 The results based 
on the other response items (excluding ‘don’t know’) can be found in the 
Appendix. For our calculations, we adjust the figures by subtracting the 
number of people with no opinion. This number is on average 13 per cent, but 
varies between 3 per cent (Latvia) and 28 per cent (Bulgaria).
Our results are gathered by calculating the share of people in favour of 
increasing subsidies for farmers followed by a computation of dispersion 
measures on the EU level.
Results
Figure 8 shows the results. The heterogeneity indicator is 36 per cent, meaning 
that the realised standard deviation is moderate compared to the maximum 
standard deviation. The application of the formula for assessing the score 
leads to a value of 3.
It has to be noted that the question covers the extensive margin – in other 
words, people were only asked whether they think subsidies for farmers 
should be increased, but not by how much. Considering heterogeneity in farm 
incomes, one would expect greater preference heterogeneity concerning the 
desired size of increase. However, such a question was not asked in the 
Eurobarometer questionnaire.
30  it was the least frequently chosen item in only denmark and the netherlands. in Finland, more people chose 
‘no change’ than ‘increase’.
Hence, our results suggest that the current allocation of the direct payments 
system to the EU level is not efficient. For the majority of member states, 
direct payments for the average farm are either too high or too low. This is 
an implication of the current system of decoupled payments, which is 
primarily based on the amount of utilised land while neglecting heteroge-
neity in farm structures and national labour markets. It follows that the 
current system of direct payments is inaccurate and therefore underper-
forming in terms of the CAP’s objective of enabling a fair standard of living 
for farmers across the EU. To overcome inaccuracy, the EU level would need 
an enormous amount of information on each farmer, which is hardly feasible. 
In addition, such a specified system would establish duplications since 
member states already apply functioning social welfare programmes specif-
ically designed for their country-specific situation.
To sum up, the current system of handling direct payments does not create 
economies of scale due to inaccuracy in closing the wage gap of farmers. If 
anything, under the current system, diseconomies of scale are created due 
to the inefficient distribution of decoupled payments. National provision of 
direct payments would increase efficiency in terms of accuracy. Economies 
of scale can be exploited by integrating direct payments into existing national 
social welfare programmes. Hence, we assign a score of 1 for this indicator, 
meaning that there are no economies of scale for farm subsidies.
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Figure 8:  
Preference heterogeneity regarding subsidies for farmers
increase in farmer subsidies
Eurobarometer question EB84.2 Qc11: “and over the next 10 years, would you like to see an increase, decrease 
or no change in the EU financial support to farmers?” (percentage values for increase per country)
Mean (μ) 0.573
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Figure  8
Preference heterogeneity regarding subsidies for farmers
Median 0.536
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.180
Heterogeneity 36.0 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘increase’ in the country. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.144, resulting in a heterogeneity of 28.7 per cent.
inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
The internal market is primarily based on the four basic freedoms and undis-
torted competition, implying that competition policy provides similar rules 
for all market participants (Tache 2007). In contrast, until major reforms in 
the 1990s, the CAP assumed market failures and aimed to correct the outcome 
of the market. This made the CAP and competition policy seemingly contra-
dictory policies (Boulanger and Messerlin 2010).31 While competition policy 
aims to establish a competitive market outcome, previously used instruments 
(e.g. price support or quotas) prevented a competitive market outcome. The 
results were striking, with price support leading to distortions in the market 
price signals or quotas which limited the supply of certain commodities (Ingco 
and Winters 2004). This influenced both farmers and consumers in their 
decisions regarding the types and quantities of farmed goods and the quan-
tities of demanded goods, which led to well-known excess supplies and 
reduced economic surplus (see, e.g., European Commission 2012; Mahé and 
Roe 1996). Prior to the Fischler reform in 2003, the cost of market interven-
tions amounted to about 0.8 per cent of the total GDP of member states 
(Borrell and Hubbard 2000).32
In the course of several reforms leading to the current system, which were 
primarily based on direct payments, the focus of the CAP underwent a transi-
tion from market interventions to income subsidies for farmers (Burrell 2009). 
By focusing on market principles and putting a halt to price support and 
quotas, the CAP is currently aligned with competition policy principles 
31  regulations 26/62 and 1184/2006 explicitly state that agricultural policy has to be in line with competition policy.
32  Since the agricultural sector contributed less than 5 per cent to Gdp, the market intervention cost of 0.8 per 
cent of total Gdp can be considered substantial.
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(Boulanger and Messerlin 2010). Hence, the current design of the CAP, with 
its focus on direct payments, has contributed to complying with the  criterion 
of internal market consistency.33
Decentralising agricultural policy is not expected to interfere with 
internal market consistency, either. Decentralisation of direct payments in 
line with national transfer schemes does not imply any new distortions. 
Since a decentralisation comes with potential leeway for member states, it 
is important to monitor the compatibility of national agricultural policies 
with internal market consistency. This task could be conducted by 
already-existing competition authorities at the national level as well as by 
the European Commission through a strict application of state aid rules to 
the agricultural sector (ibid). 
To sum up, with respect to the objective of protecting farmers’ income, it 
is irrelevant whether agricultural policy is assigned to the EU level or the 
member-state level. Hence, integrating income subsidies for farmers into 
existing national social welfare programmes would not affect internal market 
consistency. Therefore, we assign an indifferent score of 3 to express that 
internal market consistency is largely fulfilled under the status quo as well as 
in the counterfactual scenario.
ComPetition
National farm sectors vary significantly with respect to their economic 
importance to member states. Figure 9 shows the nexus of agricultural impor-
tance for employment and value added. While the share of people working 
in the agricultural sector in 2013 was 30 and 19 per cent, respectively, in 
Romania and Bulgaria, the share was less than 2 per cent in Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK. When looking at the share of agricultural in total 
value added, a similar picture emerges. In 2013, the agricultural share of value 
added only exceeded 5 per cent in Romania and Bulgaria, while the share for 
the older EU member states (except Greece) was below 3 per cent and even 
below 1 per cent for some member states (Belgium, Germany and Luxem-
bourg). This highlights that there is significant heterogeneity in the economic 
importance and structures of the farming sectors of the member states.
33  with decoupled payments, some farmers continue production in the short run, but they would cease 
production in the absence of decoupled payments. However, this is not a sustainable strategy in the long run 
since the opportunity costs of altering or halting production are the highest for these farmers. Hence, the 
deviation in the market caused by this type of farmer can be considered minor. 
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quotas, the CAP is currently aligned with competition policy principles 
31  regulations 26/62 and 1184/2006 explicitly state that agricultural policy has to be in line with competition policy.
32  Since the agricultural sector contributed less than 5 per cent to Gdp, the market intervention cost of 0.8 per 
cent of total Gdp can be considered substantial.
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Since a major part of the EU budget is still dedicated to the CAP, the differ-
ences in national agricultural sectors lead to different budget negotiation 
objectives (de Wilde 2012; Greer 2013). Depending on the structure and impor-
tance of their agricultural sectors and their net-recipient position, member 
states vary in their interest and power when it comes to negotiating their 
share of CAP funding. Hence, negotiations for CAP funding shares are also 
driven by factors beyond agriculture (see, e.g., Roederer-Rynning 2010).
However, once the CAP funding is distributed among member states, 
member states allocate subsidies to their farmers according to national alloca-
tion schemes. National allocation schemes aim to capture country-specific 
characteristics of the agricultural sector and can therefore be considered to 
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be substantially heterogeneous (European Parliament 2015a).34 As a result, 
national allocation schemes are only partially comparable at best.35
Under the status quo of centralised agricultural policy, competition only 
manifests itself when it comes to negotiations for national CAP funding shares. 
After the CAP funding is distributed to the member states, incomparable 
national allocation schemes make it impossible to have yardstick competi-
tion. In addition, the member states have few incentives to participate in 
yardstick competition as neither specific goals to achieve best practices nor 
consequences for inefficient national allocation schemes are defined.
Decentralising the CAP by integrating income subsidies for farmers into 
existing national social welfare programmes would concentrate financing 
and spending, and thereby lead to increased accountability. This would resolve 
the current common pool problem for agricultural subsidies, and would put 
agricultural policy back in a similar position as other policy fields with 
national scope (Roederer-Rynning 2010). Hence, equality of institutional 
settings of policy fields would be established, and agricultural policy would 
have to compete with similar policy fields for funding.
To sum up, the status quo of agricultural policy at the EU level combines 
degrees of freedom for member states for their national allocation schemes 
with a lack of incentives for improvements, which in turn leads to a lack of 
competition. Currently, competition between member states can only be 
observed in negotiations for national CAP funding shares. Decentralising 
agricultural policy would mainly trigger competition between agricultural 
policy and similar policy fields at the national level, thereby leading to a 
more efficient policy mix. Hence, we assign a score of 2 to denote that decen-
tralised provision would tend to foster efficiency.
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
For the scenario of national responsibility for funding agriculture-related 
local public goods, we have to create a counterfactual for the national burden. 
We make the reasonable assumption that the benefit of agriculture-related 
local public goods, measured by the share of permanent grassland and the 
share of ecological focus areas, is unaffected by a change in financing. There-
fore, we focus on the burden shares and construct counterfactual burden 
shares using a two-step procedure.
We take the current total sum of greening payments for the EU-28 as a 
starting point. This total sum is allocated to member states according to their 
shares of total utilised land. This intermediate result implies that each 
member state exhibits the same preferences for agriculture-related local 
public goods and is willing to contribute the same relative amount for their 
provision. However, this is not a plausible result since, in reality, member 
states value agriculture-related local public goods to varying degrees due to 
differences in the number of beneficiaries and the respective importance of 
their agricultural sector.
To take this national heterogeneity into account, we adjust the above-de-
scribed intermediate result by a multidimensional factor. This factor is 
constructed using six single indicators which comprise: the importance of 
the agricultural sector to the national economy (approximated by current 
national agricultural spending and the agricultural sector’s share in value 
added); national preferences for environmental actions (approximated by the 
expenditures for environmental reasons and the share of ecological focus 
areas in national arable land); and the size of beneficiaries (approximated by 
the share of the population living in rural areas which profit directly from 
cultural landscapes and the share of tourism overnight stays per 1,000 inhab-
itants36). The country-specific figures for each indicator can be found in 
Table 1. To construct the multidimensional factor, we first calculate the mean 
 in the EU-28 for each of the five indicators i. Then, we set the realisation 
of each indicator for each member state  in relation to the previously 
calculated means to calculate an indicator score:
Finally, the multidimensional factor for each country is constructed as the 
equally weighted sum of its individual indicator scores:
The computed indicator scores and the multidimensional factor for each 
member state can be found in Table 2.
36  concerning tourism overnight stays, the primary beneficiary of intact landscape is the tourism sector in rural 
areas. due to data limitations, it is impossible to distinguish between urban and rural tourism. For this reason, 
the total of overnight stays in cities and in the countryside is employed.
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The second step in creating the counterfactual is conducted by adjusting the 
intermediate result from the first step by the multidimensional factor. More 
technically, this is done as follows:
Table 1:  
indicator values for eU member states
importance of agriculture ecological awareness Externalities
country iSO national 
agricultural 
expenditures
agricultural 
share of 
value added
Environmental 
expenditures
Ecological 
focus  
areas
rural 
population
Overnights
austria aT 0.5 1.2 0.137 6 41.4 1,306
Belgium BE n.a. 0.6 0.308 7.75 8.7 1,024
Bulgaria BG 0.6 4.6 0.399 8 36.2 183
croatia Hr n.a. 3.6 0.465 14.5 -- 709
cyprus cY 0.9 2.1 0.311 14 22.2 1,576
czech rep. cZ 0.5 2.4 0.067 7.5 30.0 549
denmark dK 0.2 1.4 0.507 5 41.0 654
Estonia EE 0.7 3.0 0.026 8.5 32.0 123
Finland Fi 1.1 2.4 0.254 6 53.6 60
France Fr 0.4 1.5 0.366 n.a. 29.0 633
Germany dE 0.2 0.6 0.075 6 19.1 981
Greece El 0.0 3.4 n.a. 8.5 38.6 611
Hungary HU 0.5 3.8 0.072 9 43.3 249
ireland iE 0.5 1.4 n.a. 12.5 44.2 414
italy iT 0.4 1.9 0.368 9 28.8 1,263
latvia lv 0.4 2.9 0.074 10 34.3 55
lithuania lT 1.0 3.1 0.182 11.5 36.2 88
luxembourg lU 0.5 0.3 0.114 n.a. 28.0 984
Malta MT 0.7 1.3 0.260 21 0.1 24,786
netherlands nl 0.2 1.7 0.428 8 6.8 2,023
poland pl 0.6 2.6 0.152 7.5 40.3 198
portugal pT 0.4 2.0 0.184 9 26.9 507
romania rO 0.4 4.7 0.174 8 48.3 80
Slovak rep. SK n.a. 4.0 0.005 7.5 40.7 220
Slovenia Si 0.5 1.9 0.307 4 55.5 464
Spain ES 0.5 2.3 0.263 15.75 26.9 756
Sweden SE 0.2 1.2 0.141 8.5 69.3 111
UK UK 0.2 0.6 0.169 10 12.2 1,221
eU-28 (avg.) 0.484 2.232 0.193 9.346 33.096 631,169
Source: Eurostat. national agricultural expenditures are a member state’s subsidies for agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting for 2011, and they are measured as a percentage of Gdp. The share of value added by the 
agricultural sector is measured as a percentage of Gdp for 2014. Environmental expenditures are member states’ 
total environmental-protection expenditures (e.g. for protection and remediation of soil, groundwater and surface 
water, protection of biodiversity and landscapes, or environmental r&d) in 2011 in billions of €. The figures under 
‘Ecological focus areas’ represents the weighted share of arable land declared to be an ecological focus area in 
2016 (each member state has to declare at least 5 per cent of its arable land as ecological focus area, but can freely 
choose a higher level. For more information, see European commission (2016b)). rural population is the share of 
the population and land area in rural local administrative units level 2 (laU2) in 2010. Overnights refer to total 
overnight stays per km² in 2012. Missing values are indicated by ‘n.a.’ and imputed by the EU-28 average value of 
the corresponding indicator.
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Table 1. To construct the multidimensional factor, we first calculate the mean 
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Table 2:  
Score values and multidimensional factors
importance of agriculture ecological awareness Externalities Multi- 
dimensional 
factorcountry iSO national 
agricultural 
expenditures
agricultural 
share of 
value added
Environ-
mental 
expenditures
Ecological 
focus  
areas
rural 
population 
share
Over-
nights
austria aT 0.03 -0.46 -0.29 -0.33 0.25 1.07 0.05
Belgium BE 0.00 -0.73 0.59 -0.14 -0.74 0.62 -0.07
Bulgaria BG 0.24 1.06 -0.79 -0.11 0.09 -0.71 -0.04
croatia Hr 0.00 0.61 -0.76 0.61 0.00 0.12 0.10
cyprus cY 0.86 -0.06 0.61 0.56 -0.33 1.50 0.52
czech rep. cZ 0.03 0.08 -0.65 -0.17 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16
denmark dK -0.59 -0.37 1.62 -0.44 0.24 0.04 0.08
Estonia EE 0.45 0.34 -0.87 -0.06 -0.03 -0.81 -0.16
Finland Fi 1.27 0.08 0.31 -0.33 0.62 -0.91 0.17
France Fr -0.17 -0.33 0.89 0.00 -0.12 0.01 0.05
Germany dE -0.59 -0.73 -0.61 -0.33 -0.42 0.55 -0.36
Greece El -1.00 0.52 0.00 -0.06 0.17 -0.03 0.10
Hungary HU 0.03 0.70 -0.63 0.00 0.31 -0.61 -0.03
ireland iE 0.03 -0.37 0.00 0.39 0.34 -0.34 0.01
italy iT -0.17 -0.15 0.91 0.00 -0.13 1.00 0.24
latvia lv -0.17 0.30 -0.62 0.11 0.04 -0.91 -0.21
lithuania lT 1.07 0.39 -0.06 0.28 0.09 -0.86 0.15
luxembourg lU 0.03 -0.87 -0.41 0.00 -0.15 0.56 -0.14
Malta MT 0.45 -0.42 0.35 1.33 -0.99 2.21 0.49
netherlands nl -0.59 -0.24 1.22 -0.11 -0.80 2.21 0.28
poland pl 0.24 0.17 -0.21 -0.17 0.22 -0.69 -0.07
portugal pT -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.12
romania rO -0.17 1.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.46 -0.87 0.05
Slovak rep. SK 0.00 0.79 -0.97 -0.17 0.23 -0.65 -0.13
Slovenia Si 0.03 -0.15 0.56 -0.56 0.68 -0.27 0.05
Spain ES 0.03 0.03 0.36 0.75 -0.19 0.20 0.20
Sweden SE -0.59 -0.46 -0.27 -0.06 1.09 -0.82 -0.19
UK UK -0.59 -0.73 -0.12 0.11 -0.63 0.94 -0.17
notes: For missing realisation of indicator values, it is assumed that the country exhibits the EU-28 average value, 
leading to a score value of 0.00. The score value for Malta for overnights (38.27) is censored, meaning that it is replaced 
by the second-biggest value, namely, that of the netherlands (2.21).
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
53
Table 3:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)
Share in total of the eU (in per cent)
country iSO Greening 
payments 
share
permanent 
grassland 
share
Ecological 
focus areas 
share
Benefit  
share
Burden  
share  
(EU)
Burden  
share 
(national)
austria aT 1.71 2.18 1.31 1.74 2.31 1.64
Belgium BE 1.36 0.82 0.77 0.79 3.14 0.70
Bulgaria BG 1.43 2.13 3.15 2.64 0.35 2.58
croatia Hr 0.23 1.04 0.84 0.94 0.33 0.99
cyprus cY 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.10
czech rep. cZ 2.17 1.61 2.39 2.00 1.12 1.70
denmark dK 2.26 0.33 2.30 1.31 1.90 1.63
Estonia EE 0.24 0.54 0.60 0.57 0.15 0.46
Finland Fi 1.28 0.05 2.13 1.09 1.53 1.53
France Fr 17.59 13.84 17.72 15.78 16.80 16.70
Germany dE 12.57 7.76 11.40 9.58 22.15 6.20
Greece El 5.54 3.53 1.74 2.64 1.57 3.08
Hungary HU 3.17 1.18 3.65 2.41 3.17 2.63
ireland iE 3.02 6.57 1.00 3.79 1.22 2.88
italy iT 9.12 5.57 6.46 6.01 12.33 8.66
latvia lv 3.54 1.10 1.16 1.13 0.21 0.86
lithuania lT 0.92 0.94 2.19 1.56 0.27 0.19
luxembourg lU 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.20 0.06
Malta MT 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01
netherlands nl 1.99 1.30 1.00 1.15 5.48 1.36
poland pl 7.35 5.38 10.33 7.85 3.03 7.69
portugal pT 1.56 3.05 1.06 2.05 1.40 1.85
romania rO 3.10 7.38 7.87 7.63 1.16 7.91
Slovak rep. SK 0.92 0.87 1.31 1.09 0.54 0.95
Slovenia Si 0.32 0.48 0.17 0.32 0.28 0.29
Spain ES 12.11 13.37 10.84 12.10 8.56 16.07
Sweden SE 1.67 0.75 2.48 1.62 3.29 1.43
UK UK 7.79 18.12 6.02 12.07 9.73 8.16
notes: payments data for 2014 (source: European commission (n.d.). EU expenditure and revenue 2000–2014 
data download); benefit data for 2013 (source: Eurostat). The benefit share is the unweighted average of 
greening payments share, permanent grassland share and ecological focus area share.
Table 2:  
Score values and multidimensional factors
importance of agriculture ecological awareness Externalities Multi- 
dimensional 
factorcountry iSO national 
agricultural 
expenditures
agricultural 
share of 
value added
Environ-
mental 
expenditures
Ecological 
focus  
areas
rural 
population 
share
Over-
nights
austria aT 0.03 -0.46 -0.29 -0.33 0.25 1.07 0.05
Belgium BE 0.00 -0.73 0.59 -0.14 -0.74 0.62 -0.07
Bulgaria BG 0.24 1.06 -0.79 -0.11 0.09 -0.71 -0.04
croatia Hr 0.00 0.61 -0.76 0.61 0.00 0.12 0.10
cyprus cY 0.86 -0.06 0.61 0.56 -0.33 1.50 0.52
czech rep. cZ 0.03 0.08 -0.65 -0.17 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16
denmark dK -0.59 -0.37 1.62 -0.44 0.24 0.04 0.08
Estonia EE 0.45 0.34 -0.87 -0.06 -0.03 -0.81 -0.16
Finland Fi 1.27 0.08 0.31 -0.33 0.62 -0.91 0.17
France Fr -0.17 -0.33 0.89 0.00 -0.12 0.01 0.05
Germany dE -0.59 -0.73 -0.61 -0.33 -0.42 0.55 -0.36
Greece El -1.00 0.52 0.00 -0.06 0.17 -0.03 0.10
Hungary HU 0.03 0.70 -0.63 0.00 0.31 -0.61 -0.03
ireland iE 0.03 -0.37 0.00 0.39 0.34 -0.34 0.01
italy iT -0.17 -0.15 0.91 0.00 -0.13 1.00 0.24
latvia lv -0.17 0.30 -0.62 0.11 0.04 -0.91 -0.21
lithuania lT 1.07 0.39 -0.06 0.28 0.09 -0.86 0.15
luxembourg lU 0.03 -0.87 -0.41 0.00 -0.15 0.56 -0.14
Malta MT 0.45 -0.42 0.35 1.33 -0.99 2.21 0.49
netherlands nl -0.59 -0.24 1.22 -0.11 -0.80 2.21 0.28
poland pl 0.24 0.17 -0.21 -0.17 0.22 -0.69 -0.07
portugal pT -0.17 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.19 -0.20 -0.12
romania rO -0.17 1.11 -0.10 -0.11 0.46 -0.87 0.05
Slovak rep. SK 0.00 0.79 -0.97 -0.17 0.23 -0.65 -0.13
Slovenia Si 0.03 -0.15 0.56 -0.56 0.68 -0.27 0.05
Spain ES 0.03 0.03 0.36 0.75 -0.19 0.20 0.20
Sweden SE -0.59 -0.46 -0.27 -0.06 1.09 -0.82 -0.19
UK UK -0.59 -0.73 -0.12 0.11 -0.63 0.94 -0.17
notes: For missing realisation of indicator values, it is assumed that the country exhibits the EU-28 average value, 
leading to a score value of 0.00. The score value for Malta for overnights (38.27) is censored, meaning that it is replaced 
by the second-biggest value, namely, that of the netherlands (2.21).
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Figure 10:  
Preference heterogeneity regarding farmer subsidies: Prefer decrease
Decrease in farmer subsidies
Eurobarometer question EB84.2 Qc11: “and over the next 10 years, would you like to see an increase, decrease 
or no change in the EU financial support to farmers?” (percentage values for decrease per country)
Mean (μ) 0.132
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Figure  10:
Preference heterogeneity regarding 
farmer subsidies: Prefer decrease
Median 0.123
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.098
Heterogeneity 19.6 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘decrease’ in the country. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.075, resulting in a heterogeneity of 14.9 per cent.
Figure 11:  
Preference heterogeneity regarding farmer subsidies: Prefer no change
no change in farmer subsidies
Eurobarometer question EB84.2 Qc11: “and over the next 10 years, would you like to see an increase, decrease 
or no change in the EU financial support to farmers?” (percentage values for no change per country)
Mean (μ) 0.295
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Figure  11:
Preference heterogeneity regarding farmer subsidies: Prefer no change
Median 0.312
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.106
Heterogeneity 21.3 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘no change’ in the country. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.085, resulting in a heterogeneity of 17.0 per cent.
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viii. Case Study 2: 
 Asylum & refugee policy
Current and future challenges
In summer 2015, a dramatic increase in the number of refugees from Syria, 
but also from other countries in the Middle East and Africa, made this policy 
field a greater focus of EU policies. This escalation has revealed obvious 
shortcomings – if not a complete failure – of the current policy design. 
The current situation in Europe has been induced both by longer-run polit-
ical and economic developments as well as by recent escalations in war-torn 
countries, such as Syria. Globalisation has facilitated the mobility of factors 
(e.g. people, goods, etc.), but it also reveals more clearly the differences in 
global standards of living. This is accompanied by resource shortages in many 
regions of the world, which contribute to increased social tensions. Threats 
to security (e.g. conflicts, civil wars, poverty, famines, terrorism and the 
radicalisation of various groups) have recently destabilised the political and 
economic situation in many countries, especially in the Middle East and in 
North and West Africa. Already in 2014, forced displacement worldwide 
increased to an unprecedented level (UNHCR 2015). This also led to an 
increasing number of refugees coming to Europe. As Figure 1 shows, the 
number of asylum-seekers in Europe increased rapidly in recent years, 
especially between 2012 and 2014, and this number was expected to rise 
dramatically in 2015. EU member states along the Mediterranean Sea (e.g. Italy 
and Greece) and those further north that appear particularly attractive as 
final destinations, in particular, face inflows of refugees that are exhausting 
these states’ capacities to provide reception and accommodation. 
Status quo
According to the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations, a person 
must be recognised as a refugee in case of fear of persecution for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion. Asylum-seekers, on the other hand, are persons that seek asylum 
because of political persecution in their home country.
In the EU, member states are responsible for the reception and accommo-
dation of refugees as well as the processing of their asylum applications. 
However, there are several EU organisations, directives and doctrines that 
determine the allocation and reception of refugees – most importantly, the 
Qualification Directive, the Procedures Directive and the Conditions Direc-
tive as well as the EURODAC database and the Dublin regulations. In addition, 
the European border guard agency Frontex supports EU member states in 
performing border controls, naval rescue and return operations. Therefore, 
the status quo of migration policy in the EU represents neither a centralised 
nor a purely national case.
In the last two decades, several measures and steps have been taken 
towards developing a common migration policy in the EU. When the Treaty 
of Amsterdam entered into force in 1999, the EU made an initial attempt to 
shift the legislation of migration policy and border security towards a supra-
national legislation level in an effort to establish “an area of freedom, security 
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and justice”. Since then, the EU has worked towards setting up a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) to promote the harmonisation of national 
migration policies and standards of protection in the member states.37 
Another goal is the expression of financial solidarity by finding a concept of 
equal burden-sharing. For example, a common European Refugee Fund (ERF) 
was set up for the 2008–2013 period within the Hague Programme, which 
supports the intra-EU relocation of refugees from Malta, among other things. 
In 2011, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was founded and, in 
2014, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was set up. One of 
many goals is improving the economic and political conditions in home 
countries in order to reduce the influx of refugees.
The number of asylum-seekers varies greatly across member states. Despite 
the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees the free movement of persons 
within its 26 signatory countries making up the Schengen Area, refugees cannot 
choose their host country freely. According to the Dublin Regulation, which 
entered into force in 1997, the first European country in which a refugee arrives 
is responsible for taking fingerprints for the common European fingerprint 
database (EURODAC). This country is also responsible for assessing asylum 
claims and accommodating refugees. This competence is often delegated to 
the federal states or communities within the respective EU member state. 
However, the ongoing escalation of the situation has demonstrated that the 
Dublin rules lack effectiveness. If a refugee or asylum-seeker comes from a 
‘safe country of origin’ , he or she will be sent back. Although EU directives 
have established the notion of safe countries of origin, each EU member state 
independently decides what it will categorise as a ‘safe’ country.38
37  an overview of the cEaS can be found in a factsheet published by the European commission (European 
commission 2014a).
38  See council directive 2005/85/Ec of 1 december 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in member 
states for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
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Figure  1:
Number of asylum applications in EU-27 countries (1998–2014)
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Despite the common European regulations, there are still large differences 
among EU member states in the provision of accommodation and benefits 
to asylum-seekers. Whether asylum-seekers are allowed to look for a private 
accommodation themselves or to work while their asylum application is 
pending differs among countries. In addition, there are still considerable 
differences among member states in the national implementation of EU 
migration directives.
Counterfactual situation
If the EU had centralised regulations regarding migration policy, they could 
include the following elements: 
•	 Common standards of accommodation and personal allowances for 
refugees could be introduced, including the formation of necessary EU 
institutions/organisations to enable the implementation of these 
standards.
•	 Common criteria for the assessment of asylum applications could be estab-
lished, such as a common ‘safe country of origin’ list.
•	 A system of allocating refugees to member states that is more geared 
towards the respective member state’s capacities (e.g. measured by size, 
population, GDP, GDP growth, unemployment) could be established. 
•	 A binding quota for the allocation of refugees among member states could 
be introduced and enforced. 
•	 If necessary, transfer payments among member states for fair burden-
sharing or a common fund that covers all costs related to the common 
asylum policy could be introduced.
•	 Border enforcement could be conducted jointly.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 5 we create an index for the responsibility-sharing between member states both under the current status quo and in a hypothetical counterfactual situation of a centralised European asylum and refugee 
policy. we then compare these indicators and analyse whether free riding is reduced with European 
provision. Our indicator of free riding is markedly reduced if an integrated European asylum and 
refugee policy is created. 
Economies of scale
 4 we compare the expenses of European countries for receiving and hosting refugees and asylum-seekers to detect potential economies of scale when moving to a European solution. There is 
evidence that a broader European solution leads to economies of scale in various cost categories. 
Thus, we conclude that shifting competences to the European level would be beneficial.
Preference heterogeneity
 5 we rely on Eurobarometer 82.3 (‘Standard Eurobarometer’) and evaluate questions Qa11.1  (“please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feeling for 
you – immigration of people from other EU Member States”) and Qa11.2 (“please tell me whether 
each of the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feeling for you – immigration of 
people from outside the EU”). The standard deviations of the distributions are 0.125 and 0.137, 
respectively, resulting in a heterogeneity indicator of 25 and 27.4 per cent.
and justice”. Since then, the EU has worked towards setting up a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) to promote the harmonisation of national 
migration policies and standards of protection in the member states.37 
Another goal is the expression of financial solidarity by finding a concept of 
equal burden-sharing. For example, a common European Refugee Fund (ERF) 
was set up for the 2008–2013 period within the Hague Programme, which 
supports the intra-EU relocation of refugees from Malta, among other things. 
In 2011, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was founded and, in 
2014, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was set up. One of 
many goals is improving the economic and political conditions in home 
countries in order to reduce the influx of refugees.
The number of asylum-seekers varies greatly across member states. Despite 
the Schengen Agreement, which guarantees the free movement of persons 
within its 26 signatory countries making up the Schengen Area, refugees cannot 
choose their host country freely. According to the Dublin Regulation, which 
entered into force in 1997, the first European country in which a refugee arrives 
is responsible for taking fingerprints for the common European fingerprint 
database (EURODAC). This country is also responsible for assessing asylum 
claims and accommodating refugees. This competence is often delegated to 
the federal states or communities within the respective EU member state. 
However, the ongoing escalation of the situation has demonstrated that the 
Dublin rules lack effectiveness. If a refugee or asylum-seeker comes from a 
‘safe country of origin’ , he or she will be sent back. Although EU directives 
have established the notion of safe countries of origin, each EU member state 
independently decides what it will categorise as a ‘safe’ country.38
37  an overview of the cEaS can be found in a factsheet published by the European commission (European 
commission 2014a).
38  See council directive 2005/85/Ec of 1 december 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in member 
states for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
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Internal market consistency
 5 Since the Schengen agreement was introduced in 1995, there have been no internal borders between Schengen countries, and persons, goods, services and capital have been able to move freely within 
the borderless Schengen area. This makes it easier for refugees to move within Europe without 
being effectively controlled or held back from crossing national borders. The free-movement 
agreement is threatened if responsibilities for refugees among member states are unclear, as states 
might reintroduce border controls (Thielemann et al. 2010). This risk has massively increased with 
the dramatic surge in refugees in 2015. Thus, a centralised solution would clearly help prevent the 
reintroduction of border controls and thereby support the internal market.
Competition
 4 competition in the policy field of asylum and refugees has two effects: On the one hand, yardstick competition might encourage the further development of best practices that could improve the 
quality of refugee-hosting efforts. On the other hand, without effective sanctions and binding 
standards, there will be a race to the bottom that only worsens the situation of refugees and asylum-
seekers. Thus, combining centralised non-competitive regulations at the EU level and local initiatives 
that compete to further improve good practices would be best.
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Data source
To quantify the extent of free riding among member states in the case of 
hosting asylum-seekers and refugees, we use data on the member states 
level from Eurostat, the European Commission, the World Bank and the 
UNHCR.
We collect information on the number of refugees and asylum-seekers 
for all EU-28 countries using the UNHCR database. We include all persons 
being categorised as either a refugee or an asylum-seeker whose applica-
tion was pending at the end of 2014. Stateless persons and other refugees 
(e.g. intra-country refugees) are excluded. The share of each member state’s 
contribution to the EU budget is taken from the EU Budget 2013 Financial 
Report (European Commission 2014b). Since information on the EU budget 
for 2014 was not available at the time of the computations, we refer to the 
2013 figures. In order to compute our capacity indices, we make use of 
various information on the EU-28 countries available from Eurostat, 
including population, population density, area, unemployment rate, house 
price index and GDP for all countries over various years. Since not all data 
is available for the year 2014, we replace the missing values with the infor-
mation from the most recent year in our data set (mostly 2013 or 2012). The 
data on long-term unemployment and the old-age-dependency ratio are 
downloaded from the World Bank’s database. Again, missing values in 2014 
are replaced with data from previous years. Information is available for 
nearly all countries, except for the house price index, which is missing for 
Greece and Poland.
Methodology
It is a one-sided and distorted view to regard the immigration of refugees 
as merely a costly process. In the medium and longer term, societies can 
greatly benefit in cultural and economic terms if the economic and social 
integration of refugees is successful. This particularly holds true for EU 
countries, with their aging and shrinking populations. Nevertheless, in what 
follows, we concentrate on the more short-run aspect, the process of the 
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initial reception of refugees, including the administrative burden related 
to the reception, hosting and legal processes of refugees.39
The initial hosting of refugees and their administration implies the provi-
sion of a public good with cross-border spillover effects. All EU countries 
benefit when a country hosts refugees, for example, because it enhances 
international stability or satisfies the shared European obligation to safeguard 
human rights. Nevertheless, each individual member country has an incen-
tive to free ride and to minimise the number of refugees it hosts, such as by 
using restrictive policies to discourage applicants (see Thielemann 2010). If 
all states expect this to happen, none will be willing to shoulder the costs of 
hosting additional refugees anymore (Suhrke 1998; Hatton 2012). Thielemann 
(2010) argues that Europe’s asylum policy needs to be a level playing field 
that guarantees comparable help for all persons in need across all member 
states, which might prevent free riding and a race to the bottom. The current 
dramatic increase in the number of refugees and the striking misbalance in 
the reception rates of EU countries demonstrate that the free-riding issue 
under the status quo is of massive importance and carries far-reaching risks 
for European integration in general.
If the free-rider problem is large and the responsibility for hosting refugees 
is concentrated in only some countries, one needs to think about a cooper-
ative system of fair responsibility-sharing. The idea behind the capacity index 
is that dealing with large numbers of incoming refugees from other countries 
at the EU’s external borders in a manner that adheres to the Dublin Regula-
tion makes it necessary to fairly distribute this inflow among all European 
countries. But the question remains of how such a capacity is to be deter-
mined. Various indices can be computed given that individual factors and 
their weighting can be adjusted in several ways, which in turn influences the 
capacities (for further discussion, see Czaika 2005 and Thielemann et al. 2010). 
We compute two different capacity indices (see Figure 2) to account for the 
fact that there is not one single index that perfectly maps the capacity of 
countries to cope with refugees and asylum-seekers. The range for both 
indices is between 0 and 100. If a country has a capacity index of 15, then it 
should host 15 per cent of all refugees across Europe. 
For all subsequent computations, we averaged the existing data over the 
last five years to account for possible shocks in a certain year. An outlier 
would probably have a major influence on the capacity index even if it were 
only an outlier for a single year. For example, if Germany’s GDP collapsed in 
2014 due to some cyclical imbalances, we would presume that Germany’s 
capacity would be much lower even though its GDP might have been stable 
over many years and will recover in 2015. Thus, averaging over previous years 
makes the indicators less prone to cyclical imbalances.
The first capacity index (CI 1), following suggestions in Angenendt, Engler 
and Schneider (2013), is composed of four factors for each country: GDP, 
population, area and unemployment. Since we aim at distributing refugees 
coming to the EU, all numbers are expressed in shares of total EU values. The 
higher a country’s share of GDP is in terms of overall European GDP, the 
higher its capacity is to take care of additional refugees. It is assumed that 
countries with relatively high shares of GDP generally have higher 
39  Measuring the long-term benefits of refugees and asylum-seekers is hard to do, as czaika (2005), for example, 
has pointed out.
Internal market consistency
 5 Since the Schengen agreement was introduced in 1995, there have been no internal borders between Schengen countries, and persons, goods, services and capital have been able to move freely within 
the borderless Schengen area. This makes it easier for refugees to move within Europe without 
being effectively controlled or held back from crossing national borders. The free-movement 
agreement is threatened if responsibilities for refugees among member states are unclear, as states 
might reintroduce border controls (Thielemann et al. 2010). This risk has massively increased with 
the dramatic surge in refugees in 2015. Thus, a centralised solution would clearly help prevent the 
reintroduction of border controls and thereby support the internal market.
Competition
 4 competition in the policy field of asylum and refugees has two effects: On the one hand, yardstick competition might encourage the further development of best practices that could improve the 
quality of refugee-hosting efforts. On the other hand, without effective sanctions and binding 
standards, there will be a race to the bottom that only worsens the situation of refugees and asylum-
seekers. Thus, combining centralised non-competitive regulations at the EU level and local initiatives 
that compete to further improve good practices would be best.
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Data source
To quantify the extent of free riding among member states in the case of 
hosting asylum-seekers and refugees, we use data on the member states 
level from Eurostat, the European Commission, the World Bank and the 
UNHCR.
We collect information on the number of refugees and asylum-seekers 
for all EU-28 countries using the UNHCR database. We include all persons 
being categorised as either a refugee or an asylum-seeker whose applica-
tion was pending at the end of 2014. Stateless persons and other refugees 
(e.g. intra-country refugees) are excluded. The share of each member state’s 
contribution to the EU budget is taken from the EU Budget 2013 Financial 
Report (European Commission 2014b). Since information on the EU budget 
for 2014 was not available at the time of the computations, we refer to the 
2013 figures. In order to compute our capacity indices, we make use of 
various information on the EU-28 countries available from Eurostat, 
including population, population density, area, unemployment rate, house 
price index and GDP for all countries over various years. Since not all data 
is available for the year 2014, we replace the missing values with the infor-
mation from the most recent year in our data set (mostly 2013 or 2012). The 
data on long-term unemployment and the old-age-dependency ratio are 
downloaded from the World Bank’s database. Again, missing values in 2014 
are replaced with data from previous years. Information is available for 
nearly all countries, except for the house price index, which is missing for 
Greece and Poland.
Methodology
It is a one-sided and distorted view to regard the immigration of refugees 
as merely a costly process. In the medium and longer term, societies can 
greatly benefit in cultural and economic terms if the economic and social 
integration of refugees is successful. This particularly holds true for EU 
countries, with their aging and shrinking populations. Nevertheless, in what 
follows, we concentrate on the more short-run aspect, the process of the 
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capacities to accommodate more people in need. For countries with a higher 
share of overall European population and surface area, it might be easier to 
integrate refugees. Since even big and economically prosperous economies 
can experience periods of high unemployment, this factor is also included 
in the calculation. The higher a country’s unemployment rate is in compar-
ison to other European countries, the smaller the labour market’s ability is 
to absorb additional workers.40 Another argument, which is presented in the 
report by the council of experts, posits that people are less willing to provide 
safety to refugees during periods of high unemployment due to rising 
xenophobia.41 In the expert council’s suggested method of calculation, a 
country’s economic power and population size are weighted the most, whereas 
its area and unemployment level are weighted less.42
We come up with an alternative measure of capacity (CI 2) that differs in 
terms of both the criteria considered and the weights assigned. Though based 
on general considerations, it reflects our own thoughts and ideas on how to 
measure capacities best. As in the previous case, economic power (measured 
by GDP) is the most important criterion and is weighted with a factor of 0.4. 
For the same reasons as explained above, we include the unemployment rate 
in our index and weight it with a factor of 0.2. We replace the share of the 
population and the share of the area with the population density of countries, 
assuming that countries across Europe with a higher density have fewer 
capacities to absorb additional people. This accounts for the fact that there 
are some small countries with relatively many inhabitants (e.g. Malta) and 
some rather large countries with relatively few inhabitants (e.g. Sweden). The 
tension on the national housing market might be another point impacting a 
country’s capacity, as finding accommodations for additional refugees in an 
already tight housing market will presumably drive up the costs of taking 
care of people in need. Indeed, if the tension is pronounced, countries might 
not be able to provide any housing for refugees. Thus, a higher house price 
index in the European context decreases the capacities of countries. The last 
criterion should reflect the demographic change in countries with aging 
societies. As a proxy for this, we include the old-age-dependency ratio in our 
computations, which reflects the number of people above 64 as the share of 
all working-age people (15- to 64-years-old). However, the direction of the 
effect is unclear, as it could increase or decrease the capacity. On the one 
hand, a larger dependency ratio might express the financial pressure on the 
welfare state since a shrinking number of workers need to take care of an 
increasing number of elderly individuals, which would denote a lower capacity 
to accept additional refugees. On the other hand, a larger ratio reveals that 
a country needs to have more and younger people to combat demographic 
changes and cope with aging societies. In this case, refugees might fill this 
gap and help resolve demographic problems. Due to the well-known 
40  This is especially true if refugees and asylum-seekers do not fill jobs that are open due to a shortage of  specialists. 
41  The Expert council of German Foundations on integration and Migration (Svr).
42  Some criteria are said to have a negative effect on a country’s capacity. in these cases, we use the inverse of 
the respective criterion, which is defined as:  
 when a criterion has no natural comparison group (such as in the case of EU population or EU area) and is 
said to reduce a country’s capacity, it is calculated as:   
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demographic problems in mature economies, we expect the latter effect to 
dominate, which results in an increasing effect of the old-age-dependency 
ratio on the capacity index.43 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of incoming refugees and asylum-seekers 
across countries in per cent. When comparing both indices, it is obvious that 
the first one (blue bars) concentrates the pressure of taking care of refugees 
on economically stronger and larger states, such as Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. When including a broader set of criteria (red 
bars) that might counteract economic power or attenuate its effect, the burden 
is shared more equally across all European countries.
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compares the current situation, in which countries are essentially responsible 
for taking care of refugees on their own, to a situation into which a fixed quota 
has been introduced. In doing so, we can then determine which countries are 
hosting fewer refugees than the indices would suggest – in other words, which 
countries are free riding on the efforts of countries hosting more refugees 
than they should, based on relative calculated capacities.
43  replacing the positive effect of the old-age-dependency ratio with a negative one does not extensively alter 
the capacity per country. 
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Different capacity indices for EU countries (in per cent)
Sources: Eurostat, World Bank, UNHCR
capacities to accommodate more people in need. For countries with a higher 
share of overall European population and surface area, it might be easier to 
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its area and unemployment level are weighted less.42
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assuming that countries across Europe with a higher density have fewer 
capacities to absorb additional people. This accounts for the fact that there 
are some small countries with relatively many inhabitants (e.g. Malta) and 
some rather large countries with relatively few inhabitants (e.g. Sweden). The 
tension on the national housing market might be another point impacting a 
country’s capacity, as finding accommodations for additional refugees in an 
already tight housing market will presumably drive up the costs of taking 
care of people in need. Indeed, if the tension is pronounced, countries might 
not be able to provide any housing for refugees. Thus, a higher house price 
index in the European context decreases the capacities of countries. The last 
criterion should reflect the demographic change in countries with aging 
societies. As a proxy for this, we include the old-age-dependency ratio in our 
computations, which reflects the number of people above 64 as the share of 
all working-age people (15- to 64-years-old). However, the direction of the 
effect is unclear, as it could increase or decrease the capacity. On the one 
hand, a larger dependency ratio might express the financial pressure on the 
welfare state since a shrinking number of workers need to take care of an 
increasing number of elderly individuals, which would denote a lower capacity 
to accept additional refugees. On the other hand, a larger ratio reveals that 
a country needs to have more and younger people to combat demographic 
changes and cope with aging societies. In this case, refugees might fill this 
gap and help resolve demographic problems. Due to the well-known 
40  This is especially true if refugees and asylum-seekers do not fill jobs that are open due to a shortage of  specialists. 
41  The Expert council of German Foundations on integration and Migration (Svr).
42  Some criteria are said to have a negative effect on a country’s capacity. in these cases, we use the inverse of 
the respective criterion, which is defined as:  
 when a criterion has no natural comparison group (such as in the case of EU population or EU area) and is 
said to reduce a country’s capacity, it is calculated as:   
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Results
To determine whether there is significant free riding under the status quo 
and whether this can potentially be attenuated by using another mechanism, 
we compute two different measures for both scenarios. Instead of calling 
them ‘burden shares’ , we refer to them as ‘responsibility shares’ , which is 
used more commonly when talking about refugees (Thielemann et al. 2010).44 
First, to determine the extent of free riding under the status quo, we 
compute the responsibility share when the asylum and refugee policy is 
executed by the member states alone, using the following equation:
At present, there is no binding mechanism that obliges states to provide 
accommodations to a certain number of refugees coming to Europe or to 
distribute the refugees based on a quota. According to the Dublin Regulation, 
each member state is supposed to take care of the refugees that come into 
the country using its own means. Thus, we compare the capacity with the 
actual number of hosted persons. We then compute the standard deviation 
of the distribution to detect the diversity of the distribution. 
The counterfactual represents a situation in which the distribution of 
refugees is centralised at the EU level. We assume that the total number of 
people in need is distributed among member states according to two different 
indicators: a quota proposed by the European Commission in May 2015 (see 
European Commission 2015) and the member states’ share of total contribu-
tions to the overall EU budget. Both distribution mechanisms will be 
examined in detail further below.
The first suggestion assumes that a fair distribution of refugees can be 
achieved by using the countries’ shares of the overall EU budget. It can be 
computed easily and already reflects some differences between countries and 
their respective capacities. The rationale behind this is that wealthier and 
larger countries should shoulder a bigger burden than smaller or poorer 
countries. A country’s share of the EU budget is computed as its own contri-
bution in relation to the overall EU budget. 
Due to the massive inflow of refugees from several crisis-stricken countries 
and the uneven distribution of refugees among member states, the European 
Commission (EU COM) suggested that a fair quota should be introduced.45 
Using a variation of this quota, we compute the share of refugees that each 
member state would need to host. The quota is calculated as follows: 
44  an overview of all computed indices can be found in Table 2 in the appendix.
45  The quota proposed by the European commission includes the following factors: Gdp (40%), population 
(40%), average number of asylum applicants between 2010 and 2014 (10%), and the unemployment rate 
(10%).
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Thus, this quota takes into account each country’s economic power and popu-
lation as well as its share of already-hosted refugees and its unemployment 
rate. According to this logic, if either the EU budget share or the quota were 
similar or equal to the capacity index, free riding would be no longer be a 
problem. 
We then compute the same responsibility shares as we have done in the 
national case. To estimate the extent of free riding, we subtract the alterna-
tive measure (EU COM or Budget) from the capacity indices and examine 
whether the distribution among states becomes more even. This is again 
measured as the standard deviation of the distribution. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 (below) represent the net-receiver and net-payer coun-
tries for both scenarios, with blue bars indicating national responsibility and 
red bars European responsibility. On the Y-axis, one can see the gap between 
the capacity index and the alternative measure in per cent. In both figures, 
one can observe that extreme cases are more frequent in the national case 
than they are in the European one. Using the European Commission’s proposal 
as the counterfactual situation and comparing it to CI 1 reduces the diversity 
of the distribution by 70 per cent. In the alternative case, the EU budget would 
decrease the unequal distribution by about 55 per cent. Figures for the case 
of the second capacity index for both the European Commission’s suggestion 
and the EU budget can be found in the Appendix (Figure 8 and Figure 9).
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Figure  3:
Net benefit of asylum policies using the European Commission’s suggestion and CI 1 (in per cent)
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and whether this can potentially be attenuated by using another mechanism, 
we compute two different measures for both scenarios. Instead of calling 
them ‘burden shares’ , we refer to them as ‘responsibility shares’ , which is 
used more commonly when talking about refugees (Thielemann et al. 2010).44 
First, to determine the extent of free riding under the status quo, we 
compute the responsibility share when the asylum and refugee policy is 
executed by the member states alone, using the following equation:
At present, there is no binding mechanism that obliges states to provide 
accommodations to a certain number of refugees coming to Europe or to 
distribute the refugees based on a quota. According to the Dublin Regulation, 
each member state is supposed to take care of the refugees that come into 
the country using its own means. Thus, we compare the capacity with the 
actual number of hosted persons. We then compute the standard deviation 
of the distribution to detect the diversity of the distribution. 
The counterfactual represents a situation in which the distribution of 
refugees is centralised at the EU level. We assume that the total number of 
people in need is distributed among member states according to two different 
indicators: a quota proposed by the European Commission in May 2015 (see 
European Commission 2015) and the member states’ share of total contribu-
tions to the overall EU budget. Both distribution mechanisms will be 
examined in detail further below.
The first suggestion assumes that a fair distribution of refugees can be 
achieved by using the countries’ shares of the overall EU budget. It can be 
computed easily and already reflects some differences between countries and 
their respective capacities. The rationale behind this is that wealthier and 
larger countries should shoulder a bigger burden than smaller or poorer 
countries. A country’s share of the EU budget is computed as its own contri-
bution in relation to the overall EU budget. 
Due to the massive inflow of refugees from several crisis-stricken countries 
and the uneven distribution of refugees among member states, the European 
Commission (EU COM) suggested that a fair quota should be introduced.45 
Using a variation of this quota, we compute the share of refugees that each 
member state would need to host. The quota is calculated as follows: 
44  an overview of all computed indices can be found in Table 2 in the appendix.
45  The quota proposed by the European commission includes the following factors: Gdp (40%), population 
(40%), average number of asylum applicants between 2010 and 2014 (10%), and the unemployment rate 
(10%).
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Since we have designated the net payers and net receivers under the status 
quo, turning to a European solution will of course leave some countries worse 
off and other countries better off. This would mean that some countries need 
to increase the number of refugees they host, while others would be allowed 
to decrease their number accordingly. 
The biggest effects in terms of aligning benefits and costs can be achieved 
if we use the first capacity index (CI 1) and distribute refugees according to 
the suggestion of the European Commission.46 In addition, inequality is 
similarly reduced if we distribute persons according to a country’s share of 
the EU budget.
For both preferred cases – CI 1 with EU COM and CI 1 with EU budget – we 
compute the change in the standard deviation. In case of the first scenario 
(CI 1/EU COM), we achieve a reduction of 70 per cent, while the second 
scenario (CI 1/EU budget) gives us a reduction of about 60 per cent. We end 
up with a score of 5, which indicates that free riding will be significantly 
reduced in either case. Thus, reallocating the competences in the asylum and 
refugee policy from the national to the European level will generate benefits 
and reduce free riding.
However, one should note that these results were calculated using data 
until mid-2015. Since misbalances in the 2015 reception quotes are likely to 
massively increase, this result is likely to underestimate the potential benefits 
of an EU approach.
46  Of course, this is due to the high weights given to Gdp and population size in both measures.
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Figure  4:
Net benefit of asylum policies using the EU budget and CI 1 (in per cent)
Sources: Eurostat, World Bank, UNHCR
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Data source and methodology
The policy field of asylum and refugees might reveal economies of scale when 
going from national to European-wide competences or full European respon-
sibility. Detecting them is a difficult task, however, as the availability of 
data – and especially administrative data – is poor. Indeed, since it is nearly 
impossible to obtain budgetary data from EU countries on the costs of hosting 
asylum-seekers, we rely on two studies that have tried to collect data on 
these costs by themselves (Thielemann et al. 2010; Urth et al. 2013).47 In 
comparing their data, one notices that they differ greatly in terms of costs 
per case even between countries with similar costs of living. This might point 
to severe data problems and/or a high degree of variance in actual service 
provision (e.g. high detention rates in the UK). Nevertheless, there are a 
number of quantitative hints and compelling arguments indicating potential 
savings along several dimensions:48
•	 In countries with a homogenous group of asylum-seekers, caseworkers 
are able to process more cases per year than their counterparts in countries 
with heterogeneous groups (Urth et al. 2013). This indicates specialisation 
advantages over all phases of the asylum process, including preparation, 
decision-making (through economies in information provision on country 
of origin) and appeal procedures. 
•	 Some of the countries with very high costs per case are ones with both a 
very low number of asylum-seekers and a GDP level far below the EU 
average (Thielemann et al. 2010). This is a clear indication of high fixed 
costs and speaks in favour of potential economies of scale.49
•	 Having the EU provide (and finance) all services would render the Dublin 
system redundant. No mechanism would be needed to determine which 
member state bears these responsibilities because the EU would have taken 
them over. As a consequence, all particular Dublin-related tasks and expenses, 
including the administration and enforcement of Dublin transfers, could be 
eliminated. This study does not aim at estimating these cost savings.
•	 A European solution may be better at coping with volatility in the regional 
distribution of immigration flows. Currently, national administrations 
suffer from capacity constraints that lead to costly delays in asylum 
decisions. A European administration, however, could more easily shift 
its resources to the critical entry points and speed up final decisions.50
47  For details, see Table 4 in the appendix.
48  One caveat that is standard in any reflection on a transfer of competences to the EU level applies here: 
Economies of scale are only realistic if the service continues to be applied at average wage scales of national 
administrations. if average national pay were replaced by EU salaries, the most likely impact would be a cost 
push rather than a balancing of any economies in European service provision. For an example of this based on 
European defence, see Bassford et al. (2013).
49  The example given is Estonia, which had a very low number of applicants in the reference year. no evidence 
exists on whether economies of scale are still important at the much larger numbers characterising the cur-
rent situation. calculations by the authors do not indicate economies of scale for Germany’s 16 federal states, 
with their different sizes and numbers of asylum cases.
50  Under the status quo, the European asylum Support Office (EaSO) already has the function of organising 
assistance for particularly needy member states in order to speed up decision-making processes. 
Since we have designated the net payers and net receivers under the status 
quo, turning to a European solution will of course leave some countries worse 
off and other countries better off. This would mean that some countries need 
to increase the number of refugees they host, while others would be allowed 
to decrease their number accordingly. 
The biggest effects in terms of aligning benefits and costs can be achieved 
if we use the first capacity index (CI 1) and distribute refugees according to 
the suggestion of the European Commission.46 In addition, inequality is 
similarly reduced if we distribute persons according to a country’s share of 
the EU budget.
For both preferred cases – CI 1 with EU COM and CI 1 with EU budget – we 
compute the change in the standard deviation. In case of the first scenario 
(CI 1/EU COM), we achieve a reduction of 70 per cent, while the second 
scenario (CI 1/EU budget) gives us a reduction of about 60 per cent. We end 
up with a score of 5, which indicates that free riding will be significantly 
reduced in either case. Thus, reallocating the competences in the asylum and 
refugee policy from the national to the European level will generate benefits 
and reduce free riding.
However, one should note that these results were calculated using data 
until mid-2015. Since misbalances in the 2015 reception quotes are likely to 
massively increase, this result is likely to underestimate the potential benefits 
of an EU approach.
46  Of course, this is due to the high weights given to Gdp and population size in both measures.
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To cope with the data problems described above, we base our quantification 
on an anchor provided by Thielemann et al. (2010): a standardised average 
measure of unit costs across EU countries for the year 2007 per asylum appli-
cation.51 We then inflate this amount in proportion to the growth in nominal 
GDP between 2007 and 2015 (resulting in an EU average of €16,570 per asylum 
application).52 In the following, we assume that this amount also indicates 
the (GDP-adjusted) costs of asylum services at a truly unified EU standard 
(assuming a convergence to the mean of current EU standards). On that basis, 
we are able to provide country-specific unit costs that, by design, only mirror 
differences in GDP (see Table 4 in the Appendix). The assumption is that 
country costs vary along with average income (which approximates differ-
ences in the costs of living, including health-related service provision, accom-
modation and transfer needs).
To relate actual costs to potential cost savings, we compute the emerging 
costs per EU country and in total, which are based on estimates of the uniform 
service unit costs that would arise in 2015 (given our projection of refugees 
for that year).53, 54 The resulting total budgetary estimate is €30.3 billion, or 
21.5 per cent of the current 2015 EU budget, which is €141.2 billion in total. 
According to our projections, this amount would suffice to finance the 
processes of all asylum-seekers who apply in 2015. If we assume that the flow 
of new asylum-seekers will remain at that constant level, this amount can 
be viewed as the necessary annual budget for handling asylum-seekers.
Results
No reliable quantifications for potential economies of scale exist or could be 
derived given the available data. However, we can indicate potential magni-
tudes using assumption-based scenarios. For that purpose, we distinguish 
between the different categories in asylum-related costs. European service 
51  national unit costs are adjusted in proportion to a country’s per capita Gdp to the EU average (population 
weighted). For more details, see Thielemann et al. (2010), appendix 4.
52  in Germany, the federal government has recently committed itself to reimbursing the 16 federal states for 
each applicant with €670 per month, which amounts to annual unit costs of €8,040 (assuming the procedure 
lasts 12 months). no information was given on whether this refund is meant to be a partial or full compensa-
tion for all costs incurred. Furthermore, this refund is meant to help the states perform reception services, 
whereas it is still the central government’s responsibility to execute and fund the asylum procedure.
53  For details on the costs per country, see Table 3 in the appendix.
54  we base our projections of the number of asylum-seekers in Europe for 2015 on figures provided by Eurostat. 
The data displays all registered asylum-seekers who made a claim for asylum in the respective country and 
month. The number of asylum claims is reported until June 2015 for all EU-28 countries, while the numbers 
for the following two months were not completely available at the time of writing. For this reason, we have 
supplied missing values for august and September by using the average growth rate of asylum claims be-
tween January and June. we extrapolate the remaining months of the year by applying the average growth 
rates between January and September, and project the total number of asylum applicants per country for the 
year 2015. Our projections certainly show a lower bound of the number of asylum claims, as we have only taken 
into account the official number of asylum applications. Since there is a time lag between the date when a 
refugee enters a country and the date when he or she submits an official claim for asylum (this can currently 
take more than three months in some countries), we note that we have not fully tracked the massive inflow of 
refugees who arrived in august and September and will only be registered in the following months. in order 
to avoid any largely speculative guesses, we base our calculations on the projection as described. The massive 
increase in the number of asylum-seekers in Hungary is mainly due to the fact that we base our projections 
on a period when Hungary’s borders were open and the government was registering all incoming persons. 
The closing of Hungary’s borders in the beginning of September 2015 reduced the pressure on the country 
and passed it on, so to speak, to other European countries, such as austria and Germany. Thus, it is likely that 
our numbers are either underestimates, as in the case of Germany, or overestimates, as with Hungary.
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provision, for example, is likely to have a larger cost-saving potential when 
it comes to assessing applications than providing healthcare services to appli-
cants. Thus, economies of specialisation could be larger for the former and 
would be smaller for the latter.55
Table 1 provides an estimate of the cost structure of asylum expenses 
derived from a country survey (Thielemann et al. 2010). On that basis, we 
calculate a ‘conservative’ and an ‘optimistic’ scenario with respect to the 
cost savings from European processing. For example, we assume that, in a 
scenario with centralised competences, housing could be provided to refugees 
at a cost advantage of 5 per cent for the moderate scenario (and 30 per cent 
for the optimistic scenario) compared to national provision. An advocate of 
the optimistic scenario for housing would point to the shorter duration of 
the asylum process, which would consequentially reduce the need to finance 
accommodation over the course of the asylum procedure. In line with the 
above reasoning, we assume that economies of scale have a larger potential 
for the asylum process as such than for the costs of reception (e.g. for 
providing housing, healthcare and material reception items, such as clothing 
and food). We assume that the largest savings from European service provi-
sion would come in the areas of custody and travel expenses, which are 
strongly influenced by the Dublin rules under the status quo.
The scenario-based calculus indicates cost savings ranging between 16 and 
40 per cent as a consequence of European service provision. In absolute terms, 
based on the calculations for total costs for 2015 (see Table 3 in the Appendix), 
this would amount to savings of between €4.8 billion and €12 billion.
Table 1:  
Scenarios on economies of scale from eU service provision in asylum policies
Share of 
cost item  
(in per cent)
Assumed cost 
advantage (in 
per cent)
Resulting costs, as 
a percentage of 
current total costs
conservative Optimistic conservative Optimistic
(1) (2) (3) (4) =
(1) × (2)
(5) =
(1) × (3)
Housing 42.7 95 70 40.5 29.9
Healthcare 4.6 95 70 4.4 3.2
Material reception 
conditions
11.5 95 70 10.9 8.0
Translation 1.0 80 60 0.8 0.6
application assessment 13.8 80 60 11.0 8.3
legal aid 3.9 80 60 3.1 2.3
legal appeals 1.2 85 65 1.0 0.8
Taking and storing 
fingerprints
0.2 100 95 0.2 0.2
custody 15.6 50 20 7.8 3.1
Travel 2.2 50 20 1.1 0.4
Other costs 3.5 100 100 3.5 3.5
100.0 84.3 60.3
 
Sources: column (1): Thielemann et al. (2010): 90; columns (2) and (3): scenario assumptions; columns (4) and (5): 
own calculations. Therefore, we assign a score of 4 to account for the potential benefits of a European solution as 
is given in our analyses while acknowledging that the computation of economies of scales is difficult to do. 
55  For a similar approach to the potential cost savings resulting from EU service provision, see Heinemann et al. (2013).
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supplied missing values for august and September by using the average growth rate of asylum claims be-
tween January and June. we extrapolate the remaining months of the year by applying the average growth 
rates between January and September, and project the total number of asylum applicants per country for the 
year 2015. Our projections certainly show a lower bound of the number of asylum claims, as we have only taken 
into account the official number of asylum applications. Since there is a time lag between the date when a 
refugee enters a country and the date when he or she submits an official claim for asylum (this can currently 
take more than three months in some countries), we note that we have not fully tracked the massive inflow of 
refugees who arrived in august and September and will only be registered in the following months. in order 
to avoid any largely speculative guesses, we base our calculations on the projection as described. The massive 
increase in the number of asylum-seekers in Hungary is mainly due to the fact that we base our projections 
on a period when Hungary’s borders were open and the government was registering all incoming persons. 
The closing of Hungary’s borders in the beginning of September 2015 reduced the pressure on the country 
and passed it on, so to speak, to other European countries, such as austria and Germany. Thus, it is likely that 
our numbers are either underestimates, as in the case of Germany, or overestimates, as with Hungary.
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding asylum, we 
use two questions from the Eurobarometer questionnaire No. 82 (Autumn 2014). 
To be more specific, we focus on questions QA11.1 (“Please tell me whether each 
of the following statements evokes a positive or a negative feeling for you – 
Immigration of people from other EU Member States”) and QA11.2 (“Please tell 
me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or a negative 
feeling for you – Immigration of people from outside the EU”).
Answers could be given in a scale with four levels (‘very positive’ , ‘positive’ , 
‘negative’ and ‘very negative’). In addition, participants had the opportunity 
to suppress their opinion.
Figure 5: 
Preferences for migration from the EU (in per cent)
Migration from other EU member states
Eurobarometer question EB82.3 Qa11.1: “please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a 
positive or a negative feeling for you – immigration of people from other EU Member States”
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Figure  5:
Preferences for migration from the EU (in per cent)
Median 0.580
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.128
Heterogeneity 25.6 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly positive’ in a country. The 
answer choice ‘very positive’ is merged with ‘fairly positive’, and ‘fairly negative’ is merged with ‘very negative’. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size as 
weights, the standard deviation equals 0.114, resulting in a heterogeneity value of 22.9 per cent.
Methodology
We reduce the scale from four to two levels, meaning we merge the answer 
level of ‘very positive’ with ‘fairly positive’ and that of ‘fairly negative’ with 
‘very negative’. We also exclude all participants who suppressed their opinion, 
that is, we adjust our sample such that the shares of answers in our two levels 
add up to 100 per cent. This leads to a reduction in the country-sample size 
of up to 4 per cent (in Spain and Latvia). The overall reduction on the EU level 
of 2 per cent is of minor importance and can therefore be neglected without 
materially affecting our results.
The results are calculated in a two-step procedure. First, we calculate the 
percentage of answers with ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly positive’ for each 
country. Then, we aggregate the results at the country-level and calculate 
measures of dispersion on the EU level (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
69
Results
Since both distributions show that preferences are pretty homogenous across 
countries (with heterogeneity indicators between 25 and 30 per cent), we 
presume that this does not point to any large preference costs from central-
ising the policy on the European level.56 Hence, following our methodology, 
we assign a score of 5 to this indicator.
The finding of rather homogeneous views on immigration may come as a 
surprise given the very different policies applied in the current refugee crisis. 
However, this current behaviour is a logical outcome of incentives for free 
riding rather than a reflection of highly diverse voter preferences. Even with 
rather homogeneous voter preferences across countries, it is a rational reaction 
of one country to free ride on the costs imposed on other countries.
Figure 6: 
Preferences for migration from outside the EU (in per cent)
Migration from outside the EU
Eurobarometer question EB82.3 Qa11.2: “please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a 
positive or a negative feeling for you – immigration of people from outside the EU”
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Figure  6:
Preferences for migration from outside the EU (in per cent)
Median 0.340
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.139
Heterogeneity 27.8 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very positive’ and ‘fairly positive’ in a country. The 
answer choice ‘very positive’ is merged with ‘fairly positive’, and ‘fairly negative’ is merged with ‘very negative’. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size as 
weights, the standard deviation equals 0.118, resulting in a heterogeneity value of 23.7 per cent.
inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
The internal market as introduced on 1 January 1993 guarantees the free move-
ment of persons, goods, services and capital. In addition, the establishment 
of the Schengen Area in 1995 guarantees that all Europeans can move freely 
within the Schengen Area without being subject to any border or pass 
controls – in other words, that all internal borders can be crossed without any 
obstacle. However, asylum-seekers and refugees from outside the EU do not 
enjoy the same rights as European citizens under the Schengen regulation. 
Instead, they are obliged to stay in the country where they were first regis-
tered and issued their asylum application. According to the Dublin regulations, 
the asylum application needs to be assessed in the first member state in which 
56  in the appendix, we check whether attitudes towards migration are stable over time and across countries.
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a refugee entered the European Union (see Dublin regulations II and III).57 
At present, no country has an incentive to stick to the Dublin rules and 
thereby allow refugees to stay in the country, but all have an incentive to 
send them on to other countries. If the number of refugees and asylum-
seekers increases over time and countries refuse to register them, members 
of the Schengen Area may be tempted to reintroduce border checks and pass-
port controls or even to close their borders.58 Doing so would not only hold 
refugees back from crossing borders, but would also harm the free movement 
of European citizens as well as the free exchange of goods. 
A recent study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Petersen, Böhmer and Weisser 
2014) tried to compute the gains from the single market and increased 
integration over the last 20 years. It finds that almost all countries have 
benefited from the opening of the internal borders as a result of rising 
economic prosperity and per capita income. Limitations on the freedoms of 
the internal market, however, would probably dampen the positive effects 
they have brought about in recent years. Thus, the uncoordinated asylum and 
refugee policy of EU member states, as it is applied under the recent legal 
rules, could potentially harm the internal market. One option for trying to 
avert such damage could be a coordinated and harmonised policy that is 
binding for all member states.
Given the importance of the free movement of goods and people within 
the Schengen Area, we assign the maximum number of points (5) to this 
policy field.
ComPetition
Following the theory of fiscal federalism, competition can result in either 
positive or negative effects. Yardstick competition in the field of asylum 
policy among member states can encourage best practice solutions (Schamman 
2015). Likewise, in the spirit of Oates (1999), the European Union can be 
thought of as an innovative laboratory in which member states continuously 
improve the asylum procedure. Best practice solutions of one member state 
may be recognised, adopted and further improved by others. Non-optimal 
solutions will be replaced by more efficient ones, thereby leading to an 
increase in overall welfare. In the course of the asylum procedure, there are 
many stages at which the processes can be enhanced by experimenting with 
different solutions. For instance, a member state may improve its asylum 
application procedure by enhancing efficiency while maintaining quality. In 
addition, different local units taking care of refugees may try to experiment 
with different kinds of accommodation (central vs. decentral) or the various 
ways of organising healthcare, as can be observed among Germany’s federal 
states (see Schamman 2015).59
57  For more information, see the most recent and the preceding regulation issued by the European council: 
council regulation (Ec) no 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European 
parliament and of the council of 26 June 2013.
58  The introduction of border controls was widely discussed among European countries in 2015 (e.g. in austria, 
Germany and Hungary). in late summer 2015, many countries refused to register refugees under the dublin 
regulation and instead let refugees pass through their country and on to central Europe (an example is 
Hungary in September 2015). 
59  in Germany, some federal states (the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen) decided to insure refugees and 
 asylum-seekers in the local insurance funds (Krankenkassen) right from the start. They issued insurance 
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In general, a functioning yardstick competition requires mechanisms for 
sanctions and rewards that need to be available for the affected persons. The 
mechanisms are standard voting (i.e. replacing politicians who do not act 
according to the will of the majority of voters) or ‘voting by feet’ (i.e. leaving 
the jurisdiction and moving to another jurisdiction with a better policy match). 
In contrast, refugees and asylum-seekers are not allowed either to choose 
their location freely or participate in elections (ibid.). Without sanctions, 
however, there is no incentive for member states to improve the quality of 
the treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers. If anything, this creates an 
incentive to minimise inputs and reduce the quality of output, thereby 
triggering a ‘race to the bottom’ among members of a federal union. Insuffi-
ciently binding minimum standards for member states regarding how to treat 
refugees might exacerbate this situation (Czaika 2005). 
Recent evidence pointing to the existence of such a race to the bottom, as 
well as to discrepancies in terms of the quality of treatment provided to 
refugees and asylum-seekers, can be found in Greece, for example. Although 
Germany would theoretically be allowed to send back to Greece all refugees 
originally registered there, it refuses to do so because living conditions in the 
camps in Greece are classified as not complying with human rights (Schamman 
2015). Likewise, already back in 2011, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) decided that Belgium had no right to send an Afghan refugee back to 
Greece because the treatment there violated minimum standards and human 
rights (see European Court of Human Rights 2011).
The race to the bottom regarding the quality of treatment is one concern when 
considering competition in the policy field of asylum and refugees. But common 
standards regarding the accommodation and treatment of refugees and asylum-
seekers are not the only pitfalls, as there is also the issue of divergent classifi-
cation standards. Under the current system, every EU member state can define 
its own list of ‘safe countries of origin’ and calibrate its designation of ‘safe’ 
based loosely on criteria set by the EU (Lambert 2012). Accordingly, asylum-
seekers from countries designated as safe have poorer chances of being officially 
recognised and accepted – and may therefore be sent home immediately (see, 
e.g., Hunt 2014 for a comprehensive overview). Given this situation, rather than 
positive competition for the best solutions, states may be tempted to enter into 
a race to the bottom by compiling longer lists of ‘safe’ countries and thereby 
reducing the number of potentially successful asylum applications. 
In general, the hosting of asylum-seekers and refugees is outsourced to 
some members states (countries with external borders in the south and the 
east or some attractive countries, such as Germany and Sweden), while others 
refuse to accommodate additional refugees. Thus, instead of having fair 
burden-sharing among European countries, some kind of a race to the bottom 
seems to be happening (Trauner 2015). This can be attributed to a missing 
mechanism for equitably distributing persons among member states.60
Other sources of harmful heterogeneity are the national asylum procedures. 
For instance, the admission rates for Syrian refugees varied between 0 and 100 
cards that can be used to visit doctors and receive basic treatment, and any costs are reimbursed by the state 
government. in most other states, however, it is still common that refugees and asylum-seekers need to go the 
authorities and obtain a certificate that enables them to see a doctor if they are ill. Only urgent illnesses are 
subject to treatment (e.g. pain management), but treatment is not provided for chronic illnesses. Since 2011, 
everyone who has been in Germany for at least one year has received an insurance card (see, e.g., rasche 2015).
60  a comprehensive discussion of the failure of the common European asylum policy and the dublin regulation 
can be found in Guild et al. (2015).
a refugee entered the European Union (see Dublin regulations II and III).57 
At present, no country has an incentive to stick to the Dublin rules and 
thereby allow refugees to stay in the country, but all have an incentive to 
send them on to other countries. If the number of refugees and asylum-
seekers increases over time and countries refuse to register them, members 
of the Schengen Area may be tempted to reintroduce border checks and pass-
port controls or even to close their borders.58 Doing so would not only hold 
refugees back from crossing borders, but would also harm the free movement 
of European citizens as well as the free exchange of goods. 
A recent study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Petersen, Böhmer and Weisser 
2014) tried to compute the gains from the single market and increased 
integration over the last 20 years. It finds that almost all countries have 
benefited from the opening of the internal borders as a result of rising 
economic prosperity and per capita income. Limitations on the freedoms of 
the internal market, however, would probably dampen the positive effects 
they have brought about in recent years. Thus, the uncoordinated asylum and 
refugee policy of EU member states, as it is applied under the recent legal 
rules, could potentially harm the internal market. One option for trying to 
avert such damage could be a coordinated and harmonised policy that is 
binding for all member states.
Given the importance of the free movement of goods and people within 
the Schengen Area, we assign the maximum number of points (5) to this 
policy field.
ComPetition
Following the theory of fiscal federalism, competition can result in either 
positive or negative effects. Yardstick competition in the field of asylum 
policy among member states can encourage best practice solutions (Schamman 
2015). Likewise, in the spirit of Oates (1999), the European Union can be 
thought of as an innovative laboratory in which member states continuously 
improve the asylum procedure. Best practice solutions of one member state 
may be recognised, adopted and further improved by others. Non-optimal 
solutions will be replaced by more efficient ones, thereby leading to an 
increase in overall welfare. In the course of the asylum procedure, there are 
many stages at which the processes can be enhanced by experimenting with 
different solutions. For instance, a member state may improve its asylum 
application procedure by enhancing efficiency while maintaining quality. In 
addition, different local units taking care of refugees may try to experiment 
with different kinds of accommodation (central vs. decentral) or the various 
ways of organising healthcare, as can be observed among Germany’s federal 
states (see Schamman 2015).59
57  For more information, see the most recent and the preceding regulation issued by the European council: 
council regulation (Ec) no 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, regulation (EU) no 604/2013 of the European 
parliament and of the council of 26 June 2013.
58  The introduction of border controls was widely discussed among European countries in 2015 (e.g. in austria, 
Germany and Hungary). in late summer 2015, many countries refused to register refugees under the dublin 
regulation and instead let refugees pass through their country and on to central Europe (an example is 
Hungary in September 2015). 
59  in Germany, some federal states (the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen) decided to insure refugees and 
 asylum-seekers in the local insurance funds (Krankenkassen) right from the start. They issued insurance 
 
72
per cent across member states in 2013 (see Figure 7), which lends support to the 
hypothesis that chances for admission differ across member states (de Haan 
and Toshkov 2013; Trauner 2015). A comparable finding of varying admission 
rates with similar refugees was found in the Swiss context, where part of the 
variation could be attributed to the different treatments found in the individual 
cantons (Holzer, Schneider and Widmer 2000).
0
270 0
85 0
40 0
15 0
15 0
10 0
10 0
10 0
2,005 10
1,195 60
1,535 85
8,700 495
150 10
105 10
785 85
11,390 1,480
1,295 195
1,455 230
1,695 295
935 190
145 30
130 45
120 70
105 70
395 385
10 10
5 5
5
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
MT
PL
IE
LV
PT
HR
LT
SK
BG
FR
BE
DE
ES
CZ
RO
SE
DK
UK
NL
AT
FI
HU
CY
GR
IT
LU
SI
EE
acceptances rejections
Figure  7:
Admission rates of Syrian refugees across Europe in 2013 (in per cent)
Notes: The X-axis denotes the share of positive decisions, which is represented for each country by dark-grey bars; the light-grey bars 
represent the rejections. The bold numbers are the absolute number of refugees with positive or negative decisions. The sum of both 
bold numbers is the sum of asylum applicants in the corresponding country in 2013. Source: Eurostat (own calculations).
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To let positive effects from competition unfold, institutional settings must 
be adapted to implement mechanisms for sanctions and rewards. A possible 
solution would be to uncouple the asylum procedure from hosting and 
integrating refugees, as is done in the Canadian immigration system, in 
which immigration control policy is centralised and immigration integration 
policy is the concern of the provinces (Boushey and Luedtke 2006; Hatton 
2015; Schuck 1997). Despite limited comparability of refugees and migrants, 
such a division of competences between the EU and its member states could 
eliminate mechanisms that encourage a race to the bottom by ensuring 
harmonised minimum standards in the sensitive area of refugee admission 
(e.g. fair division among member states, accommodation, etc.). Positive effects 
from yardstick competition can improve the situation of recognised refugees 
on the local level. For enabling positive effects from yardstick competition, 
a sensitive part of asylum policy must be shifted to the European level, and 
binding minimum standards for the member states must be defined and 
enforced by the supranational level. Competition can be significantly 
improved by allowing ‘more Europe’ , although a complete reallocation of 
competences would leave out gains from yardstick competition. Hence, we 
assign a score of 4 to this indicator.
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
Table 2:  
Computed indices for asylum and refugee policy
Country iSo Share of 
Refugees
Ci 1 Ci 2 Responsibility 
Share nat. 
(Ci 1)
Responsibility 
Share nat. 
(Ci 2)
Responsibility 
Share eU 
Budget (Ci 1)
Responsibility 
Share eU 
Com (Ci 1)
Responsibility 
Share eU 
Budget (Ci 2)
Responsibility 
Share eU 
Com (Ci 2)
austria aT 4.88 2.43 3.47 -2.45 -1.41 -0.01 0.16 1.03 1.20
Belgium BE 5.91 2.50 2.89 -3.41 -3.02 -0.66 0.05 -0.27 0.44
Bulgaria BG 1.21 1.22 2.29 0.01 1.09 0.88 0.16 1.95 1.23
croatia Hr 0.07 0.81 2.08 0.74 2.01 0.63 -1.33 1.90 -0.06
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Net benefit of asylum policies using the EU budget and CI 2 (in per cent)
Sources: Eurostat, World Bank, UNHCR
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Figure  9:
Net benefit of asylum policies using the EU Commission’s suggestion and CI 2 (in per cent)
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Economies of scale
Table 3:  
Cost estimates for EU financing of 2015 asylum applications
Country Asylum  
applications
Annual costs per  
case (in €)
EU financing
(in billions of €)
eU 100 per cent
EU financing
(in billions of €)
eU 50 per cent
Germany 514,240 21,163 10.8828 5.4414
Sweden 139,249 25,814 3.5946 1.7973
Hungary 509,677 6,628 3.3781 1.6890
austria 124,984 22,674 2.8339 1.4170
italy 121,644 15,581 1.8954 0.9477
France 88,979 19,128 1.7020 0.8510
netherlands 61,468 22,791 1.4009 0.7004
Belgium 64,248 21,337 1.3709 0.6854
UK 59,670 22,907 1.3669 0.6834
Finland 21,278 21,977 0.4676 0.2338
denmark 14,956 27,151 0.4061 0.2030
Spain 21,872 13,663 0.2988 0.1494
Greece 18,193 9,419 0.1714 0.0857
luxembourg 2,357 49,767 0.1173 0.0587
poland 17,061 6,686 0.1141 0.0570
ireland 4,382 24,535 0.1075 0.0538
Bulgaria 20,919 3,430 0.0718 0.0359
cyprus 2,306 11,744 0.0271 0.0135
Malta 2,373 11,337 0.0269 0.0135
czech rep. 1,726 8,953 0.0155 0.0077
portugal 1,196 10,000 0.0120 0.0060
romania 1,656 4,593 0.0076 0.0038
Estonia 417 9,012 0.0038 0.0019
latvia 489 7,326 0.0036 0.0018
lithuania 464 7,558 0.0035 0.0018
Slovenia 288 10,756 0.0031 0.0015
Slovakia 236 8,314 0.0020 0.0010
croatia 194 5,988 0.0012 0.0006
Total 1,816,522 30.2859 15.1430
Source: Own calculations (as explained in text) based on cost data from Thielemann et al. (2010); for the 
calculation of the number of asylum applicants, see footnote 18.
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Table 4:  
Data on annual costs per asylum application (in €)
Country Source
TBw,  
2007 
Own calculation, 
2015, inflated 
with nominal 
Gdp growth 
2007–2015,  
own calculation
Own calculation, 
2015, standardised 
costs of uniform 
provision, 
accounting for 
differences in per 
capita Gdp,  
own calculation
U, 2011: 
whole 
procedure, 
including 
return and 
reception
U, 2011: 
reception 
only
Belgium 24,875 28,090 21,337 “country B” 6,743
Bulgaria 375 527 3,430 “country c” 26,874
czech rep. 375 431 8,953 “country E” 1,477
 
denmark 26,250 28,642 27,151 “country F” 30,755 23,000
Germany 53,125 63,194 21,163 “country G” 24,066 18,381
Estonia 20,625 26,420 9,012
ireland 78,125 73,591 24,535
Greece - - 9,419
Spain 5,000 4,916 13,663
France 9,750 10,552 19,128
italy 1,250 1,223 15,581
cyprus 2,500 2,225 11,744
latvia 2,375 2,905 7,326
lithuania - - 7,558
luxembourg 39,750 44,478 49,767
Hungary 125 141 6,628
Malta 10,000 13,732 11,337
netherlands 70,000 73,369 22,791
austria 14,375 16,489 22,674
poland 1,250 1,753 6,686
portugal 1,500 1,554 10,000
romania 1,500 1,975 4,593
Slovenia 1,875 1,994 10,756
Slovak rep. 1,875 2,578 8,314
Finland 25,000 26,771 21,977
Sweden 11,250 12,808 25,814
UK 33,750 37,670 22,907
average 17,475 19,304
Standardised 15,000 16,570
 
Sources: TBw: Thielemann et al. (2010): 85 (Fig. 22). note that there is a degree of imprecision with the data 
because it was presented in a bar chart. a request to the authors for more precise data was unsuccessful. 
U:  Urth et al. (2013), page 92. They only provide anonymised country information.
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Xi. Case Study 3: 
 Corporate taxation
Current and future challenges
At the end of 2014, it was reported that Luxembourg, a member state of the 
European Union, had been acting as a tax haven for many multinational 
companies (e.g. IKEA and Fiat) to reduce their tax liabilities. This undertaking 
is said to violate European law and became known as the LuxLeaks affair.61 
In a nutshell, Luxembourg offered preferential tax treatments to these 
companies to guarantee low taxes on profits which were channelled through 
the country. In some cases, companies ended up with effective tax rates on 
their profits of less than 1 per cent (Wayne et al. 2014).
In summer 2016, the European Commission ruled that Ireland’s tax provi-
sion for Apple is forbidden state aid and sued Ireland for €13 billion in undue 
tax benefits. Beginning in 2013, Apple’s declared profits were taxed at less 
than 1 per cent; in 2014, its profit was taxed at 0.005 per cent (European 
Commission 2016b).
These recent cases of preferential tax treatment for some companies 
provided by EU member states have shed light on a relevant topic which is 
attracting more and more political attention (see, e.g., the OECD’s BEPS initi-
ative62). These issues have emerged as a consequence of the increased globali-
sation of business activities, which is leading to an increase in the number 
of companies active across borders, also known as multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). The rise of MNEs has been accompanied by significantly more degrees 
of freedom for these companies to avoid taxes on their income due to 
loopholes and constructional flaws in international tax laws. Available strat-
egies to reduce tax burdens include shifting profits from a high-tax to a 
low-tax country by manipulating prices on intra-firm transactions (transfer 
prices), by exploiting mismatches between national corporate tax systems 
(e.g. by using loans one jurisdiction recognises as equity and another as debt),63 
or by strategically locating intangible assets (i.e. trademarks and patents).64
In particular, multinational companies heavily rely on intangible assets 
which are highly mobile and therefore relatively easy to locate at affiliates 
in low-tax countries (Karkinsky and Riedel 2012). Since intangible assets are 
non-divisible, their cost is split up among affiliates with the help of royalty 
payments. In the best of all worlds, each affiliate’s royalty payments for using 
the intangible asset is its benefit share. In reality, however, this true benefit 
share is difficult to observe (even for the company), as the underlying intan-
gible asset is unique by definition (OECD 2015a). However, if an affiliate makes 
royalty payments that are too high (low), profit can be shifted out of (into) 
the country the affiliate resides in.
61  Technically, luxembourg’s advance tax rulings are considered to be illegal state aid (FaZ 2015). in the case of 
Fiat, the European commission already decided that the preferential tax treatment is selective illegal state 
aid (European commission 2015).
62  in 2013, the OEcd launched the BEpS (base erosion and profit shifting) initiative to counteract tax practices 
considered to be harmful. in 2015, the OEcd announced concrete BEpS action plans (OEcd 2015b).
63  Using these cross-border constructions, known as ‘hybrid mismatch arrangements’, firms exploit loopholes in 
the interaction of national tax laws to reduce their tax burden (for an overview, see OEcd 2015c).
64  Such actions are not necessarily illegal, but they often are against the intention of tax laws.
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Figure 1 shows the total sum of inflows and outflows of royalty payments for 
various EU member states. Differences in inflows and outflows may be 
explained by different levels of innovation and research and development 
(R&D) in member states. But the situation of some countries is peculiar. Strik-
ingly, Ireland receives by far the largest share of all royalty payments, which 
is nearly four times the size of Germany’s inflows. The second-biggest 
receiver is the Netherlands. If one agrees that it is unlikely that these rather 
small countries are the biggest exporters of patents, there must be another 
explanation. One possible explanation is that especially Ireland and the Neth-
erlands have corporate tax codes with special regulations for intellectual 
property which make it more beneficial to locate intellectual property and 
the resulting payments in these countries. Both countries are regarded as 
low-tax countries which attract foreign investments (see, e.g., the example 
of the ‘Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich’65) (IMF 2013). This assumption 
is in line with studies which find evidence of the tax-sensitivity of the deci-
sion to locate intellectual property (Dischinger and Riedel 2011; Griffith, Miller 
and O’Connell 2014; Karkinsky and Riedel 2012) and royalty flows (Dudar, 
Spengel and Voget 2015).
Especially in the context of the European Union, where economic integration 
is pronounced and several measures to strengthen intra-European business 
activities (e.g. directives on cross-border activities) have been implemented, 
international corporate income taxation is of great importance.66 But 
economic integration is incomplete with respect to the tax dimension. For 
instance, member states have still not agreed on harmonising corporate taxes 
and their regulations on the determinations of the corporate income tax base 
65  The ‘double irish with a dutch Sandwich’ refers to a tax avoidance strategy based on royalty flows from 
intellectual property which exploits loopholes in irish tax law. The strategy involves tunnelling royalty flows 
through the netherlands.
66  For an overview of the history of corporate taxation in the EU, see European commission (2001).
AT BE CZ DK EE FI DE FR GR HU IE IT LU NL PL PT SK SI ES SE UK 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
inflows outflows
Figure  1:
Royalty flows in Europe
Source: OECD (2015e), own illustration. Note: Figures represent royalty and license payments in millions of US dollars for the year 2012. 
The red bars show the inflow of payments from other countries (worldwide) to the respective country. The blue bars represent the level 
of royalty payments flowing out of the country.
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(Wasserfallen 2013). Instead, member states participate in fiscal competition 
and undercut each other in setting corporate tax rates. As can be seen in Figure 
2, corporate income tax rates have steadily declined in recent years, especially 
when compared to other taxes (e.g. consumption or personal income taxes). 
The decline in the statutory corporate tax rate was partly compensated for by 
a broadening of the tax base (‘tax rate cut cum base broadening’; see, e.g., 
Finke et al. (2010)), which is reflected in the relatively smaller decline in the 
effective average tax rate on corporate income.67 Despite the decreasing trend 
in corporate tax rates, there is still considerable heterogeneity in corporate 
tax rates across Europe, as statutory tax rates range between 10 and 38 per 
cent (Eurostat 2014).68 Nevertheless, corporate tax revenues are still impor-
tant for EU member states to finance their governmental tasks, as they make 
up between 10 and 20 per cent of all tax revenues.
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Figure  2:
Taxation trends in Europe over time
Source: De Groen (2015), own illustration. Based on data from the European Commission, DG Tax. STR stands for ‘statutory tax rate’. 
EATR stands for ‘effective average tax rate’, which is the STR adjusted for deductions and allowances. Base year (=100 per cent) is 2000.
Currently, international corporate income taxation is often regulated by 
double tax treaties involving two or more countries. But this does not solve 
the overall problem of diverging tax systems and regulations, which makes 
it costly both for companies to comply with tax laws and for member states 
to enforce them. The European Commission has implemented several changes 
in the regulations, but the fundamental flaws still exist (De Groen 2015). In 
67  Unlike the statutory tax rate, the effective tax rate takes into account exemptions, deductions and 
 allowances, which reduce taxable income and therefore tax liability.
68  Top statutory tax rates on corporate income in 2014.
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the context of international taxation, how to tax multinational enterprises 
and how to assign profits and tax revenues to countries are matters of much 
debate (see, e.g., Freedman and Macdonald 2008; Kußmaul, Niehren and 
Pfeifer 2010; Mayr 2008). The most basic question is whether to tax profits 
according to the source or residence principle. But the definition of source 
and residence is even more difficult in large and globalised networks like 
those present in many multinational enterprises (Devereux and Vella 2014). 
Both the OECD and the European Union are trying to solve problems of 
international corporate taxation by introducing several measures. In 2013, 
the OECD set up a programme aiming at fighting tax base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS).69 And, in 2001, the European Commission launched its first 
initiative to harmonise corporate taxation of multinational companies 
(common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB) (Kolassa 2016). However, 
since the CCCTB initiative did not result in any policy changes, it was 
relaunched in fall 2016 (European Commission 2016a).70
Status quo
The main competence for direct taxation, and thus corporate taxation, is 
currently located at the level of the member states. They have the primary 
right to set tax regulations, tax rates and definitions of the tax base. In 
contrast, the EU’s competence is limited to issuing regulations or directives 
on general matters which restrict member states in their right to act in this 
policy field. This is especially true for tax matters which directly influence 
the establishment or functioning of the internal market (Kolassa 2016). 
To date, the EU has implemented three directives regulating economic 
activities in two or more member states: the Mergers Directive, the Interest 
and Royalties Directive, and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (CEU 1990, 2003, 
2011). The Mergers Directive was introduced to remove financial obstacles in 
cross-border activities, while the Interest and Royalties Directive is supposed 
to eliminate problems with withholding taxes on cross-border royalties and 
interest payments within corporate groups. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
updated the rules made in the Merges Directive from 1990.
Due to the location of corporate taxation competence at the member-state 
level, multinational companies are subject to corporate taxation by all tax 
authorities of countries in which they operate affiliates. Therefore, national 
profits are calculated by treating each entity in each member state as an 
independent entity which is taxed according to national tax law (Devereux 
and Fuest 2010). The disentanglement of a multinational company’s profits is 
conducted by separate accounting principles. Specifically, cross-border trans-
actions within the multinational company are captured by means of transfer 
pricing. With transfer pricing, this kind of transactions is booked in the same 
way as a transaction with a third-party customer or supplier, meaning the 
so-called arm’s length principle (ALP) is applied (Haskic 2009).
69  For more information, see the project homepage of the OEcd: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm.
70  in 2016, the European commission relaunched cccTB, but in a two-step procedure (European commission 
2016a). in the first step, the focus is on the harmonisation of corporate tax base definitions (‘common corpo-
rate tax base’, ccTB); in the second step, consolidation is addressed.
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Counterfactual situation
As our counterfactual, we assume a system with a harmonised European defi-
nition of corporate profits and an apportionment of corporate profits among 
member states by using a formula. This formula relies on indicators which 
should relate profits of companies to real economic activity in member states. 
With this counterfactual, the member states would retain the competence of 
setting corporate tax rates but use a uniform tax base definition. Companies 
would have to file their tax return only once, resulting in a ‘one-stop-shop’ 
principle. This counterfactual system would shut down most profit-shifting 
channels and establish a unified corporate tax system for the internal market.
Our analysed counterfactual situation follows principles of the concept of 
the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) proposed by the 
European Commission (2011).
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 4 we calculate net benefits under the status quo and the hypothetical counterfactual situation of unified corporate taxation by calculating the benefit shares and contribution shares of member states. 
Burden shares are based on efforts to provide infrastructure for companies, benefit shares on tax 
revenue shares. in the counterfactual situation, net benefits are more equally distributed, implying a 
better alignment of taxable profits and efforts made by member states. Our indicator of free riding is 
reduced by 31 per cent in the case of a European coordination of corporate taxation. 
Economies of scale
 4 we compare a European unified corporate tax system and the status quo with regard to the implications for companies and fiscal authorities. By analysing tax compliance costs for companies, 
we find significantly higher compliance costs under the status quo resulting from fragmented national 
tax laws. By analysing economies of scale for fiscal authorities, we do not find efficiency gains when 
centralising fiscal administration of corporate taxation.
Preference heterogeneity
 4 For determining preference heterogeneity, we rely on Eurobarometer 83 (Spring 2015) and assess question Qc3.4: “Thinking about reforming global financial markets, please tell me whether you 
are in favour [of] or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU.” One of the asked 
measures was ‘Tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax havens’. The standard deviation of answers is 
0.038, resulting in a heterogeneity indicator of 7.5 per cent. However, the importance of corporate 
income taxes in national tax systems varies considerably. On the whole, we find rather homogeneous 
preferences.
Internal market consistency
 5 we analyse decentralised corporate taxation in the context of the internal market. Heterogeneous national corporate tax systems lead to a different treatment of domestically and internationally 
organised companies. This inherently conflicts with the principles of the internal market, in particular 
the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital. in addition, companies participating in 
the internal market face different tax burdens depending on the country of residence.
Competition
 4 Fiscal competition between member states takes place in various ways. By analysing the development of corporate taxation in the EU, we find a decline in tax rates on corporate profits. However, this 
decline was compensated for by a broadening of corporate tax bases, which can be interpreted 
as a rechannelling of fiscal competition. we expect that by centralising corporate taxation, fiscal 
competition would also not vanish, but be reframed in a fairer setting fostering efficiency for both 
member states and companies.
the context of international taxation, how to tax multinational enterprises 
and how to assign profits and tax revenues to countries are matters of much 
debate (see, e.g., Freedman and Macdonald 2008; Kußmaul, Niehren and 
Pfeifer 2010; Mayr 2008). The most basic question is whether to tax profits 
according to the source or residence principle. But the definition of source 
and residence is even more difficult in large and globalised networks like 
those present in many multinational enterprises (Devereux and Vella 2014). 
Both the OECD and the European Union are trying to solve problems of 
international corporate taxation by introducing several measures. In 2013, 
the OECD set up a programme aiming at fighting tax base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS).69 And, in 2001, the European Commission launched its first 
initiative to harmonise corporate taxation of multinational companies 
(common consolidated corporate tax base, CCCTB) (Kolassa 2016). However, 
since the CCCTB initiative did not result in any policy changes, it was 
relaunched in fall 2016 (European Commission 2016a).70
Status quo
The main competence for direct taxation, and thus corporate taxation, is 
currently located at the level of the member states. They have the primary 
right to set tax regulations, tax rates and definitions of the tax base. In 
contrast, the EU’s competence is limited to issuing regulations or directives 
on general matters which restrict member states in their right to act in this 
policy field. This is especially true for tax matters which directly influence 
the establishment or functioning of the internal market (Kolassa 2016). 
To date, the EU has implemented three directives regulating economic 
activities in two or more member states: the Mergers Directive, the Interest 
and Royalties Directive, and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive (CEU 1990, 2003, 
2011). The Mergers Directive was introduced to remove financial obstacles in 
cross-border activities, while the Interest and Royalties Directive is supposed 
to eliminate problems with withholding taxes on cross-border royalties and 
interest payments within corporate groups. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
updated the rules made in the Merges Directive from 1990.
Due to the location of corporate taxation competence at the member-state 
level, multinational companies are subject to corporate taxation by all tax 
authorities of countries in which they operate affiliates. Therefore, national 
profits are calculated by treating each entity in each member state as an 
independent entity which is taxed according to national tax law (Devereux 
and Fuest 2010). The disentanglement of a multinational company’s profits is 
conducted by separate accounting principles. Specifically, cross-border trans-
actions within the multinational company are captured by means of transfer 
pricing. With transfer pricing, this kind of transactions is booked in the same 
way as a transaction with a third-party customer or supplier, meaning the 
so-called arm’s length principle (ALP) is applied (Haskic 2009).
69  For more information, see the project homepage of the OEcd: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm.
70  in 2016, the European commission relaunched cccTB, but in a two-step procedure (European commission 
2016a). in the first step, the focus is on the harmonisation of corporate tax base definitions (‘common corpo-
rate tax base’, ccTB); in the second step, consolidation is addressed.
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Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data source
We detect spillover effects by comparing the current situation of a national 
competence for corporate taxation with the counterfactual of an EU compe-
tence. We compute benefit and burden shares as well as the net benefit, which 
is defined as the difference between benefit share and burden share (for 
details, see Table 1 in the Appendix). Then, we compare net benefits under 
the status quo and in the counterfactual situation to assess the change in 
spillover effects among member states.
National burden shares are calculated as the efforts member states make 
to provide infrastructure for firms that is either tangible (e.g. roads) or intan-
gible (e.g. legal framework). They approximate the contribution of a member 
state to fostering corporate profits generated by companies. We measure 
member states’ efforts for providing tangible infrastructure as public invest-
ment spending, while we determine effort for intangible infrastructures using 
three indicators for ‘Doing Business’ provided by the World Bank (2016).71 We 
assume that higher indicator scores represent a higher degree of effort. To 
make efforts for intangible infrastructure comparable between member states, 
we normalise the indicator scores between 0 and 1 and weight them by national 
GDP. We then calculate each member state’s share of the European Union’s 
public investment spending and GDP-weighted intangible indicator scores. For 
the final step in calculating member states’ burden share, the shares for 
tangible and intangible infrastructure are equally weighted. Centralising corpo-
rate taxation should presumably have a negligible impact on member states’ 
efforts since their incentive to host firms remains unchanged.72 Hence, the 
burden shares of member states are assumed to stay the same both under the 
national status quo and in the hypothetical scenario with EU competence.
National benefit shares under the status quo represent the member states’ 
shares of total corporate profits generated within the EU-28. Due to data avail-
ability and potential biases caused by profit shifting, we approximate corpo-
rate profits using the gross operating surplus.73 The latter is defined as gross 
corporate profits minus labour input costs, and is calculated as part of the 
GDP.74 In the counterfactual scenario of a centralised corporate taxation compe-
tence, corporate profits generated by all companies active in EU member states 
are distributed to member states according to three macro indicators: number 
of employees, physical assets and GDP. We calculate the national share for each 
indicator. The national benefit share of total corporate profits results from 
equally weighting national indicator shares.
71  More specifically, we use the indices for the quality of judicial processes, the quality of the land administration, 
and the quality of building control. For more information, see Table 2 in the appendix.
72  Benefits for member states from hosting corporations are not limited to corporate tax revenues, but also 
include benefits such as employment effects or technology. corporate tax revenues certainly play a role, but 
as long as in the centralised-solution tax bases are not tremendously redistributed, the effort that member 
states make to host corporations is unaffected.
73  Taking the value added as a measure for profit is also proposed by nerudová (2012).
74  The Gdp calculation is based on a complex procedure which takes multiple data sources into account and 
is checked for consistency, such as by using different approaches (Statistisches Bundesamt 2016). due to 
the usage of multiple data sources, the application of sophisticated algorithms, and consistency checks, the 
Gdp – and therefore also gross operating surplus – should be a reasonably good and unbiased proxy for true 
profits (assuming capital input is homogenous within the EU-28).
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Finally, we calculate the net benefit for both scenarios. A positive net benefit 
indicates that the corporate tax base assigned to a member state exceeds the 
member state’s relative effort. One reason behind a positive net benefit is a 
high inflow of foreign profits. In contrast, a negative net benefit may be the 
result of excessive outward profit shifting.
Results
The results are presented in Figure 3. Under the status quo, France exhibits 
the highest negative net benefit. Put differently, compared to its relative 
contribution to provide public infrastructure for firms, its relative share of 
total corporate profit is the lowest. At the other extreme, Germany gains the 
highest net benefit, with the relative share of corporate profits exceeding its 
relative burden the most. Note that, by itself, a discrepancy in benefit share 
and cost share under the status quo does not necessarily have to be fully 
driven by free riding in the form of attracting foreign corporate profits. Other 
hard-to-quantify factors (e.g. differences in entrepreneurial ability or produc-
tivity) may also affect the size of national corporate profits and, ultimately, 
the net benefit of a member state.
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Figure  3:
Net benefits from corporate taxation policy, by country (in per cent)
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat and World Bank data.
To assess spillover effects in corporate taxation, we also calculate net benefits 
for the case of European responsibility and compare the outcome with the 
status quo. In this counterfactual situation, the benefit share is on average 
more aligned with the burden share. Most strikingly, Italy would have an 
almost neutral net benefit and France could improve its negative net-benefit 
position.
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corporate profits minus labour input costs, and is calculated as part of the 
GDP.74 In the counterfactual scenario of a centralised corporate taxation compe-
tence, corporate profits generated by all companies active in EU member states 
are distributed to member states according to three macro indicators: number 
of employees, physical assets and GDP. We calculate the national share for each 
indicator. The national benefit share of total corporate profits results from 
equally weighting national indicator shares.
71  More specifically, we use the indices for the quality of judicial processes, the quality of the land administration, 
and the quality of building control. For more information, see Table 2 in the appendix.
72  Benefits for member states from hosting corporations are not limited to corporate tax revenues, but also 
include benefits such as employment effects or technology. corporate tax revenues certainly play a role, but 
as long as in the centralised-solution tax bases are not tremendously redistributed, the effort that member 
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To sum up, the implementation of a centralised distribution scheme for corpo-
rate profits among member states would reduce the net-benefit position of 
the majority of member states. While the standard deviation of net benefits 
among member states is 1.42 under the status quo, it can be reduced to 0.98 
in the case of a European competence. The corresponding relative reduction 
in the standard deviation is equal to 31 per cent. We therefore assign a score 
of 4, which indicates that it would be better to allocate this competence to 
the EU level.
eConomieS oF SCAle
Data source
Potential economies of scale in corporate taxation can be found at the level 
of the taxpayer and at the level of the tax administration. For firms, central-
ising corporate taxation potentially affects tax compliance costs. For admin-
istering corporate taxes, centralisation would render multiple processing of 
the same tax subjects unnecessary.
To assess economies of scale in the case of corporate taxation, we rely on 
two data sources. For economies of scale on the firm level, we utilize the 
European Tax Survey conducted by the European Commission (2004). This 
survey, conducted in 15 EU member states with 700 firms responding, captures 
corporate tax compliance costs of companies operating in the internal market 
in one or more member states. Tax compliance costs entail all costs related 
to complying with tax laws and filing corporate income tax returns. For 
economies of scale on the level of tax authorities, we use data from the OECD 
(2015d) and assess whether administrative costs per taxpayer decrease if a 
tax authority handles more taxpayers.
Methodology
For determining economies of scale for companies resulting from corporate 
taxation, we analyse tax compliance costs. We focus on relative changes in 
tax compliance costs in the number of foreign affiliates.75 If companies are 
facing constant relative tax compliance costs regardless of the number of 
foreign affiliates, this would point to constant returns to scale. If companies 
with many foreign affiliates report tax compliance costs relatively lower than 
those with few foreign affiliates, this would imply economies of scale for 
companies in handling taxation. However, if companies with many foreign 
affiliates report relatively higher tax compliance costs than their counter-
parts with few foreign affiliates, diseconomies of scale in the tax handling 
of companies would be in place.
Concerning potential economies of scale for tax authorities, we analyse 
costs for administering taxes with respect to the number of taxpayers. To 
make the administrative costs of tax authorities of smaller and larger member 
states comparable, we calculate the administrative costs per €1 of corporate 
income tax revenue. If there are economies of scale in administering taxes, 
it would make sense to reorganise the levy of corporate income taxes by 
75  due to data limitations, we stick to the number of foreign affiliates as a proxy for the number of different 
member states in which the company operates affiliates.
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concentrating tax administration either at fewer national tax authorities or 
at a single EU corporate income tax agency. Beyond cost savings, arguments 
for such a reorganisation are the implementation of a harmonised procedure 
for a harmonised corporate tax and the creation of an excess administration 
capacity usable for other taxes due to the implementation of the ‘one-stop-
shop’ principle for companies.
Results
Companies without foreign affiliates spend between 0.02 and 2.6 per cent of 
their turnover for tax compliance purposes (European Commission 2004). 
Figure 4 illustrates the relative change in tax compliance costs to this base-
line in accordance with the number of affiliates abroad. For a company with 
up to five foreign affiliates, tax compliance costs increase by 141 per cent (i.e. 
tax compliance costs are about 2.5 times larger than those of a purely domestic 
company). Companies with more than five but fewer than 16 foreign affili-
ates face an increase in tax compliance costs of 535 per cent, while those with 
more than 15 but fewer than 51 foreign affiliates report tax compliance costs 
which are 831 per cent higher than those reported by purely domestic compa-
nies. Lastly, very large companies with more than 50 foreign affiliates report 
tax compliance costs which are 649 per cent higher than those of their purely 
domestic counterparts.76
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Figure  4:
Foreign affiliates and compliance costs
Own calculation based on European Commission (2004), unweighted results. Baseline: Firms with no affiliate abroad. 
Relationship approximated by a third-degree polynomial.
Our results suggest that tax compliance costs are increasing with the number 
of foreign affiliates. The increase is sizeable, and it stems from the fact that 
different countries have different corporate tax laws, which increases infor-
mation costs and administrative burdens alike. The company has to report 
tax returns to the tax authorities of each country it operates affiliates in. 
76  The lower increase in tax compliance costs for companies with more than 50 foreign affiliates may be caused 
by economies of scale in complying with taxes for very big companies or a concentration of foreign affiliates 
in fewer member states. due to data availability, we cannot infer the reason. However, the principal result 
holds of a sizeable increase in tax compliance costs relative to domestic companies.
To sum up, the implementation of a centralised distribution scheme for corpo-
rate profits among member states would reduce the net-benefit position of 
the majority of member states. While the standard deviation of net benefits 
among member states is 1.42 under the status quo, it can be reduced to 0.98 
in the case of a European competence. The corresponding relative reduction 
in the standard deviation is equal to 31 per cent. We therefore assign a score 
of 4, which indicates that it would be better to allocate this competence to 
the EU level.
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Potential economies of scale in corporate taxation can be found at the level 
of the taxpayer and at the level of the tax administration. For firms, central-
ising corporate taxation potentially affects tax compliance costs. For admin-
istering corporate taxes, centralisation would render multiple processing of 
the same tax subjects unnecessary.
To assess economies of scale in the case of corporate taxation, we rely on 
two data sources. For economies of scale on the firm level, we utilize the 
European Tax Survey conducted by the European Commission (2004). This 
survey, conducted in 15 EU member states with 700 firms responding, captures 
corporate tax compliance costs of companies operating in the internal market 
in one or more member states. Tax compliance costs entail all costs related 
to complying with tax laws and filing corporate income tax returns. For 
economies of scale on the level of tax authorities, we use data from the OECD 
(2015d) and assess whether administrative costs per taxpayer decrease if a 
tax authority handles more taxpayers.
Methodology
For determining economies of scale for companies resulting from corporate 
taxation, we analyse tax compliance costs. We focus on relative changes in 
tax compliance costs in the number of foreign affiliates.75 If companies are 
facing constant relative tax compliance costs regardless of the number of 
foreign affiliates, this would point to constant returns to scale. If companies 
with many foreign affiliates report tax compliance costs relatively lower than 
those with few foreign affiliates, this would imply economies of scale for 
companies in handling taxation. However, if companies with many foreign 
affiliates report relatively higher tax compliance costs than their counter-
parts with few foreign affiliates, diseconomies of scale in the tax handling 
of companies would be in place.
Concerning potential economies of scale for tax authorities, we analyse 
costs for administering taxes with respect to the number of taxpayers. To 
make the administrative costs of tax authorities of smaller and larger member 
states comparable, we calculate the administrative costs per €1 of corporate 
income tax revenue. If there are economies of scale in administering taxes, 
it would make sense to reorganise the levy of corporate income taxes by 
75  due to data limitations, we stick to the number of foreign affiliates as a proxy for the number of different 
member states in which the company operates affiliates.
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Therefore, it needs to keep separate country-specific accounts and to appor-
tion profits using transfer pricing. These two factors were also singled out 
by companies as the most burdensome in the European Tax Survey (European 
Commission 2004). Hence, our results strongly suggest that the resulting 
costs of separate accounting are disproportionally increasing with the number 
of different national corporate tax systems, which results in diseconomies 
of scale in tax handling for companies.
Economies of scale may also arise on the side of the fiscal authorities. The 
implementation of a ‘one-stop-shop’ principle for companies’ taxation 
concerns could be supplemented by a European fiscal authority for corporate 
income taxation. The main argument for such an institution would be the 
existence of economies of scale in tax administration and the resulting cost 
efficiency. To test this argument empirically, in Figure 5, we analyse the 
relation between tax administration cost and the number of tax subjects. We 
find that national fiscal authorities spend between 0.39 and 1.60 per cent of 
their tax revenues for administrative purposes. However, there seems to be 
no pattern between the per-unit administration cost and the number of 
taxpayers administered, meaning that the fiscal authorities of larger countries 
are not operating more or less efficiently than those of smaller member states. 
Hence, we find no evidence for or against economies of scale for corporate 
tax administration.
To sum up, we analyse potential economies of scale in corporate taxation for 
both companies and fiscal authorities. For companies, we find substantial 
economies of scale in compliance costs under a system of European corpo-
rate taxation competence. Companies’ tax compliance burdens increase with 
the number of different national corporate tax systems they have to deal 
with. Since centralising corporate taxation would abolish heterogeneous 
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Figure  5:
Administration cost of national fiscal authorities
Source: OECD (2015d) and Eurostat (population and number of corporations), own calculation. Number of taxpayers is the sum of 
population and corporations. Administration cost is measured relative to net tax revenue. The line represents the relationship between 
administration cost and number of taxpayers approximated by a third-degree polynomial.
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national corporate tax systems, it would significantly reduce tax compliance 
costs and abolish currently existing diseconomies of scale. For fiscal author-
ities, we do not find evidence of the existence of either economies of scale 
or diseconomies of scale. Hence, reorganising tax administration by central-
ising the levy of corporate income taxes is expected to be neutral. Thus, we 
assign a score of 4 for this indicator, indicating that a centralised solution 
would improve efficiency.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
We determine preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding corporate 
taxation by analysing Eurobarometer survey data. In addition, we analyse 
the share of corporate income tax in total tax revenue, which we use as a 
proxy for the revealed preferences of member states regarding corporate 
income taxation.
In particular, we use question QC3.4 (“Thinking about reforming global 
financial markets, please tell me whether you are in favour [of] or opposed 
to the following measures to be taken by the EU – Tougher rules on tax avoid-
ance and tax havens”) from the Eurobarometer questionnaire No. 83 (Spring 
2015). Answers could be given on a four-level scale (‘strongly in favour’ , ‘fairly 
in favour’ , ‘fairly opposed’ , ‘strongly opposed’). In addition, participants had 
the opportunity to suppress their opinion.
For the revealed preferences analysis, we use tax revenue data from 2013 
from the OECD, which covers all 21 EU member states which are also members 
of the OECD.77
Methodology
For our Eurobarometer results, we reduce the scale from four to two levels 
(i.e. we merge the answer levels of ‘strongly in favour’ with ‘fairly in favour’ , 
and ‘fairly opposed’ with ‘strongly opposed’). We also exclude all participants 
who suppressed their opinion (i.e. we adjust our sample such that the shares 
of answers in our two levels sum up to 100 per cent). This leads to a reduc-
tion in country-sample size of between 1 per cent (in Greece and the Neth-
erlands) and 16 per cent (in Lithuania). The overall reduction of the EU-28 is 
of minor importance (on average 6 per cent) and can therefore be neglected 
without affecting our results.
The results are calculated in a two-step procedure. First, we calculate the 
percentage of answers with either ‘very important role’ or ‘important role’ 
for each country. Then, we aggregate the results at the country level and 
calculate measures of dispersion on the EU level.
Additionally to our Eurobarometer results, we stick to the concept of 
revealed preferences and calculate the share of corporate taxes in national 
tax revenues. The resulting shares serve as revealed preferences of national 
governments concerning corporate taxation. The idea here is that a high 
share of corporate taxes in total tax revenue reveals a national preference to 
77  EU member states not actively participating in the OEcd are Bulgaria, croatia, cyprus, latvia, lithuania, 
Malta and romania.
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of scale in tax handling for companies.
Economies of scale may also arise on the side of the fiscal authorities. The 
implementation of a ‘one-stop-shop’ principle for companies’ taxation 
concerns could be supplemented by a European fiscal authority for corporate 
income taxation. The main argument for such an institution would be the 
existence of economies of scale in tax administration and the resulting cost 
efficiency. To test this argument empirically, in Figure 5, we analyse the 
relation between tax administration cost and the number of tax subjects. We 
find that national fiscal authorities spend between 0.39 and 1.60 per cent of 
their tax revenues for administrative purposes. However, there seems to be 
no pattern between the per-unit administration cost and the number of 
taxpayers administered, meaning that the fiscal authorities of larger countries 
are not operating more or less efficiently than those of smaller member states. 
Hence, we find no evidence for or against economies of scale for corporate 
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tax companies rather than, for example, individuals for providing public 
goods. For better visualisation, we categorise these shares of corporate income 
tax revenues into ten bins with widths of 1.3 percentage points each, which 
capture all realised shares.78
Results
The results for the Eurobarometer survey analysis are presented in Figure 6. 
The resulting heterogeneity indicator amounts to 7.5 per cent (unweighted). 
In other words, compared to the maximum standard deviation, the realised 
standard deviation of mean population preferences is extremely small.
Figure 6:  
Preferences regarding tougher rules against tax avoidance and tax havens
tougher tax rules
Eurobarometer question EB83 Qc3.4: “Thinking about reforming global financial markets, please tell me 
whether you are in favour [of] or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU – Tougher rules on 
tax avoidance and tax havens”
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notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘strongly in favour’ and ‘fairly in favour’ in a country. 
The answer choices ‘strongly in favour’ is merged with ‘fairly in favour’, and ‘fairly opposed’ is merged with 
‘strongly opposed’. respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country 
population size as weights, the standard deviation = 0.041, resulting in a heterogeneity of 8.2 per cent.
The result for revealed preferences for corporate taxation of member states 
is presented in Figure 7 and shows moderate heterogeneity on a relatively 
small scale of national corporate income tax shares ranging from 3.26 per 
cent (Slovenia) to 12.43 per cent (Luxembourg).
However, the concept of revealed preferences suffers from multiple 
(data-related) issues. First, a high share of corporate income taxes in total 
tax revenue may also indicate success in attracting foreign profits. Also, a 
country hosting highly productive companies may also exhibit a higher share 
of corporate income taxes. The same holds true for countries with high shares 
of incorporated firms, as non-incorporated firms are not subject to corpo-
rate income taxation. Due to the severity of these issues and the impossi-
bility of accounting for them, we interpret the revealed preferences results 
78  This size of the bin was chosen to best fit the data.
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as fuzzy. Despite its fuzziness, we can still infer from our result that there 
is significant heterogeneity among member states when it comes to the 
importance of corporate income taxes for total tax revenue.
To sum up, according to the Eurobarometer analysis, the preferences of 
citizens concerning tougher rules on tax avoidance and tax havens are highly 
aligned, which would justify a score of 5. However, as is shown with the 
revealed preferences analysis, national tax systems exhibit heterogeneous 
emphases on corporate income taxation, which implies disagreement on the 
appropriate tax level for companies. We therefore do not use the maximum 
score and only assign a score of 4, which nonetheless points towards a 
European competence.
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Figure  7:
Revealed preferences regarding taxation of corporate income
Source: OECD (own calculation), values for 2013. Notes: The X-axis denotes the share of corporate income taxes in the 
total tax revenues of member states. Member states are binned in bins with widths of 1.3 percentage points each.
inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
Ideally, the internal market promotes the efficient allocation of investment 
and business activity across Europe, which is not distorted by national tax 
regulations or the crossing of borders. European primary law specifies that 
member states need to choose their economic policy so as to promote the 
coordination of member states and the internal market (TFEU Article 119 (1)). 
In addition, it is stated that economic policy should enhance the principles 
of the open market economy, which should favour the efficient allocation of 
resources (TFEU Article 120).
Wasserfallen (2013) explains the problems which occur if the overall (polit-
ical) European integration is far ahead of fiscal integration, particularly in 
the field of tax harmonisation. The development of the internal market has 
been pushed forward while member states have hesitated to transfer compe-
tences in taxation to the EU. As a result, firms enjoy an integrated internal 
market, which should promote an efficient allocation of resources and a 
business environment without borders, while corporate tax systems under-
mine these efforts by not being unified.
tax companies rather than, for example, individuals for providing public 
goods. For better visualisation, we categorise these shares of corporate income 
tax revenues into ten bins with widths of 1.3 percentage points each, which 
capture all realised shares.78
Results
The results for the Eurobarometer survey analysis are presented in Figure 6. 
The resulting heterogeneity indicator amounts to 7.5 per cent (unweighted). 
In other words, compared to the maximum standard deviation, the realised 
standard deviation of mean population preferences is extremely small.
Figure 6:  
Preferences regarding tougher rules against tax avoidance and tax havens
tougher tax rules
Eurobarometer question EB83 Qc3.4: “Thinking about reforming global financial markets, please tell me 
whether you are in favour [of] or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU – Tougher rules on 
tax avoidance and tax havens”
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Preferences regarding tougher 
rules against tax avoidance and t x havens
Median 0.920
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.038
Heterogeneity 7.5 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘strongly in favour’ and ‘fairly in favour’ in a country. 
The answer choices ‘strongly in favour’ is merged with ‘fairly in favour’, and ‘fairly opposed’ is merged with 
‘strongly opposed’. respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country 
population size as weights, the standard deviation = 0.041, resulting in a heterogeneity of 8.2 per cent.
The result for revealed preferences for corporate taxation of member states 
is presented in Figure 7 and shows moderate heterogeneity on a relatively 
small scale of national corporate income tax shares ranging from 3.26 per 
cent (Slovenia) to 12.43 per cent (Luxembourg).
However, the concept of revealed preferences suffers from multiple 
(data-related) issues. First, a high share of corporate income taxes in total 
tax revenue may also indicate success in attracting foreign profits. Also, a 
country hosting highly productive companies may also exhibit a higher share 
of corporate income taxes. The same holds true for countries with high shares 
of incorporated firms, as non-incorporated firms are not subject to corpo-
rate income taxation. Due to the severity of these issues and the impossi-
bility of accounting for them, we interpret the revealed preferences results 
78  This size of the bin was chosen to best fit the data.
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The fragmentation in national corporate tax systems creates obstacles to 
corporate investment, cross-border trade, relocation decisions and the multi-
national mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of companies (see, e.g., Devereux 
2004). Corporate taxes reduce the net return on investment. Within the 
internal market, the interplay of different corporate tax systems results in 
heterogeneous tax burdens depending on the organisation of the company 
and its ability to ‘double dip’ 79 (Mintz 2002). In addition, national systems 
of corporate taxation exhibit features which create a bias toward domestic 
investment (European Commission 2001).
Concerning trade within companies, the burden of tax handling increases 
disproportionally once there are affiliates residing in multiple member states 
due to the separate accounting and information costs of multiple corporate 
tax systems (ibid). These factors lead to higher tax compliance costs for multi-
national companies than for their solely domestic counterparts. In the 
European Tax Survey, multinational companies reported tax compliance costs 
which were 253 per cent higher than for domestic companies (European 
Commission 2004). These major compliance costs are a threat to the 
functioning of the internal market (Bénassy-Quéré, Trannoy and Wolff 2014).
Multinational reorganisations and takeovers both challenge national corpo-
rate tax systems. If a company relocates from one member state to another, 
it changes corporate tax system. The member state the company is leaving 
often levies exit taxes (e.g. on unrealised capital gains). Exit taxes create a 
barrier for companies wishing to leave, thus potentially violating the internal 
market freedom of establishment. However, although the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) ruled that exit taxes do affect the freedom of establishment, it 
nevertheless deemed them a legitimate tool for reconciling the transition 
from one corporate tax system to another one (von Brocke and Müller 2013). 
Concerning takeovers, various scholars find evidence of the influence of 
national corporate tax systems on the price of cross-border M&As and subse-
quent firm reorganisation. Regarding the latter, Voget (2011) presents evidence 
of the influence of taxes on the decision of where to locate the headquarters 
of the newly formed company. Likewise, Huizinga and Voget (2012) show a 
negative impact of dividend taxation on M&A prices. Feld et al. (2016) find a 
similar negative effect on M&A prices caused by capital gains taxation.80
The current system of a national competence for corporate taxation creates 
various obstacles for the internal market. These obstacles arise from the fact 
that national corporate tax systems typically end at the border of the member 
state. Since the implementation of the internal market, numerous infringe-
ments on the internal market have been eliminated by rulings of the European 
Court of Justice. However, numerous obstacles will remain as long as national 
corporate tax systems are not coordinated (Cerioni 2015). Our counterfactual 
scenario of an EU competence for corporate taxation would remove currently 
existing impediments to internal market consistency. Therefore, we assign 
a score of 5 to emphasise that a centralisation of corporate taxation would 
contribute to internal market consistency.
79  The term ‘double dip’ refers to systematically exploiting incompatibilities of national tax systems to reduce 
one’s tax burden.
80  in 2006, the Mergers directive was implemented to reduce the barriers to cross-border M&as. However, 
heterogeneous corporate tax systems still create obstacles impeding internal market consistency (European 
commission 2013).
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ComPetition
Fiscal competition among EU member states in the field of corporate taxa-
tion has been widely discussed in academia (see, e.g., Altshuler and Good-
speed 2015; Crabbé 2013; Zodrow 2003) and beyond (see, e.g., European 
Commission 2001; European Parliament 1998). Researchers studying corpo-
rate tax competition have identified positive effects by pointing to efficiency 
gains as well as negative effects resulting in efficiency losses. Positive effects 
stemming from (corporate) tax competition include counteracting over-tax-
ation and limiting inefficient public spending,81 while negative effects encom-
pass a potential ‘race to the bottom’ impairing member states in public good 
provision, higher compliance costs for taxpayers, and reduced transparency 
(Schön 2002).82
Fiscal competition for corporate taxation in Europe emerges via two 
channels. First, member states compete in setting their corporate income tax 
rate, which serves as an important indicator of the size of the tax burden. In 
recent years, we have seen a significant decline in the statutory corporate 
income tax rates of EU member states (see Figure 8). The average top statu-
tory tax rate on corporate income in the EU-28 fell from 34.17 per cent in 1998 
to 22.93 per cent in 2012. However, lowering corporate tax rates was accom-
panied by broadening tax bases (Carone, Schmidt and Nicodème 2007).83 
Although profits are now taxed at a lower tax rate, corporate taxes capture a 
wider-reaching definition of corporate profits (Bénassy-Quéré, Trannoy and 
Wolff 2014). This can be seen in the relatively smaller decline in the effective 
average tax rate (EATR), which was reduced from 29.1 per cent in 1998 to 20.8 
per cent in 2012.84 Therefore, tax revenue from corporate income stagnated 
at around 3 per cent of GDP during this period of time (with the exceptions 
of an increase before the financial crisis in 2008 and a lower level during the 
immediate aftermath). Concerns about a harmful ‘race to the bottom’ for 
corporate taxes can therefore not be confirmed.
81  The underlying idea regarding positive effects caused by tax competition is that governments also pursue 
non-benevolent objectives (Brennan and Buchanan 1980).
82  reduced transparency arises from increased complexity and enables profit shifting.
83  also, the European commission follows a strategy of shifting the focus of taxation from direct taxes to indi-
rect taxes in order to reduce distortions (Bénassy-Quéré, Trannoy and wolff 2014).
84  The effective average tax rate (EaTr) takes the corporate tax base into account. For detailed information on 
the concept of the EaTr, see Schreiber, Spengel and lammersen (2001).
The fragmentation in national corporate tax systems creates obstacles to 
corporate investment, cross-border trade, relocation decisions and the multi-
national mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of companies (see, e.g., Devereux 
2004). Corporate taxes reduce the net return on investment. Within the 
internal market, the interplay of different corporate tax systems results in 
heterogeneous tax burdens depending on the organisation of the company 
and its ability to ‘double dip’ 79 (Mintz 2002). In addition, national systems 
of corporate taxation exhibit features which create a bias toward domestic 
investment (European Commission 2001).
Concerning trade within companies, the burden of tax handling increases 
disproportionally once there are affiliates residing in multiple member states 
due to the separate accounting and information costs of multiple corporate 
tax systems (ibid). These factors lead to higher tax compliance costs for multi-
national companies than for their solely domestic counterparts. In the 
European Tax Survey, multinational companies reported tax compliance costs 
which were 253 per cent higher than for domestic companies (European 
Commission 2004). These major compliance costs are a threat to the 
functioning of the internal market (Bénassy-Quéré, Trannoy and Wolff 2014).
Multinational reorganisations and takeovers both challenge national corpo-
rate tax systems. If a company relocates from one member state to another, 
it changes corporate tax system. The member state the company is leaving 
often levies exit taxes (e.g. on unrealised capital gains). Exit taxes create a 
barrier for companies wishing to leave, thus potentially violating the internal 
market freedom of establishment. However, although the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) ruled that exit taxes do affect the freedom of establishment, it 
nevertheless deemed them a legitimate tool for reconciling the transition 
from one corporate tax system to another one (von Brocke and Müller 2013). 
Concerning takeovers, various scholars find evidence of the influence of 
national corporate tax systems on the price of cross-border M&As and subse-
quent firm reorganisation. Regarding the latter, Voget (2011) presents evidence 
of the influence of taxes on the decision of where to locate the headquarters 
of the newly formed company. Likewise, Huizinga and Voget (2012) show a 
negative impact of dividend taxation on M&A prices. Feld et al. (2016) find a 
similar negative effect on M&A prices caused by capital gains taxation.80
The current system of a national competence for corporate taxation creates 
various obstacles for the internal market. These obstacles arise from the fact 
that national corporate tax systems typically end at the border of the member 
state. Since the implementation of the internal market, numerous infringe-
ments on the internal market have been eliminated by rulings of the European 
Court of Justice. However, numerous obstacles will remain as long as national 
corporate tax systems are not coordinated (Cerioni 2015). Our counterfactual 
scenario of an EU competence for corporate taxation would remove currently 
existing impediments to internal market consistency. Therefore, we assign 
a score of 5 to emphasise that a centralisation of corporate taxation would 
contribute to internal market consistency.
79  The term ‘double dip’ refers to systematically exploiting incompatibilities of national tax systems to reduce 
one’s tax burden.
80  in 2006, the Mergers directive was implemented to reduce the barriers to cross-border M&as. However, 
heterogeneous corporate tax systems still create obstacles impeding internal market consistency (European 
commission 2013).
 
94
Rather than ending fiscal competition between member states, centralising 
corporate taxation with a formulary apportionment of profits would rechannel 
competition (Devereux and Fuest 2010). One would expect the member states 
to change their focus on specifically attracting factors of the apportionment 
formula to increase their share of total corporate tax base and, ultimately, 
corporate tax revenue. Hence, it is not expected that centralising corporate 
taxation would limit positive welfare effects arising from competition.
However, when looking at the level of the targets of corporate tax compe-
tition, centralising corporate tax competition would shut down commonly 
used profit-shifting channels (Fuest 2008).85 This would, in turn, establish a 
fairer setting for companies by eliminating competitive advantages for those 
participating in profit shifting. However, new concerns of potential discrim-
ination against certain member states could arise. For example, knowl-
edge-based economies could be disadvantaged if intangible assets were 
neglected in the apportionment formula (Evers et al. 2016).
To sum up, we have analysed corporate tax competition among EU member 
states under the status quo. Despite a decrease in corporate tax rates in recent 
last years, corporate income tax revenues have remained at a constant level. 
This can be explained by a broadening of the corporate income tax base. We 
find no evidence of a harmful ‘race to the bottom’. Centralising corporate 
taxation is not expected to abolish competition, but rather to redirect it to 
other channels. However, a centralisation of corporate taxation would 
increase fairness among member states and companies as targets of the 
competition. Hence, we find some additional benefits in the centralised 
scenario and therefore assign a score of 4, which indicates that it would be 
better to allocate this competence to the EU level.
85  in particular, a centralisation of corporate taxation would cease hybrid mismatch arrangements, manipula-
tion of transfer pricing, strategical location of highly mobile intangible assets for tax purposes, and artificial 
debt arrangements within the EU.
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Figure  8:
Development of corporate income taxation 1995–2012
Sources: ZEW, Eurostat and European Commission (DG Tax), own illustration. All values represent averaged values for 
the EU-28 for the corresponding year. Corporate tax revenues do not include Germany (1995–2004) and Croatia 
(1995–2001) due to the non-availability of data in these periods of time.
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
Table 1:  
Benefit- and contribution-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)
Share of eU total (in per cent)
country iSO Benefit share (nat.)
(= corporate profits)
workforce assets Gdp Benefit 
share  (EU)
Burden 
share
austria aT 2.40 1.90 2.83 2.36 2.36 2.45
Belgium BE 2.78 2.12 3.29 2.88 2.76 2.47
Bulgaria BG 0.39 1.37 0.37 0.31 0.68 0.32
croatia Hr 0.31 0.72 0.35 0.33 0.47 0.37
cyprus cY 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13
czech rep. cZ 1.46 2.28 1.52 1.20 1.66 1.40
denmark dK 1.52 1.24 1.83 1.88 1.65 2.09
Estonia EE 0.15 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.21
Finland Fi 1.36 1.15 1.63 1.49 1.42 1.69
France Fr 13.40 12.10 17.28 15.54 14.97 18.71
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Table 2 holds detailed information of the derivation of burden shares. We 
approximate national burdens for attracting firms (and, ultimately, corpo-
rate profits as a tax base) with efforts member states undertake towards 
providing tangible and intangible infrastructure. The effort towards providing 
tangible infrastructure can be directly measured by government spending 
on public infrastructure. For the efforts towards providing intangible infra-
structure, we rely on three indicators from the World Bank measuring the 
respective quality of judicial processes, land administration and building 
control. The key assumption here is that higher quality reflects a higher 
degree of effort. We sum up the three realised indicator values for each 
country and weight them by GDP (column ‘Total score’) to make efforts 
comparable across member states. The next step is transforming calculated 
values into relative national shares. Finally, we calculate total burden share 
as the simple average of government spending on tangible infrastructure 
and national share of tangible infrastructure efforts.
Table 2: 
Calculation of burden shares
tangible infrastructure intangible infrastructure total
Government 
spending
Judicial  
processes
land  
administration
Building 
control
Total  
score
national 
share
Burden 
share
% of EU  
total
 Quality index [0-100]
Gdp 
weighted
% EU  
total
% EU total
austria 2.24 77.78 80.00 86.67 775025 2.66 2.45
Belgium 2.35 44.44 76.67 73.33 753314 2.58 2.47
Bulgaria 0.36 58.33 60.00 86.67 85471 0.29 0.32
croatia 0.38 83.33 75.00 80.00 104708 0.36 0.37
cyprus 0.14 44.44 76.67 60.00 35260 0.12 0.13
czech rep. 1.63 58.33 71.67 80.00 337483 1.16 1.40
denmark 2.35 55.56 81.67 73.33 532527 1.83 2.09
Estonia 0.27 75.00 91.67 66.67 42014 0.14 0.21
Finland 1.97 50.00 90.00 66.67 412905 1.42 1.69
France 20.59 66.67 81.67 86.67 4904283 16.82 18.71
Germany 15.10 66.67 73.33 63.33 5601548 19.21 17.16
Greece 1.16 66.67 15.00 80.00 309112 1.06 1.11
Hungary 0.90 55.56 86.67 93.33 233135 0.80 0.85
ireland 0.88 47.22 70.00 86.67 356487 1.22 1.05
italy 10.07 72.22 88.33 73.33 3776539 12.95 11.51
latvia 0.26 69.44 73.33 80.00 48972 0.17 0.21
lithuania 0.32 80.56 95.00 73.33 82966 0.28 0.30
luxembourg 0.33 47.22 85.00 90.00 96831 0.33 0.33
Malta 0.06 58.33 41.67 73.33 12530 0.04 0.05
netherlands 5.88 33.33 95.00 66.67 1258069 4.32 5.10
poland 4.47 58.33 61.67 80.00 778546 2.67 3.57
portugal 1.01 69.44 70.00 73.33 358313 1.23 1.12
romania 1.57 72.22 53.33 86.67 283340 0.97 1.27
Slovak rep. 0.53 66.67 88.33 73.33 165359 0.57 0.55
Slovenia 0.36 61.11 76.67 83.33 79574 0.27 0.31
Spain 6.30 55.56 75.00 80.00 2195824 7.53 6.92
Sweden 4.70 66.67 90.00 66.67 945460 3.24 3.97
UK 13.81 83.33 80.00 60.00 4586401 15.73 14.77
Source: Eurostat and world Bank. data for government spending and Gdp are for 2012. data on the respective 
quality of judicial processes, land administration and building control are for 2015 and standardised.
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X. Case Study 4: 
 Defence policy
Current and future challenges
Since the end of the Cold War, most EU member states have cut military 
spending (see, e.g., Ballerster 2013; Larrabee et al. 2012; McKinsey 2013). As 
a result, with the exception of the United Kingdom, military expenditures 
(expressed in constant 2011 USD) in large EU member states are below their 
1992 levels (see Figure 1). 
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Figure  1:
Development of military expenditures in large EU member states (constant 2011 million USD)
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012 (http://milexdata.sipri.org).
The impression even worsens if relative figures are taken into account. 
Figure 2 shows the development of military expenditures in per cent of GDP 
for the EU-28 and the four biggest European economies. In 2014, the average 
spending on defence by the EU-28 countries was 1.52 per cent of GDP, which 
marks a new all-time low (the small peak in 2009 can be explained by the 
drop in most national GDPs after the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008). 
The time series for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom also 
exhibit a clearly falling trend (i.e. member states have either cut military 
spending or not adjusted spending to GDP growth).
Table 2 holds detailed information of the derivation of burden shares. We 
approximate national burdens for attracting firms (and, ultimately, corpo-
rate profits as a tax base) with efforts member states undertake towards 
providing tangible and intangible infrastructure. The effort towards providing 
tangible infrastructure can be directly measured by government spending 
on public infrastructure. For the efforts towards providing intangible infra-
structure, we rely on three indicators from the World Bank measuring the 
respective quality of judicial processes, land administration and building 
control. The key assumption here is that higher quality reflects a higher 
degree of effort. We sum up the three realised indicator values for each 
country and weight them by GDP (column ‘Total score’) to make efforts 
comparable across member states. The next step is transforming calculated 
values into relative national shares. Finally, we calculate total burden share 
as the simple average of government spending on tangible infrastructure 
and national share of tangible infrastructure efforts.
Table 2: 
Calculation of burden shares
tangible infrastructure intangible infrastructure total
Government 
spending
Judicial  
processes
land  
administration
Building 
control
Total  
score
national 
share
Burden 
share
% of EU  
total
 Quality index [0-100]
Gdp 
weighted
% EU  
total
% EU total
austria 2.24 77.78 80.00 86.67 775025 2.66 2.45
Belgium 2.35 44.44 76.67 73.33 753314 2.58 2.47
Bulgaria 0.36 58.33 60.00 86.67 85471 0.29 0.32
croatia 0.38 83.33 75.00 80.00 104708 0.36 0.37
cyprus 0.14 44.44 76.67 60.00 35260 0.12 0.13
czech rep. 1.63 58.33 71.67 80.00 337483 1.16 1.40
denmark 2.35 55.56 81.67 73.33 532527 1.83 2.09
Estonia 0.27 75.00 91.67 66.67 42014 0.14 0.21
Finland 1.97 50.00 90.00 66.67 412905 1.42 1.69
France 20.59 66.67 81.67 86.67 4904283 16.82 18.71
Germany 15.10 66.67 73.33 63.33 5601548 19.21 17.16
Greece 1.16 66.67 15.00 80.00 309112 1.06 1.11
Hungary 0.90 55.56 86.67 93.33 233135 0.80 0.85
ireland 0.88 47.22 70.00 86.67 356487 1.22 1.05
italy 10.07 72.22 88.33 73.33 3776539 12.95 11.51
latvia 0.26 69.44 73.33 80.00 48972 0.17 0.21
lithuania 0.32 80.56 95.00 73.33 82966 0.28 0.30
luxembourg 0.33 47.22 85.00 90.00 96831 0.33 0.33
Malta 0.06 58.33 41.67 73.33 12530 0.04 0.05
netherlands 5.88 33.33 95.00 66.67 1258069 4.32 5.10
poland 4.47 58.33 61.67 80.00 778546 2.67 3.57
portugal 1.01 69.44 70.00 73.33 358313 1.23 1.12
romania 1.57 72.22 53.33 86.67 283340 0.97 1.27
Slovak rep. 0.53 66.67 88.33 73.33 165359 0.57 0.55
Slovenia 0.36 61.11 76.67 83.33 79574 0.27 0.31
Spain 6.30 55.56 75.00 80.00 2195824 7.53 6.92
Sweden 4.70 66.67 90.00 66.67 945460 3.24 3.97
UK 13.81 83.33 80.00 60.00 4586401 15.73 14.77
Source: Eurostat and world Bank. data for government spending and Gdp are for 2012. data on the respective 
quality of judicial processes, land administration and building control are for 2015 and standardised.
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In 2002, NATO member states adopted a non-binding requirement of spending 
2 per cent of their GDP for military purposes (Mölling 2014). However, in 2014, 
only France, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom managed to have 
military expenditures exceeding 2 per cent of national GDP.
The failure to achieve this objective stands in direct contrast to an increase 
in current and future European challenges. For example, the recent conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine about Crimea has revealed the need for a common 
and effective defence policy (Major and Mölling 2015), and an EU army could 
more effectively intervene than single national operations to establish peace 
in the sub-Saharan region (Gallhöfer 2014). Finally, the growth of terrorism 
also increases the need for effective military operations. Given these circum-
stances, a simultaneous easing of tension regarding budgetary restrictions 
must be viewed as unrealistic (see, e.g., Brune and Mölling 2011; Larrabee et 
al. 2012; Major and Mölling 2013), as it would only further increase the pressure 
to have more and tighter collaboration in the policy field of defence.
Status quo
European defence is a policy field that has EU member states cooperating in 
a wide range of different ways, for example, with procurement or interna-
tional interventions. However, even with such cooperation, decision-making 
is often difficult and complex (Gallhöfer 2014). This stands in sharp contrast 
to the requirements of a powerful military structure. A root cause for the 
heterogeneity of cooperation can be found in the two distinct types of member 
states: neutral and non-neutral states.86 The neutral member states have 
committed to not join military alliances, while all non-neutral member states 
86  neutrality is directly enacted in the national constitution. This applies to austria, Finland, ireland, Malta and 
Sweden.
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Figure  2:
Development of military expenditures (in per cent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators). The figure shows military expenditures using the NATO classification.
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(except Cyprus) are currently members of NATO (see, e.g., von Ondarza 2005).
Concerning the coordination of procurement of military equipment, some 
attempts at harmonisation exist. The goal of organisations and unions such 
as OCCAR87 and EDA88 is to set common standards, harmonise procurement 
and exploit resulting cost advantages. These attempts, however, can be viewed 
as having room for improvement (see, e.g., Mölling 2015).
At present, the European Union has 28 different armies with 28 different 
army structures. Although some multinational military units have been 
established (e.g. EUFOR, Eurocorps and the EU battlegroups), they are small 
(Staack and Krause 2014). In addition, since their organisation is primarily 
multinational and not supranational, fundamental decisions must still be 
taken by the national parliaments, and most of the soldiers are still the 
concern of their home countries. When it comes to efficiency gains, for 
instance, the European Parliament (2015) calculated that more than €7.7 
billion could be saved each year through greater cooperation.
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we assume a fully integrated European 
army. This includes unified decision-making and centralised provision of 
military equipment.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 4 we create an index for the burden-sharing between member states under both the status quo and the hypothetical counterfactual situation 
of an integrated European army, and compare these indicators with an indicator of the relative benefits of a common defence policy. Based on 
these figures, we are able to judge how much a European competence would better align benefits and costs for member states and thereby 
decrease the extent of free riding. Our indicator of free riding is reduced by 37 per cent if an integrated European defence policy is created.
Economies of scale
 4 Using both data from the European defence agency (Eda 2015) and information from a recent study conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
(2013), we investigate economies of scale in the provision of defence. There are some hints regarding the presence of economies of scale, e.g., 
the number of deployable land forces increases disproportionately to the total number of land-force soldiers. Furthermore, the overall number 
of land-force soldiers can be reduced if an integrated European army is created. However, some countervailing effects prevail: The potential 
cost savings sink dramatically if an EU salary scheme is applied. Furthermore, the positive effect in the case of increasing deployment shares is 
mainly driven by the four largest European armies. 
Preference heterogeneity
 5 we rely on the Special Eurobarometer 432 questionnaire (‘Europeans’ attitudes towards security’) and evaluate question Qa9: “in your 
view, what role should each of the following play in ensuring the security of citizens in (OUr cOUnTrY)?” ‘army’ was one of the elements 
mentioned. The standard deviation of the distribution is 0.119, resulting in a heterogeneity indicator of 23.8 per cent, which in turn points to 
rather homogenous preferences of European citizens across EU member states.
Internal market consistency
 5 The market for defence goods is exempted from the internal market (article 346 TFEU). This results in 28 national markets with national 
regulations intended to protect national defence industries. despite efforts aimed at fostering better integration of Europe’s armament sector 
(e.g. the European defence Technological and industrial Base, EdTiB), the focus is still primarily national. Shifting this policy field to the European 
level could improve efficiency, reduce military spending significantly and enhance the competitiveness of the European armament sector.
Competition
 5 Undersized markets for the armament sector and decreasing military expenditures counteract yardstick competition. Some member 
states already cooperate in various projects. an integrated European army could enable real competition in the armament sector, reduce 
redundancies and improve overall efficiency.
87  Occar is the abbreviation for Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d‘armement (Organisation 
for Joint armament cooperation).
88  Eda is the abbreviation for the European defence agency.
In 2002, NATO member states adopted a non-binding requirement of spending 
2 per cent of their GDP for military purposes (Mölling 2014). However, in 2014, 
only France, Greece, Lithuania and the United Kingdom managed to have 
military expenditures exceeding 2 per cent of national GDP.
The failure to achieve this objective stands in direct contrast to an increase 
in current and future European challenges. For example, the recent conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine about Crimea has revealed the need for a common 
and effective defence policy (Major and Mölling 2015), and an EU army could 
more effectively intervene than single national operations to establish peace 
in the sub-Saharan region (Gallhöfer 2014). Finally, the growth of terrorism 
also increases the need for effective military operations. Given these circum-
stances, a simultaneous easing of tension regarding budgetary restrictions 
must be viewed as unrealistic (see, e.g., Brune and Mölling 2011; Larrabee et 
al. 2012; Major and Mölling 2013), as it would only further increase the pressure 
to have more and tighter collaboration in the policy field of defence.
Status quo
European defence is a policy field that has EU member states cooperating in 
a wide range of different ways, for example, with procurement or interna-
tional interventions. However, even with such cooperation, decision-making 
is often difficult and complex (Gallhöfer 2014). This stands in sharp contrast 
to the requirements of a powerful military structure. A root cause for the 
heterogeneity of cooperation can be found in the two distinct types of member 
states: neutral and non-neutral states.86 The neutral member states have 
committed to not join military alliances, while all non-neutral member states 
86  neutrality is directly enacted in the national constitution. This applies to austria, Finland, ireland, Malta and 
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Figure  2:
Development of military expenditures (in per cent of GDP)
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators). The figure shows military expenditures using the NATO classification.
 
102
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data source
For the computation of spillover effects, we create indices for the burden- and 
benefit-sharing among member states under both the status quo (i.e. national 
provision of individual armies) and the counterfactual European provision of 
an integrated European army. This enables us to approximate the degree of 
free riding for both cases and to compare changes when moving from the 
national provision of military services to a supranational provision.
The benefit share is based on academic literature (see, e.g., Kollias 2008) 
and captures the specific benefits an EU country enjoys from military protec-
tion. Benefits comprise the protection of citizens, land and wealth. Accord-
ingly, using Eurostat data for 2013, we compute each country’s share of the 
European Union’s total population (citizens’ protection), total land area (terri-
torial protection) and total GDP (wealth protection). The figures are shown 
in Table 2 in the Appendix.
Since we do not know the exact preferences of the various countries for 
each of the benefit elements, we calculate an unweighted average of the three 
percentage shares (i.e. we add up the shares for population, area and GDP, 
and then divide this figure by three).89 The resulting figure is a rough approx-
imation of the benefits a specific country enjoys from military protection 
(see Table 2, column 6).
In contrast to authors who assume that these benefits only are prevalent 
in the case of an integrated EU provision of military services (e.g. Kollias 
2008), we argue that the calculated benefit share approximates a country’s 
benefits from military protection under both the status quo (national armies) 
and in the counterfactual situation (European army). Thus, we assume that 
a national provision of military services also has de facto spillover effects 
that are positive on the EU-wide level, in the sense that the military capac-
ities of EU member countries augment the security of the other EU partners 
(e.g. through its deterrence effects or its contribution to EU capacities in 
international conflicts). 
However, in contrast to the benefits, the burden-sharing of military 
protection obviously differs between national and supranational provision. 
For burden-sharing under a national provision, we calculate a country’s share 
of military expenditures relative to the sum of military expenditures of all 
EU countries.90 Since defence budgets in France and the United Kingdom 
include nuclear deterrence costs that serve an exclusively national purpose, 
we subtract these costs from the budgets before calculating the shares.91
For the counterfactual situation (i.e. a European army), we argue that there 
is a strong case that such an army would be financed out of the European 
89  we have also used an economy’s capital stock instead of Gdp. The results are not affected by this modification 
and are presented in the appendix (see Figure 7).
90  Figures are only available until 2011. we have extrapolated these figures using the development of overall 
defence expenditure in 2012 and 2013 (with the underlying assumption being that nuclear and total defence 
expenditures follow similar trajectories).
91  it would be misleading to expect nuclear deterrence in these countries to add to a general European 
deterrence because both nuclear strategies are only applicable for assaults on national territories. we are 
thankful to Hilmar linnenkamp for pointing this out.
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budget.92 Accordingly, we use a country’s share of the EU budget as an 
indicator for the specific burden-sharing among member states.93
For both cases, we then subtract the burden share from the benefit share 
to detect free riding. Positive figures denote net-receiver countries (i.e. the 
country’s benefits from military protection are higher than its respective 
contributions), whereas negative figures denote net-payer countries (i.e. the 
country’s contributions are higher than its benefits).
Results
The results are presented in Figure 3. The United Kingdom, in particular, 
suffers from free riding by other member states under the status quo – in 
other words, compared to its relative benefits from military protection, the 
UK’s relative contributions are rather high. However, one should bear in mind 
that the UK aims not only at protecting itself, but also at playing a major role 
in international military operations. The same, albeit to a lesser extent, holds 
true for France. In contrast, other large member states – such as Italy, but 
also Germany – do not suffer that much from free riding under the status quo.
However, the picture changes when moving to a European provision of 
military services. If a European army were financed under the current 
financing structure of the EU budget, the contribution of Germany (and Italy) 
would increase to the benefit of the UK. The situation in France would remain 
unchanged, as it (and then Germany) is the largest net payer. However, it 
should be stressed that some of the differences in net payment also occur 
due to differences in the types of states. Neutral states (e.g. Austria, Finland, 
Ireland, Malta and Sweden) have lower defence expenditures per se, which 
might cause a net-receiving position. In this case, the result should not be 
mis- or over-interpreted as free riding. Furthermore, free riding must not 
necessarily be viewed as something negative. For example, the free riding of 
surrounding countries might be of only minor importance in the eyes of a 
well-meaning hegemon (i.e. a specific country providing them with defen-
sive protection).
92  There may be other distributions, as well. However, we do assume that the financing scheme will follow 
the current burden-sharing in the EU budget. Of course, burden-sharing in the EU budget is endogenously 
determined by the structure of the spending side. But since the outcome of budget negotiations with an EU 
defence competence is impossible to predict, we abstain from any speculation on this issue.
93  The data source is the EU Budget 2013 Financial report (see annex 2c, p. 123).
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benefit-sharing among member states under both the status quo (i.e. national 
provision of individual armies) and the counterfactual European provision of 
an integrated European army. This enables us to approximate the degree of 
free riding for both cases and to compare changes when moving from the 
national provision of military services to a supranational provision.
The benefit share is based on academic literature (see, e.g., Kollias 2008) 
and captures the specific benefits an EU country enjoys from military protec-
tion. Benefits comprise the protection of citizens, land and wealth. Accord-
ingly, using Eurostat data for 2013, we compute each country’s share of the 
European Union’s total population (citizens’ protection), total land area (terri-
torial protection) and total GDP (wealth protection). The figures are shown 
in Table 2 in the Appendix.
Since we do not know the exact preferences of the various countries for 
each of the benefit elements, we calculate an unweighted average of the three 
percentage shares (i.e. we add up the shares for population, area and GDP, 
and then divide this figure by three).89 The resulting figure is a rough approx-
imation of the benefits a specific country enjoys from military protection 
(see Table 2, column 6).
In contrast to authors who assume that these benefits only are prevalent 
in the case of an integrated EU provision of military services (e.g. Kollias 
2008), we argue that the calculated benefit share approximates a country’s 
benefits from military protection under both the status quo (national armies) 
and in the counterfactual situation (European army). Thus, we assume that 
a national provision of military services also has de facto spillover effects 
that are positive on the EU-wide level, in the sense that the military capac-
ities of EU member countries augment the security of the other EU partners 
(e.g. through its deterrence effects or its contribution to EU capacities in 
international conflicts). 
However, in contrast to the benefits, the burden-sharing of military 
protection obviously differs between national and supranational provision. 
For burden-sharing under a national provision, we calculate a country’s share 
of military expenditures relative to the sum of military expenditures of all 
EU countries.90 Since defence budgets in France and the United Kingdom 
include nuclear deterrence costs that serve an exclusively national purpose, 
we subtract these costs from the budgets before calculating the shares.91
For the counterfactual situation (i.e. a European army), we argue that there 
is a strong case that such an army would be financed out of the European 
89  we have also used an economy’s capital stock instead of Gdp. The results are not affected by this modification 
and are presented in the appendix (see Figure 7).
90  Figures are only available until 2011. we have extrapolated these figures using the development of overall 
defence expenditure in 2012 and 2013 (with the underlying assumption being that nuclear and total defence 
expenditures follow similar trajectories).
91  it would be misleading to expect nuclear deterrence in these countries to add to a general European 
deterrence because both nuclear strategies are only applicable for assaults on national territories. we are 
thankful to Hilmar linnenkamp for pointing this out.
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However, it also becomes evident from the estimated figures that moving 
from national to EU responsibility drastically reduces the extremes (from 
3.9 to 2.8 per cent for net payers, and from -12.08 to -6.03 per cent for net 
contributors). This is also reflected in the standard deviation, which 
decreases from 2.69 to 1.69 (i.e. our indicator of free riding is reduced by 
around 37 per cent). We therefore assign a score equal to 4, which points 
towards an allocation to the European level.
eConomieS oF SCAle
Data source
Economies of scale in defence may arise from both the input and output 
perspectives. On the input side, a European army may provide defence with 
lower per-unit costs (e.g. by reducing redundancies in headquarters and/or 
overhead). On the output side, there is the chance that a European army may 
use the overall resources more efficiently compared to smaller armies. For 
example, training facilities could be used at capacity and staff workload 
optimised. Similarly, there could be opportunities for better exploiting 
complementarities in equipment, logistics and operational capabilities.
We rely on two different sources to detect economies of scale. First, we use 
data from the European Defence Agency (EDA 2015) from 2013 to investigate 
potential capability advantages in the provision of military services. Second, 
we take into account the results of a study conducted by the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (2013) that already estimated the cost-savings estimated the potential 
cost savings of having integrated European land forces and thus points towards 
the presence of economies of scale in this specific field of military services.
net benefit (in per cent) = benefit share - cost share  
AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
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Figure  3:
Net benefits from defence policy, by country (in per cent)
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat and Global Zero (2011).
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Methodology
For the investigation of capability advantages, we compare the number of 
deployable land forces and the number of sustainable land forces (both 
measured either as the total number or as a share of land-force soldiers) to 
the total number of land forces per country.94
Another possibility for detecting economies of scale would be a unit-cost 
comparison between small and large countries. However, when unit costs 
are compared, one has to ensure that the output level is comparable across 
countries. This is particularly not the case in the field of defence policy 
because some countries primarily focus on national defence while others aim 
at playing a major role in international interventions.95 Furthermore, the 
needs for national defence differ between countries because of neighbour-
hood or other foreign conflicts. We therefore refrain from drawing inferences 
from unit-cost comparisons, relying instead on the results on potential cost 
savings presented in the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013) study.
Results
With respect to capabilities, there is some evidence that larger armies exhibit 
a substantially higher share of both deployable and sustainable soldiers. Their 
number increases disproportionately to the number of land-force soldiers 
(see Figure 4). 
However, this effect is mainly induced by the four largest European armies 
(i.e. those of France, Greece, Spain and the UK).96 If these armies are disre-
garded (and there might be some good arguments for doing so due to specific 
characteristics, such as the neighbourhood conflicts between Turkey and 
Greece or the specific focus on international interventions in France and the 
UK), a different picture emerges. This becomes evident in Figure 4: If we 
disregard the four largest armies (mentioned above), a much less pronounced 
positive relationship emerges.97 Taken together, the positive results on the 
presence of economies of scale with respect to deployability/sustainability 
must be treated with caution.
Concerning the potential cost savings in the provision of land forces, the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (2013) has investigated the monetary European added 
value in the provision of integrated European land forces. The total estimate 
for the number of European soldiers necessary to fulfil the Petersberg tasks 
is between 480,000 and 750,000, and is thus far below the current total sum 
of 890,000 land-force soldiers in 28 national armies. Depending on the 
assumed payment scheme (i.e. differentiating between a common European 
payment and retained national payment), the authors detect enormous poten-
tial cost savings in the case of retained national wages (the estimated cost 
savings of having integrated European land forces range from €3.1 billion in 
94  deployable (land) forces are the strength of (land) forces troops structured, prepared and equipped for 
deployed operations (the naTO 50% usability target). Sustainable land forces are the strength of (land) 
forces troops undertaking or planned for sustained operations, including those on high readiness standby 
(the naTO 10% usability target). it is a subset of deployable (land) forces. Source: http://www.eda.europa.
eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/definitions.
95  Furthermore, military expenditures might be higher owing to political reasons, such as when a country aims 
at gaining or keeping a (permanent) seat on the Un Security council.
96  information on the number of deployable/sustainable soldiers for Germany and italy is not available.
97  The corresponding graphs are presented in the appendix; see Figure 8.
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case of the upper bound to more than €9.2 billion in case of the lower bound).98 
Furthermore, there might be additional cost savings resulting from improved 
cooperation or joint military procurement (see ‘Internal market consistency’ 
section below). For instance, the European Parliament estimates a potential 
for efficiency gains through intensified cooperation in procurement of €12 
billion annually (European Parliament 2015).
Taken together, there are some indications of the presence of cost savings in 
the provision of military services in the case of European provision. However, 
the results are not as clear-cut as might be expected. We therefore assign a 
score equal to 4.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding the army, 
we use information from the Special Eurobarometer 432 questionnaire (‘Euro-
peans’ attitudes towards security’) and investigate question QA9. EU citizens 
were asked the following: “In your view, what role should each of the following 
play in ensuring the security of citizens in (OUR COUNTRY)?” One institution 
to rate was the army.
Answers could be given in a scale with four levels (‘very important role’ , 
‘important role’ , ‘limited role’ , ‘no role’). In addition, participants had the 
opportunity to suppress their opinion.
98  However, as a robustness test, the authors show that the potential savings decline and partly disappear if a 
European payment scheme is applied since this would imply enormous wage increases for a large number 
of soldiers.
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Figure  4:
Deployable and sustainable land forces relative to the total number of land forces
Notes: Data refer to 2013.  Source: EDA (2015). A third-order polynomial is calculated to detect the best fit.
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Methodology
For our results, we reduce the scale from four levels to two (i.e. we merge the 
answer levels of ‘very important role’ with ‘important role’ , and of ‘limited 
role’ with ‘no role’).
We also exclude all participants who suppressed their opinion (i.e. we 
adjust our sample so that the shares of answers in our two levels add up to 
100 per cent). This leads to a reduction in country-sample size of up to 4 per 
cent (in Spain and Latvia). The overall reduction on the EU-28 level is of minor 
importance (less than 2 per cent reduction) and can therefore be disregarded 
without affecting our results.
The results are calculated in a two-step procedure. First, we calculate the 
percentage of answers with either ‘very important role’ or ‘important role’ 
for each country. Then, we aggregate the results at the country level and 
calculate measures of dispersion on the EU level.
Results
The results are presented in Figure 5. The heterogeneity indicator amounts 
to 23.8 per cent (unweighted), meaning that, compared to the maximum 
standard deviation, the realised standard deviation of mean population pref-
erences is rather small.99 Referring to the scoring decision for preference 
heterogeneity, we assign a score of 5.
Figure 5:  
Preference heterogeneity regarding the role of the army across europe (in per cent)
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Eurobarometer question SEB432 Qa9: “in your view, what role should the army play in ensuring the security of 
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Preference heterogeneity regarding 
the role of the army across Europe (in per cent)
Median 0.781
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.119
Heterogeneity 23.8 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very important role’ and ‘important role’ in a country. The 
answer choices ‘very important role’ is merged with ‘important role’, and ‘limited role’ is merged with ‘no role’. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size as 
weights, the standard deviation = 0.101, resulting in a heterogeneity of 20.2 per cent.
99  The results still hold if we exclude the four largest armies (i.e. those of France, Greece, Spain and the UK) 
from our calculations.
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inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
According to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU), “any Member State may take such measures as it considers 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security which 
are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material.” This exception from the internal market provision allows member 
states to internally regulate production and trade in the field of defence, and 
it is widely used in all member states because each member state aims at 
protecting its national defence industry by claiming ‘essential security inter-
ests’ (Mölling 2015).
The exemption from the internal market has the de facto result of leaving 
28 national defence markets (Gallhöfer 2014). On average, member state 
governments invest 75 per cent of all military funding domestically (European 
Commission 2013). This leads to a highly fragmented defence industry in 
Europe with many relatively small (in the global context) national compa-
nies (Hartley 2011a, b). In the United States, by contrast, a higher number of 
companies account for only one-third of the US annual investment volume 
(EDA 2012). Thus, the exemption from the internal market for defence-re-
lated goods leads to a significant lack of competition and overpriced goods 
(Briani et al. 2013).
Furthermore, although there is an agreement on fostering a better-inte-
grated armament sector in Europe (European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, EDTIB), the focus still remains predominantly national with 
only a few exceptions (Ballerster 2013; Briani et al. 2013; Mölling 2015). One 
result is a distinct heterogeneity in weapon systems. Table 1 compares the 
weapon systems in use in the EU and the US, showing that the EU uses more 
than three times as many weapon systems as the US does. Since the US 
operates a fully integrated army, the difference between the EU and the US 
is primary driven by competing systems, which lead to expensive redundan-
cies in R&D, procurement and operation (Gallhöfer 2014; Hartley 2011b; 
McKinsey 2013).
Table 1:  
Weapon systems in the eU and the US
Weapon system eU US
Tank 20 4
artillery 3 1
Fighter 13 6
Helicopter 7 5
Missile 17 7
Frigate 11 1
Submarine 18 3
TOTAL 89 27
Source: Based on Gallhöfer (2014).
The policy field of defence is thus a textbook example of the kinds of negative 
effects there can be in the absence of the internal market. An integrated 
European army, in addition to removing the exception to the internal market 
provision, could contribute to solving this dilemma as many reasons for 
protecting national defence industries would disappear. This is particularly 
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true with respect to currently predominantly national weapon systems and 
national procurement. In contrast, if only internal market restrictions were 
removed but the current system of national defence (industries) were 
maintained, national standards in line with secrecy deliberations could 
counteract the merits of an internal market in the field of defence policy. 
Even if governments are committed to Europe-wide public submissions, 
national considerations may hinder the full exploitation of trans-European 
benefits and the creation of trans-European champions in the production of 
specific defence goods. Taken together, assuming that a European defence 
competence would also imply a large step towards internal market consist-
ency, we assign a score of 5 for this indicator.
ComPetition
Nominal military expenditures in Europe have been stagnating for years. At 
the same time, military expenditures in the other regions of the world have 
evolved more dynamically and reached a higher level in 2014 than in 1992. 
Figure 6 illustrates the development between 1992 and 2014 for six world 
regions. In 2013, Asia and Oceania overtook Europe and are now the regions 
with the second-highest military expenditures. Even if looking at spending 
in isolation from capabilities only displays one side of the coin, these devel-
opments point towards the fact that the EU’s primary concern is not about 
competition between member states, but about competition with other world 
regions (Gallhöfer 2014; Mölling 2015).
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Figure  6:
Development of military expenditures in six world regions (1992–2014)
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012 (http://milexdata.sipri.org). Figures are in 2011 USD at constant prices and exchange rates.
The fact that technological progress generally leads to increased R&D efforts 
particularly applies to defence goods (Ablett and Erdmann 2013). This, in turn, 
leads to higher prices and maintenance costs for these defence goods 
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(Kirkpatrick 2004, 2008; Lefeez 2013). To bear the costs of technologically 
sophisticated defence goods, member states are forced to cooperate on R&D 
(see, e.g., Gallhöfer 2014; Mölling 2015), which typically involves the member 
states that have a substantial armament industry, namely, France, Germany, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom (Schmitt 2005).100 Prominent exam-
ples of jointly developed defence goods include the Airbus A400M military 
transport plane and the Eurofighter Typhoon. Thus, in general, instead of 
competing with each other, member states prefer to collaborate in the policy 
field of defence.
However, a major shortcoming of current cooperation is the application 
of the ‘juste retour’ principle. For instance, the standard rate for cooperation 
within the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) is 66 per 
cent (i.e. if a national government contributes €30 million to an OCCAR 
procurement project, the organisation will place orders worth €20 million in 
the contributing country) (OCCAR 1996). The rate was even 100 per cent in 
the case of Eurofighter procurement, meaning that for each euro a country 
contributes to the Eurofighter project, one euro is spent in that country in 
turn (Mölling 2015). This causes inefficient or even insufficient resource 
allocations because orders are not allocated to the firms offering the leading 
technologies (i.e. the trans-European champions), but are instead allocated 
based only on considerations of fairness (Edwards 2011; Gallhöfer 2014; 
Keohane 2002).
Competition between member states mostly occurs after a phase of cooper-
ation (e.g. if a new defence good is developed, national governments compete 
for the best-equipped version of the good) (Edwards 2011; Maulny and Liberti 
2008), leading to a high fragmentation of national orders. A prominent 
example is the ordering of the NH90 helicopters, which has even more 
versions than participating member states (Mölling 2015). In contrast, by 
pooling the demand of all member states, procurement costs could be cut by 
30 per cent (McKinsey 2013).
Concerning the innovative function of competition, pure national advances 
in defence goods leading to innovation spillover effects have been rare in recent 
years. One exceptional example is the Type 212A submarine, which was devel-
oped in Germany for the German navy to replace its predecessor type, which 
was almost 40 years old. That attracted the Italian navy, which finally bought 
licences to rebuild the submarine (see Gallhöfer 2014). Thus, this case can be 
considered an example of successful yardstick competition: One member state 
developed a best practice defence good, and another one adopted it.101
Taken together, the current competition is generally not welfare-enhancing 
(Mölling 2015), and there is only limited evidence of welfare-enhancing 
innovative competition, such as in the case of the submarine. For positive 
effects from yardstick competition, member states would need sufficient 
resources for defence (e.g. for R&D). However, given how much the 2008 
economic crisis impacted public budgets, there are only limited chances that 
there will be sufficient national resources for defence in the short and 
medium terms (see, e.g., Brune and Mölling 2011; Larrabee et al. 2012; Major 
100  in 1998, these countries signed a letter of intent (loi) to facilitate cross-border consolidation and cooper-
ation of defence industries. in 2000, the loi countries signed a framework agreement covering security of 
supply, exports and transfers.
101  The submarine, however, suffers from various technological problems, which decreases its value as a best 
practise example for the provision of defence technologies (see repinski, rosenbach and Traufetter 2015).
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and Mölling 2013). Hence, the discussion is about how to improve output given 
constant input, or at least how to maintain output given decreasing input 
(Ballerster 2013). The European Parliament (2015) estimates that EU member 
states would reduce military expenditures by 66 per cent102 if the military 
agenda were to be organised in a fashion similar to that of the US (i.e. if 
Europe had an integrated army). Assigning the policy field of defence to the 
European level may thus eliminate negative effects from competition, 
improve military organisation and increase overall welfare. Therefore, we 
assign a score of 5 for this indicator.
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
Table 2:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)
Share of eU total (in per cent)
country iSO population area Gdp Benefit
share
Burden
share (nat.)
Burden 
share (EU)
austria aT 1.67 1.89 2.39 1.98 1.14 2.43
Belgium BE 2.21 0.70 2.92 1.94 2.08 3.16
Bulgaria BG 1.44 2.50 0.30 1.42 0.28 0.34
croatia Hr 0.84 1.30 0.32 0.82 0.31 0.18
cyprus cY 0.17 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.14
czech rep. cZ 2.08 1.77 1.16 1.67 0.68 1.16
denmark dK 1.11 0.98 1.87 1.32 1.92 2.10
Estonia EE 0.26 1.00 0.14 0.47 0.19 0.15
Finland Fi 1.07 6.98 1.49 3.18 1.69 1.63
France Fr 12.98 14.53 15.65 14.39 17.62 17.59
Germany dE 15.94 8.20 20.78 14.97 17.17 21.00
Greece El 2.18 3.00 1.35 2.18 2.19 1.44
Hungary HU 1.96 2.14 0.74 1.61 0.28 0.74
ireland iE 0.91 1.57 1.29 1.26 0.38 1.22
italy iT 11.82 6.94 11.90 10.22 10.73 12.66
latvia lv 0.40 1.43 0.17 0.67 0.11 0.20
lithuania lT 0.59 1.44 0.26 0.76 0.19 0.28
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Malta MT 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06
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Slovak rep. SK 1.07 1.13 0.54 0.91 0.52 0.57
Slovenia Si 0.41 0.46 0.27 0.38 0.20 0.30
Spain ES 9.25 11.52 7.76 9.51 5.60 8.34
Sweden SE 1.89 9.35 3.23 4.82 3.65 3.03
United Kingdom UK 12.65 5.57 14.92 11.05 23.12 11.67
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national defence expenditure before calculating the shares (source: Global Zero 2011).
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Economies of scale
net benefit (in per cent) = benefit share - cost share  
AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
national responsibility European responsibility
-5.00
10.00
-10.00
-15.00
0
AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE EL HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK
Std. Dev. Nat. = 3.03
Std. Dev. EU = 1.90
5.00
Figure  7:
Net benefits of defence policy by country using capital stock (in per cent)
Sources: Eurostat; Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015).
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Figure  8:
Deployable and sustainable land forces relative to the total number of land forces 
(excluding France, Greece, Spain and the UK)
Notes: Data refer to 2013. Source: EDA (2015). The fitted line is calculated using a second-order polynomial.
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Xi. Case Study 5: 
 Development aid
Current and future challenges
There is wide consensus about the challenges regarding developing coun-
tries. No poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, quality educa-
tion and gender equality are some of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) adopted in 2015 by 193 members of the United Nations (The Guardian 
2015; United Nations 2016). While some progress has been achieved in recent 
decades, many of those problems are still serious. For example, almost 800 
million people still suffered from hunger between 2014 and 2016, and an 
estimated 5.9 million children below the age of five died in 2015 for reasons 
that could have been prevented (United Nations 2016). 
The onset of diseases, poverty and climate change have made develop-
ment aid an even more important subject – not just from a perspective of 
altruism, but also with respect to donor self-interest (Ayers and Huq 2009; 
BAMF 2016; World Bank 2002). As a consequence, the amount of official 
development assistance (ODA) provided by international organisations as 
well as national agencies reached a new peak in 2015 – even without in-donor 
expenditures for refugees – and an increasing number of different interna-
tional declarations underlines the importance of development aid as a global 
task (OECD 2016). The same holds true for the EU member states. As shown 
in Figure 1, the total net ODA of the EU-28 increased considerably in recent 
years, reaching $75.84 billion in 2014.103 In recent years, the net ODA from 
Germany and the United Kingdom, in particular, has driven this result.
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Figure  1:
Net ODA trend for the EU-28 and selected EU member states (2000–2014)
Notes: The figure shows net ODA for France, Germany and the United Kingdom (left scale) as well as the sum of all EU-28 net ODA (right scale). 
Source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/).
103  net Oda is defined as Oda minus repayments on the principal. See, e.g., http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/
natlinfo/indicators/methodology_sheets/global_econ_partnership/net_oda.pdf and https://data.oecd.org/
oda/net-oda.htm.
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Deployable and sustainable land forces relative to the total number of land forces 
(excluding France, Greece, Spain and the UK)
Notes: Data refer to 2013. Source: EDA (2015). The fitted line is calculated using a second-order polynomial.
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Recent challenges (e.g. the increasing number of refugees and immigrants 
coming from developing countries) highlight the importance of development 
aid for creating liveable conditions there. Fundamental problems – such as 
unemployment, a lack of education, a poor healthcare system, climate change, 
in several cases bad governance, wars and persecution – have triggered the 
flows of immigrants and refugees (BMZ 2011).
Another difficult challenge will emerge in the long run, as the number of 
people living in developing countries will increase considerably. The popula-
tion in African countries, for instance, will reach 2.4 billion by 2050, which 
is twice as high as its current level (United Nations 2015). This population 
growth, which will further increase emigration pressure, underlines the need 
for a successful approach to development policies.
Status quo
The EU and its member states share responsibility for development aid (Euro-
pean Parliament 2014). The individual member states, the EU institutions 
(especially the European Commission), a combination of the two, and other 
official agencies can either directly support developing countries or fund the 
agencies that perform development aid. The European Development Fund 
(EDF), launched in 1959, is the most important example of multilateral coop-
eration among EU member states outside the EU budget (see European Commis-
sion n.d.; European Parliament 2014).
According to an agreement reached by members of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), ODA is defined as: “Grants or loans to countries 
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and 
to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) 
with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; 
(c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 
25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included 
in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer 
payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance 
payouts) are in general not counted” (OECD n.d.-b).
Accordingly, ODA can be executed via grants, loans or technical coopera-
tion. As an example, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) distinguishes between (1) financial cooperation aimed 
at supporting partner countries in the financing of measures which are impor-
tant for their development and (2) technical cooperation, which is focused on 
transferring technical, economic and organisational knowledge and skills. The 
latter is provided free of charge (grant element of 100%) to the partner countries 
and consists, for example, of advisory services and the supply of materials and 
equipment (BMZ n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The grant level for financial cooperation 
depends on a country’s level of development, and the least developed countries 
are eligible for a grant element of 100 per cent.
Several commitments have been made regarding the way development aid 
should be fulfilled (see ‘Internal market consistency’ section below). For instance, 
donors want to harmonise their aid (better coordination, simplification of proce-
dures, and sharing of information), reduce aid fragmentation (reduce the number 
of small aid projects in a sector and merge them into a larger project with more 
impact) and achieve better policy cohesion (Council of the European Union 2011; 
OECD 2008). Especially the latter is very relevant to the EU. The European 
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
117
Commission has identified 12 policy areas (e.g. trade, environment, security) in 
which contradictions should be avoided and synergies could be achieved among 
different EU policies (European Commission 2005, 2015). 
However, there is still room for improvement. For instance, although the 
problem of aid fragmentation seems to be at the top of the European devel-
opment agenda, international coordination and cooperation lag behind to a 
significant degree. Furthermore, current development payments are below 
pledged levels, as the EU has not achieved the net ODA/GNI (gross national 
income) ratio of 0.7 per cent agreed upon by the United Nations. While only 
four countries fulfilled this commitment level in 2014 (Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and the UK), many others have not (see Figure 2). The average 
net ODA/GNI ratio for the considered countries is equal to 0.41 per cent. 
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Figure  2:
Net ODA/GNI ratios of 19 EU member states (2014)
Source: OECD (https://data.oecd.org/natincome/gross-national-income.htm; http://stats.oecd.org/). 
Notes: The figure displays the net ODA/GNI ratio (in per cent) of 19 EU countries in 2014. The solid black line indicates the target 
ratio of 0.7 per cent, while the dotted blue line shows the average ratio of the 19 countries. Countries are sorted in descending order. 
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we assume a very far-reaching scenario in 
which national development aid is terminated and all European development 
aid is instead centrally financed and managed by the EU. In financial terms, 
this means that development aid ceases to be a national expenditure and is 
instead fully financed from the EU budget. The full shift of expenditures to 
the EU budget under this radical scenario also implies that the allocation of 
European development aid is completely determined via EU decision-making. 
Moreover, this also entails having all payments made to international organ-
isations determined by the EU.
Recent challenges (e.g. the increasing number of refugees and immigrants 
coming from developing countries) highlight the importance of development 
aid for creating liveable conditions there. Fundamental problems – such as 
unemployment, a lack of education, a poor healthcare system, climate change, 
in several cases bad governance, wars and persecution – have triggered the 
flows of immigrants and refugees (BMZ 2011).
Another difficult challenge will emerge in the long run, as the number of 
people living in developing countries will increase considerably. The popula-
tion in African countries, for instance, will reach 2.4 billion by 2050, which 
is twice as high as its current level (United Nations 2015). This population 
growth, which will further increase emigration pressure, underlines the need 
for a successful approach to development policies.
Status quo
The EU and its member states share responsibility for development aid (Euro-
pean Parliament 2014). The individual member states, the EU institutions 
(especially the European Commission), a combination of the two, and other 
official agencies can either directly support developing countries or fund the 
agencies that perform development aid. The European Development Fund 
(EDF), launched in 1959, is the most important example of multilateral coop-
eration among EU member states outside the EU budget (see European Commis-
sion n.d.; European Parliament 2014).
According to an agreement reached by members of the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), ODA is defined as: “Grants or loans to countries 
and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients (developing countries) and 
to multilateral agencies which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) 
with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; 
(c) at concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a grant element of at least 
25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical cooperation is included 
in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Transfer 
payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance 
payouts) are in general not counted” (OECD n.d.-b).
Accordingly, ODA can be executed via grants, loans or technical coopera-
tion. As an example, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) distinguishes between (1) financial cooperation aimed 
at supporting partner countries in the financing of measures which are impor-
tant for their development and (2) technical cooperation, which is focused on 
transferring technical, economic and organisational knowledge and skills. The 
latter is provided free of charge (grant element of 100%) to the partner countries 
and consists, for example, of advisory services and the supply of materials and 
equipment (BMZ n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The grant level for financial cooperation 
depends on a country’s level of development, and the least developed countries 
are eligible for a grant element of 100 per cent.
Several commitments have been made regarding the way development aid 
should be fulfilled (see ‘Internal market consistency’ section below). For instance, 
donors want to harmonise their aid (better coordination, simplification of proce-
dures, and sharing of information), reduce aid fragmentation (reduce the number 
of small aid projects in a sector and merge them into a larger project with more 
impact) and achieve better policy cohesion (Council of the European Union 2011; 
OECD 2008). Especially the latter is very relevant to the EU. The European 
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Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 4 Spillover effects are present if a member state does not pay for development aid in foreign countries 
but receives benefits stemming from development aid paid by other countries. we calculate national 
benefits from development aid based on commercial and security motives and contrast these figures 
with current (national) and counterfactual (EU) payments for development aid. Our indicator of free 
riding decreases by 36 per cent when moving from a national to a European competence. This result 
points towards a European allocation of competences.
Economies of scale
 5 we use OEcd data on administration costs for development aid to show that there are potential cost 
savings if development aid were centrally executed by the EU. relative administration costs decrease 
disproportionally with an increasing size of the donor. Furthermore, we show that aid concentration 
increases with donor size, which points towards a more efficient use of funds if development aid were 
allocated to the EU level.
Preference heterogeneity
 5 we analyse questions from the Special Eurobarometer 441 (The European Year for development – 
citizens’ views on development, cooperation and aid) from February 2016, and find that preferences 
for development aid are highly comparable across EU member states. The heterogeneity varies from 
9.7 to 21.9 per cent, indicating that development aid could be allocated to the European level.
Internal market consistency
 3 while the member states and the EU have expressed their desire to foster better coordination, a large 
part of development aid is still executed on the national level. This could pose a problem with respect 
to the functioning of the internal market if the procedures for public procurement differ between 
the member states and if the member states bias public procurement towards national contractors. 
However, the member states and their implementing organisations adhere to the EU’s public 
procurement rules, which prohibit the preferred selection of national contractors. as the member 
states have likewise agreed to halt tied aid, there is no problem with respect to the internal market.
Competition
 4 we contrast the threat of a race to the bottom with the merits of potential yardstick competition. 
concerning the latter, competition has negative effects as member states care about the impact of 
their aid disbursements relative to the aid disbursements of other member states, which increases 
aid fragmentation. as there are enough international players preventing a European monopoly on 
development aid, the competence could be allocated to the European level. However, there is no 
evidence of a race to the bottom, which limits the indication of a clear European competence.
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS 
Methodology and data source
Spillover effects in this policy field are present if a member state does not 
(adequately) pay for development aid in foreign countries but receives bene-
fits stemming from development aid paid by other countries. 
To approximate the presence of these spillover effects, we calculate the 
member states’ benefit and burden shares for both the status quo (of a 
national provision of development aid) and the counterfactual situation (with 
development aid being centrally managed by the EU).
For the approximation of the member states’ benefits, we focus the analysis 
on development aid objectives. Based on the aforementioned SDGs and the 
classification of donor aid motives by Bandyopadhyay and Vermann (2013), we 
can distinguish between the following development aid motives:
1. Altruistic motives (e.g. improving economic growth to help developing 
countries for humanitarian reasons)
2. Paternalistic motives (e.g. building institutions, improving governance)
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3. Political motives (e.g. fostering reciprocal support in international 
organisations)
4. Commercial motives (e.g. improving trade relationships, developing 
resources)
5. Migration and security motives (e.g. reducing migration, fighting terrorism)
These motives are in principle used to develop a base for calculating the 
benefit share. However, both paternalistic and political motives are very hard 
to quantify. Furthermore, the importance of altruistic motives and the contri-
bution of aid to economic growth is highly controversial in the academic 
literature (see, e.g., Nowak-Lehmann et al. 2012). We therefore disregard 
these rather qualitative motives and base our calculation instead on commer-
cial as well as migration and security motives. On top of being quantifiable, 
the latter motives have an additional advantage in that a member state’s 
benefits accruing from these motives can spill over to other countries 
relatively easily. For instance, the allocation of development aid to reduce 
migration benefits all EU member states irrespective of their contribution. 
The same applies to improvements in global security due to activities in 
developing countries. The reasoning behind the latter aspect is that devel-
opment aid can be used to prevent terrorism by tying aid to counterterrorism 
measures or by using aid to fight the grassroots causes of terrorism, such as 
for education and conflict prevention (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas 
2011; Young and Findley 2011). 
To measure commercial motives, we use OECD data on the member states’ 
imports and exports with least developed countries (LDCs) and compute the 
respective percentage share of each member state in total imports and exports.104
Concerning the objective of limiting migration pressure, we use data from 
Eurostat on the number of asylum-seekers from non-EU countries in the 
2009–2014 period and compute the percentage distribution of these figures 
across member states.105 The underlying assumption is that the relative 
number of asylum-seekers in one country is a good indicator for the benefits 
a member state has from limiting migration pressure via development aid.106 
The member states’ incentives to fight terrorism are approximated using 
the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism 2016).107 We use figures on the attacks on the 
member states’ citizens worldwide and figures on the attacks on the member 
states’ territory.108 For both figures, we compute the percentage distribution 
104  another idea would be to use information on the member states’ foreign direct investments (Fdi) in countries 
receiving Oda. However, information on this indicator is lacking for too many countries (according to the 
OEcd), which renders the application of this measure infeasible.
105  The lower bound of the time frame is driven by data availability. we exclude migration figures from 2015 due 
to the large increase in asylum-seekers in this year and the potential biases resulting from the 2015 European 
asylum crisis.
106  Of course, development aid is not the only solution for fighting migration. Furthermore, the topic has become 
particularly important in recent years. nonetheless, we assume that development aid contributes to a reduc-
tion in migration as the incentives to stay in the respective ldc increases. This is still an assumption, however, 
as one could also argue that development aid contributes to migration because very poor citizens do not have 
the chance to migrate whereas (only relatively) poor citizens can migrate to other countries. Given these 
caveats, we will also present robustness tests which disregard migration benefits.
107  See, e.g., dreher and Fuchs (2011) on the importance of development aid to fighting terrorism.
108  For both indicators, we include all types of attacks, all types of weapons, and all kinds of targets. The number 
of attacks only refers to international terrorism, meaning that the attack was ideologically international and 
that the nationality of the perpetrator group differs from the nationality of the target(s)/victim(s). if the 
perpetrator group or target is multinational, the attack is ideologically international.
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across the member states and calculate the average of both shares. The 
assumption is that the higher this average is, the more a country benefits 
from its own development aid and that of other member states.109
In the baseline scenario, we calculate the unweighted average of the four 
individual benefit measures (import, export, migration and terrorism share), 
meaning that commercial as well as migration and security motives are 
equally weighted with 50 per cent. Furthermore, we present robustness tests 
without migration and security motives as both motives rely on relatively 
strong assumptions. In the first alternative scenario, commercial motives 
are calculated with equal weights for imports and exports. In the second 
alternative scenario, we take the comparatively strong importance of 
exploiting natural resources into account, and thus weight a member state’s 
imports with LDCs with 75 per cent (exports with 25 per cent). In each scenario, 
we assume that the distribution of benefits is – at least in the short run – 
independent of the financing of development aid.
Burden shares under the status quo are calculated using the percentage 
distribution of the sum of the member states’ ODA contributions in the 
2013–2015 period.110 The figures comprise bi- and multilateral aid and thus 
also include the member states’ payments to the UN, the World Bank and EU 
institutions (the latter comprise, e.g., payments to the European Commis-
sion, the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank). 
For the counterfactual, we assume that development aid is financed from 
the EU budget, and we use the current distribution of the member states’ 
contributions to the EU budget as an approximation of the member states’ 
share in the case of centrally managed development aid.
Finally, we calculate net benefits of development aid under the status quo 
and in the counterfactual situation by subtracting the individual burden 
shares from the benefit shares (see Table 2 to Table 4 in the Appendix). Due 
to missing information for some components in the calculation of the benefit 
share and the status quo burden share, the analysis only includes 18 
countries.111 All percentage shares are adjusted to these missing values and 
sum up to 100 per cent.
Results
The baseline results of the calculation of net benefits for the benefit share 
based on commercial as well as migration and security motives are presented 
in Figure 3. 
109  we assume that improved development decreases the chances that the ldc may be susceptible to terroristic 
perpetrator groups. as for migration, we will present robustness tests without the terrorism indicator in the 
appendix.
110  we use the sum of payments from this period to smooth outlier years. The selection of the time frame is driv-
en by data availability. as a caveat, our results (especially for 2015) may be biased by in-donor expenditures 
for refugees.
111  in particular, small member states are dropped. The included countries are austria, Belgium, the czech 
republic, denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, ireland, italy, luxembourg, the 
netherlands, poland, portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Std. Dev. Nat. = 4.69
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Figure  3:
Net benefits from development aid, by country (in per cent)
Notes: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/asylum-and-managed-migration/data/main-tables), 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/) and the OECD 
(http://stats.oecd.org/). The benefit share includes commercial (50%) as well as migration and security (50%) motives.
The United Kingdom, in particular, would benefit from a change from the 
status quo to a European competence of development aid. Put differently, 
under the current situation and its focus on national payments, the other 
member states free ride on the comparatively high development aid payments 
made by the UK.112 A similar result would occur for Sweden, which would 
transition from a relatively large net-payer to a minor net-receiver position. 
The opposite applies for Italy, whereas changes in the net-benefit position 
of other countries (e.g. Germany, Greece and Poland) are rather negligible. 
Taken together, the standard deviation decreases from 4.69 to 2.99 when 
shifting the competence from the national to the European level. The corre-
sponding relative decrease is equal to 36 per cent.
The results of the analysis without migration and security motives are 
highly comparable. In Figure 4, we present net benefits from development 
aid with equal weights for member states’ imports and exports with LDCs. 
The main difference to the baseline result presented in Figure 3 occurs in 
Greece, which shifts from a net-receiver to a small net-payer position. Taken 
together, the standard deviation decreases by 28.33 per cent. A similar result 
is found for the analysis with higher weights for imports (see Figure 12 in the 
Appendix). The standard deviation decreases by 37 per cent, which is similar 
to the decrease in the standard deviation in the case of the baseline result. 
Combining these results, we assign a score equal to 4 for the ‘spillover effects’ 
indicator, which points towards a European competence of development aid.
112  The payments can in part be traced back to historical ties or specific foreign policy strategies of the UK.
across the member states and calculate the average of both shares. The 
assumption is that the higher this average is, the more a country benefits 
from its own development aid and that of other member states.109
In the baseline scenario, we calculate the unweighted average of the four 
individual benefit measures (import, export, migration and terrorism share), 
meaning that commercial as well as migration and security motives are 
equally weighted with 50 per cent. Furthermore, we present robustness tests 
without migration and security motives as both motives rely on relatively 
strong assumptions. In the first alternative scenario, commercial motives 
are calculated with equal weights for imports and exports. In the second 
alternative scenario, we take the comparatively strong importance of 
exploiting natural resources into account, and thus weight a member state’s 
imports with LDCs with 75 per cent (exports with 25 per cent). In each scenario, 
we assume that the distribution of benefits is – at least in the short run – 
independent of the financing of development aid.
Burden shares under the status quo are calculated using the percentage 
distribution of the sum of the member states’ ODA contributions in the 
2013–2015 period.110 The figures comprise bi- and multilateral aid and thus 
also include the member states’ payments to the UN, the World Bank and EU 
institutions (the latter comprise, e.g., payments to the European Commis-
sion, the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank). 
For the counterfactual, we assume that development aid is financed from 
the EU budget, and we use the current distribution of the member states’ 
contributions to the EU budget as an approximation of the member states’ 
share in the case of centrally managed development aid.
Finally, we calculate net benefits of development aid under the status quo 
and in the counterfactual situation by subtracting the individual burden 
shares from the benefit shares (see Table 2 to Table 4 in the Appendix). Due 
to missing information for some components in the calculation of the benefit 
share and the status quo burden share, the analysis only includes 18 
countries.111 All percentage shares are adjusted to these missing values and 
sum up to 100 per cent.
Results
The baseline results of the calculation of net benefits for the benefit share 
based on commercial as well as migration and security motives are presented 
in Figure 3. 
109  we assume that improved development decreases the chances that the ldc may be susceptible to terroristic 
perpetrator groups. as for migration, we will present robustness tests without the terrorism indicator in the 
appendix.
110  we use the sum of payments from this period to smooth outlier years. The selection of the time frame is driv-
en by data availability. as a caveat, our results (especially for 2015) may be biased by in-donor expenditures 
for refugees.
111  in particular, small member states are dropped. The included countries are austria, Belgium, the czech 
republic, denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, ireland, italy, luxembourg, the 
netherlands, poland, portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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eConomieS oF SCAle
Methodology and data source
To investigate economies of scale in development aid, we first analyse poten-
tial cost savings based on fixed cost degression in administrative costs if 
development aid were centrally executed by the EU. The underlying idea 
regarding these cost savings is that the number of headquarters, administra-
tive staff members and transaction costs could be reduced if the number of 
individual donors were to decrease. The analysis is based on information 
regarding administrative costs from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS) on ODA in 2014. 
We calculate the ratio of administrative costs to total ODA for members of the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC),113 various international organ-
isations (IDB Special Fund, Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), 
UNHCR, UNICEF and UNRWA), and European institutions (European Commis-
sion, European Development Fund and European Investment Bank), and plot 
this ratio against the total ODA payments of the countries or institutions. If 
economies of scale are present, there should be a disproportional decrease in 
relative administration costs with increasing donor size. 
Second, we refer to the effectiveness of development aid and point to the 
merits of centralising development aid with respect to aid fragmentation. As 
113  Only 29 dac members provide information on administrative costs: australia, austria, Belgium, canada, 
the czech republic, denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, iceland, ireland, italy, Japan, 
 luxembourg, the netherlands, new Zealand, norway, poland, portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
-15.00
-10.00
-5.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
AT BE CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IR IT LU NL PL PO SE UK
AT BE CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IR IT LU NL PL PO SE UK
net benefit (in per cent) = benefit share - cost share  
Std. Dev. Nat. = 5.01
Std. Dev. EU = 3.59
EU responsibility national responsibility 
Figure  4:
Net benefits from development aid (only commercial motives, equal weights), by country (in per cent)
Notes: Own calculations based on data from the OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/). The benefit share only includes commercial motives with equal 
weights for imports and exports.
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was already mentioned above, developing countries share the problem of 
“too little aid from too many donors” (OECD 2011: 3). Due to the lack of 
concerted and coordinated aid allocation, transaction costs hinder a more 
efficient use of funds. We therefore investigate how the concentration of 
development aid depends on the size of the donor. Using data on aid fragmen-
tation provided by the OECD, we compute aid concentration rates of EU 
member states and of European institutions, and relate these figures to the 
total ODA of the member states and the European institutions.114 The concen-
tration ratio measures “the number of donors’ significant aid relations to all 
of its aid relations” , with significance denoting that the donor is “among the 
largest donors that cumulatively account for at least 90% of the partner 
country’s aid” (OECD 2011: 6). The higher this concentration ratio, the less 
fragmented a donor’s ODA. 
Results
The results for economies of scale in administrative costs using gross 
disbursements as a measure of ODA are presented in Figure 5 (plot of admin-
istrative cost share against total ODA for DAC members, international organ-
isations and EU institutions) and Figure 6 (plot of administrative cost share 
against total ODA for DAC members only). All figures rely on information on 
gross disbursements and refer to 2014. Both graphs indicate a decreasing 
share of administrative costs in total ODA with increasing donor size, and 
thus point to potential cost savings due to fixed cost degression in admin-
istrative costs if development aid were executed by the EU. However, the 
figures do not differentiate between the various ways in which development 
assistance can be executed. For instance, administrative costs for budgetary 
assistance could be smaller than for project assistance. Nonetheless, the 
results are underpinned by recent studies that focus on potential cost savings 
on transaction costs. For instance, an estimated €800 million in transaction 
costs could be saved each year if donors concentrated their aid efforts on 
fewer countries (see Bigsten 2013; Klingebiel, Morazán and Negre 2013).
114  The data can be downloaded at https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/fragmentation-orphans.htm and 
include information about 4,000 pairs of donor/receiver aid relations for all OEcd development assistance 
committee (dac) members (for more information, see http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm) and 
major multilateral agencies. However, other donors (e.g. additional multilateral organisations or non-dac 
members) are not included (OEcd 2011).
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Figure  5:
Ratio of administrative costs to total ODA (gross disbursements) compared to total ODA (DAC members, 
international organisations and EU institutions, 2014)
Notes: Data source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/). The figure includes a logarithmic line of best fit.
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Figure  6:
Ratio of administrative costs to total ODA (gross disbursements) compared to total ODA (only DAC members, 2014)
Notes: Data source: OECD (http://stats.oecd.org/). The figure includes a logarithmic line of best fit.
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The results concerning the correlation of development aid concentration and 
donor size are presented in Figure 7. The figures refer to 2014 and include a 
polynomial line of best fit. The concentration ratio increases with a donor’s 
ODA, indicating that aid allocated by larger donors is less fragmented than aid 
provided by smaller donors. Of course, this result seems to be the natural 
outcome given the way aid concentration is measured (i.e. larger donors can 
more easily account for a cumulated 90 per cent of a receiver country’s aid). 
Furthermore, donations defined as non-significant in financial terms according 
to the applied definition can be well targeted and have an effective impact in 
the receiving country (OECD 2011: 6). Nonetheless, the result supports the 
assumption that combined aid allocated by the EU would be less fragmented 
and could be allocated more efficiently and with lower transaction costs.115 
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Figure  7:
EU member states’ ODA concentration ratio to total ODA (2014)
Notes: Data refer to 2014. Source: OECD (https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/fragmentation-orphans.htm). 
ODA is measured in gross disbursements, and the figure includes a third-order polynomial line of best fit.
Overall, we assign a score of 5 for economies of scale, as both potential cost 
savings in administration costs and effectiveness deliberations point towards 
the merits of a European competence for development aid.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining the preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding devel-
opment aid, we use information from the Special Eurobarometer 441 (The Euro-
pean Year for Development – Citizens’ views on development, cooperation and 
115  However, several political economy arguments may explain why this potential has gone unutilised to date. 
See Klingebiel, negre and Morazán (2016: 5ff) for a detailed survey.
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aid) published in February 2016. In the baseline analysis, we investigate the 
following questions:
•	 QA1: “In your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very impor-
tant or not at all important to help people in developing countries?”
•	 QA5: “The EU (the European Commission and Member States) has promised 
to increase the level of its aid to developing countries. Given the current 
economic situation, which of the following statements best describes your 
opinion?”
 – We should increase aid to developing countries beyond what is already promised
 – We should keep our promise to increase aid to developing countries
 – We should not increase aid to developing countries even though it has been promised
 – We should reduce aid to developing countries as we can no longer afford it
•	 QA6: “Would you be prepared to pay more for groceries or other products 
from developing countries to support people living in these countries (for 
instance, for fair trade products)?”
 – Not ready to pay more
 – Ready to pay up to 5% more
 – Ready to pay 6 to 10% more
 – Ready to pay more than 10%
Furthermore, for each question, respondents could choose the answer ‘don’t know’.
Methodology
For all questions, we reduce the scale of answers from four to two levels (i.e. 
for QA1, we merge the answer levels ‘very important’ and ‘fairly important’ 
as well as ‘not very important’ and ‘not at all important’). The same is done 
for the QA5 answers ‘increase aid to developing countries beyond what is 
already promised’ and ‘keep our promise to increase aid to developing coun-
tries’ as well as for ‘not increase aid to developing countries even though it 
has been promised’ and ‘reduce aid to developing countries as we can no 
longer afford it’. For QA6, we combine ‘not ready to pay more’ and ‘ready to 
pay up to 5% more’ as well as ‘ready to pay 6 to 10% more’ and ‘ready to pay 
more than 10% more’. 
For each question, we investigate the approval with one of the two merged 
answer categories. Thus, with QA1, we look at the approval rates of those who 
agree that development aid is important; for QA5, we investigate the approval 
rates of people thinking that development aid should be (further) increased; 
and, for QA6, we analyse the respondents’ willingness to pay a premium of 
more than 5 per cent to support people in developing countries.
To take differences in population size into account, we also calculate the 
weighted standard deviation and heterogeneity index using the population 
size of each country as weights (with the weighted results being displayed in 
the respective figure notes). 
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Results
The results are presented in Figure 8 to Figure 10. The unweighted heteroge-
neity indicator varies from 14.9 per cent (QA1) over 24.2 per cent (QA6) to 24.6 
per cent (QA5). The weighted results are even smaller, ranging from 9.7 to 
21.9 per cent.
According to our scoring scheme, this results in an overall score of 5. 
Nonetheless, some caveats need to be stressed. First, QA1 and QA5 only ask 
for the importance of development aid and the total amount of spending. 
However, the answers do not account for any preferences regarding the 
precise manner in which ODA should be allocated to developing countries. 
For instance, there might be differences between various donors with respect 
to programmes aimed at economic promotion or programmes aimed at direct 
payments to households. Second, different EU countries may have different 
preferences with respect to individual recipient countries, for example, due 
to historic ties or specific foreign policy strategies (see, e.g., Klingebiel, Negre 
and Morazán 2016). Third, the goals of development aid may differ between 
countries. While some countries might be driven by altruistic motives, others 
might be primarily engaged in fighting migration or allocate development 
aid for economic or political reasons. The importance of these issues, however, 
cannot be determined using the available Eurobarometer questions. 
Figure 8:  
Preferences regarding willingness to help developing countries
Development aid
Special Eurobarometer 441 Qa1: “in your opinion, is it very important, fairly important, not very important or not 
at all important to help people in developing countries?”
a. Very important and fairly important
b. Not very important and not at all important
results are shown for answer category a).
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Preferences regarding willingness to help developing countries
Median 0.893
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.074
Heterogeneity 14.9%
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very important and fairly important’ in a country. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 
2014 as weights, the standard deviation = 0.049, resulting in a heterogeneity of 9.7 per cent.
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Figure 9: 
Preferences regarding the amount of development aid
Development aid
Special Eurobarometer 441 Qa5: “The EU (the European commission and Member States) has promised to 
increase the level of its aid to developing countries. Given the current economic situation, which of the following 
statements best describes your opinion?” 
a. Keep the promise to increase aid or increase aid beyond what is already promised
b. Do not increase aid or reduce aid, even if it is promised
results are shown for answer category a).
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Preferences regarding the amount of development aid
Median 0.689
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.123
Heterogeneity 24.6%
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘keep the promise to increase aid or increase aid beyond 
what is already promised’ in a country. respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. 
if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard deviation = 0.087, resulting in a 
heterogeneity of 17.5 per cent.
Figure 10:  
Preferences regarding willingness to pay for development aid
Development aid
Special Eurobarometer 441 Qa6: “would you be prepared to pay more for groceries or other products from 
developing countries to support people living in these countries (for instance, for fair trade products)?”
a. Ready to pay a premium of more than 5%
b. Not ready to pay a premium of more than 5% or to pay a premium at all
results are shown for answer category a).
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Figure  10
Preferences regarding willingness to pay for development aid
Median 0.138
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.121
Heterogeneity 24.2%
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘ready to pay a premium of more than 5%’. respondents with 
no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the 
standard deviation = 0.109, resulting in a heterogeneity of 21.9 per cent.
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
129
inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
After a decade of declining ODA flows in the 1990s, firm targets for ODA were 
established in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for Devel-
opment held in Monterrey (OECD n.d.-a). Beside the need to increase ODA, 
the conference also agreed upon the need for a more effective use of the 
financial resources (United Nations 2003). Further agreements between OECD 
countries were made at the High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness (OECD 2003, 
2008). Together with the proposals in the European Commission’s Agenda 
for Change (European Commission 2007, 2011) and the Treaty on the 
 Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), these agreements formed the 
standards of the internal market for development aid in the EU:
 
•	 Starting with the Declaration of Rome of 2003 (OECD 2003), donor countries 
agreed to strengthen the leadership role of partner countries in the coordi-
nation of development assistance and to enhance harmonisation of aid 
activities (reduce donor missions, reviews and documentation; streamline 
conditionality and reporting). 
•	 With the subsequent Paris Declaration of 2005 (OECD 2008), donor countries 
committed to result-oriented management of aid, mutual accountability 
and aligning their overall support with the partners’ national develop-
ment strategies. 
•	 The TFEU outlines further guidelines for development aid. In Article 210, 
the EU member states agree to coordinate their policies on development 
cooperation and to undertake development activities with other member 
states and/or international organisations. 
•	 The Code of Conduct on Division of Labour concretised the importance of 
complementarity regarding aid activities.116 First, the already-mentioned aid 
fragmentation is a problem on the in-country level, which shall be solved 
through better coordination. Second, cross-country complementarity shall 
be achieved, tackling the problem of aid orphans and darlings (European 
Commission 2007; see footnote 119). 
•	 In line with the former is the approach of joint programming, which is 
one aim of the EU resulting from the findings of the Fourth High Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Council of the European Union 2011).117 
•	 Furthermore, it is not necessary that all EU member states build up 
capacity in all sectors. Each country should focus on its specific know-how, 
which will add up to a complete ‘toolbox’ for the EU as a whole (European 
Commission 2007).
Overall, the member states and the EU have expressed their desire to better 
coordinate development aid in a number of internal and external commitments 
(Klingebiel, Morazán and Negre 2013). This notwithstanding, a large part of 
development aid is still executed on the national level. As national  development 
aid is financed with public money but – at least in some countries – executed 
via private market agencies (implementing organisations), the national allo-
cation scheme could pose a problem with respect to the  functioning of the 
internal market if the procedures for public procurement differ between the 
116  it should be noted that the code of conduct on division of labour as well as other recommendations or 
agreements made at the EU level are not legally binding, but rather – as described in the European consensus 
on development – a “common vision”.
117  Joint programming implies the determination of a joint strategy for the EU development partners working in 
a partner country.
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member states and if the member states bias public procurement for devel-
opment aid towards national contractors. However, the member states and 
their implementing organisations adhere to the EU’s public procurement rules, 
which prohibit the preferred selection of national contractors.118 
Tied aid (i.e. official grants or loans that limit procurement to companies 
in the donor country or in a small group of countries) could pose another 
problem to the internal market. However, already at the DAC High Level 
Meeting in 2001, the DAC members agreed to untie ODA to LDCs, and they 
continue to pursue this objective (see OECD 2014). From 2001 to 2008, the 
proportion of untied bilateral aid rose from 46 to 82 per cent (Clay, Geddes 
and Natali 2009), and several countries (Australia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom) have even untied ODA “beyond the requirements of the 
recommendation” (OECD n.d.-c).
To summarise, the currently shared competences for ODA do not hinder 
the completion of the internal market. We therefore assign an indifferent 
score equal to 3.
ComPetition
We contrast the threat of a race to the bottom with the merits of potential 
yardstick competition. Starting with the latter, there is little evidence of 
positive yardstick competition. While the member states care about the 
impact of their aid disbursements relative to the aid disbursements of other 
member states (Knack, Rogers and Eubank 2011), this ‘relativeness’ does 
not foster positive competition – though it does come at the cost of overall 
aid effectiveness. As the absolute impact of aid is hard to quantify, each 
donor has an incentive to surpass other donors in important relative donor 
rankings. While one could argue that this competition could lead to improved 
ODA allocations, more than anything it increases aid fragmentation (see 
Annen and Moers 2016). The current pattern of how aid is delivered and 
received shows that aid is splintered across too many donors, which leads 
to increased transaction costs and administrative burdens for recipient 
countries (see also the “Economies of scale’ section above). In a theoretical 
model and an empirical application, Annen and Moers (2016: 24) show that 
donor competition for aid impact “inherently leads to aid fragmentation” 
and thus has detrimental effects on aid effectiveness. As a result, the “two 
commonly discussed ways to increase aid effectiveness, namely, improving 
aid impact evaluations and increasing donor coordination, can work against 
each other if improved aid impact evaluations lead to stronger relativeness 
and thus donor competition for aid impact” (Annen and Moers 2016: 3).119 
118  in two case studies for France and Germany, we compare procurement rules for France’s ‘agence Française 
de développement’ (aFd) and the major German implementing organisations, the ‘deutsche Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit’ (GiZ) and the ‘Kreditanstalt für wiederaufbau’ (Kfw). in the case of the aFd, 
contracts above the thresholds of €5,000,000 for works and €200,000 for supply and consultancy projects 
“shall be subject to international competitive bidding” (aFd 2015). a similar threshold (€200,000) is used for 
services in the case of the GiZ (GiZ n.d.). The rulings of the Kfw do not state exact figures for any thresholds but 
foresee that public procurement “in principle” must be applied using a public tendering procedure (Kfw 2016).
119  another negative effect of an overly fragmented aid system is the emergence of so-called ‘aid orphans’ and 
‘aid darlings’, meaning countries which are respectively under- or over-aided. due to the lower attractiveness 
of some recipient countries and a lack of coordination among donors, there is a negative herding effect for 
orphan countries. This can cause negative cross-border spillover effects which reduce the effectiveness 
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The allocation of development assistance to the European level could do 
away with these negative effects and thus contribute to increased aid effec-
tiveness. While one could think about a potential monopoly problem in the 
case of the latter, the number of international players (e.g. Japan, the UN, 
the US and the World Bank) would limit a far-reaching monopolistic role of 
European development aid (Klingebiel, Morazán and Negre 2013).
Concerning the threat of a potential race to the bottom, we analyse the 
subcomponent aid from the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) (Center 
for Global Development n.d.). This index ranks 27 of the world’s richest econo-
mies in seven categories (aid, finance, technology, environment, trade, security 
and migration) that directly or indirectly affect developing countries. Until 
2013, the aid component of the CDI was calculated as the sum of aid volumes 
from each donor discounted by certain quality measures (e.g. the extent of 
tied aid or good governance of the recipient countries) (Center for Global 
Development 2016). Starting in 2014, aid quantity and quality entered the aid 
component as two equally weighted subcomponents. Aid quantity is now 
measured by a country’s ODA/GNI share. Aid quality is approximated as quality 
of official development assistance (QuODA), which comprises the following 
four dimensions: maximising impact, fostering institutions, reducing burden, 
and transparency and learning. An overview of their subcomponents is 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1:  
Subcomponents to measure the quality of oDA
maximising impact Fostering Institutions Reducing Burden transparency and 
learning 
Share of allocation to 
poor countries# 
Share of aid to recipients’ 
top development 
priorities*# 
Significance of aid 
relationships#
Signatory of iaTi# 
Share of allocation 
to well-governed 
countries# 
avoidance of piUs*+ Fragmentation across 
donor agencies# 
implementation of iaTi 
data reporting standards
low unit administrative 
costs# 
Share of aid recorded in 
recipient budgets*+
Median project size*# recording of project title 
and description
High country 
programmable aid share# 
Share of aid to partners 
with good operational 
strategies# 
contribution to 
multilaterals# 
detail of project 
description 
Focus/specialisation by 
recipient country*# 
Use of recipient country 
systems*+
coordinated missions*+ reporting of aid delivery 
channel
Focus/specialisation by 
sector*
Share of scheduled aid 
recorded as received by 
recipients*+
Use of programmatic 
aid*+
Quality of main agency 
evaluation policy
Support of select global 
public goods facilities#
coordination of technical 
cooperation*+
coordinated analytical 
work*+
completeness of project-
level commitment data
Share of untied aid*+ coverage of forward 
spending plans/aid 
predictability*#
aid to partners with good 
M&E frameworks#
 
Source: center for Global development (2014: 5). notes: iaTi = international aid Transparency initiative; 
piU = project implementation unit; M&E = monitoring and evaluation. labels denote benchmarks: * = recipient 
governments; + = the paris declaration; # = the academic literature.
of aid (pietschmann 2016). However, there is no evidence of improvements if development aid were to be 
organised by the EU, as the latter might likewise focus on (or neglect) particular countries or regions.
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proportion of untied bilateral aid rose from 46 to 82 per cent (Clay, Geddes 
and Natali 2009), and several countries (Australia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom) have even untied ODA “beyond the requirements of the 
recommendation” (OECD n.d.-c).
To summarise, the currently shared competences for ODA do not hinder 
the completion of the internal market. We therefore assign an indifferent 
score equal to 3.
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We contrast the threat of a race to the bottom with the merits of potential 
yardstick competition. Starting with the latter, there is little evidence of 
positive yardstick competition. While the member states care about the 
impact of their aid disbursements relative to the aid disbursements of other 
member states (Knack, Rogers and Eubank 2011), this ‘relativeness’ does 
not foster positive competition – though it does come at the cost of overall 
aid effectiveness. As the absolute impact of aid is hard to quantify, each 
donor has an incentive to surpass other donors in important relative donor 
rankings. While one could argue that this competition could lead to improved 
ODA allocations, more than anything it increases aid fragmentation (see 
Annen and Moers 2016). The current pattern of how aid is delivered and 
received shows that aid is splintered across too many donors, which leads 
to increased transaction costs and administrative burdens for recipient 
countries (see also the “Economies of scale’ section above). In a theoretical 
model and an empirical application, Annen and Moers (2016: 24) show that 
donor competition for aid impact “inherently leads to aid fragmentation” 
and thus has detrimental effects on aid effectiveness. As a result, the “two 
commonly discussed ways to increase aid effectiveness, namely, improving 
aid impact evaluations and increasing donor coordination, can work against 
each other if improved aid impact evaluations lead to stronger relativeness 
and thus donor competition for aid impact” (Annen and Moers 2016: 3).119 
118  in two case studies for France and Germany, we compare procurement rules for France’s ‘agence Française 
de développement’ (aFd) and the major German implementing organisations, the ‘deutsche Gesellschaft für 
internationale Zusammenarbeit’ (GiZ) and the ‘Kreditanstalt für wiederaufbau’ (Kfw). in the case of the aFd, 
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services in the case of the GiZ (GiZ n.d.). The rulings of the Kfw do not state exact figures for any thresholds but 
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119  another negative effect of an overly fragmented aid system is the emergence of so-called ‘aid orphans’ and 
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Based on the index scores of the subcomponent aid, we compute yearly 
average scores for all European countries included in the CDI.120 As shown in 
Figure 11, the average scores for the EU member states do not vary much over 
time. The minimum and maximum figures are 4.99 (2007 and 2015) and 6.12 
(2011). This points to a rather limited threat of eroding standards, and does 
not indicate a clear European competence. However, there are some argu-
ments in favour of a European competence due to the detrimental effects of 
yardstick competition. We therefore assign a score of 4, which points towards 
an allocation to the European level. 
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
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Figure  12:
Net benefits from development aid (only commercial motives; 75% imports, 25% exports), by country (in per cent)
Notes: Own calculations based on data from the OECD and Eurostat. The benefit share only includes commercial motives 
(75% weight for imports, 25% weight for exports).
Table 2: 
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)  
 – using Benefit Share 1
Country Benefit Share 1 Burden Shares Net Benefit 1
national EU national EU
austria 1.95 1.69 2.75 0.26 -0.80
Belgium 7.69 3.10 3.57 4.59 4.12
czech rep. 0.71 0.29 1.31 0.42 -0.60
denmark 1.20 3.97 2.37 -2.76 -1.16
Estonia 0.10 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.07
Finland 0.92 2.04 1.85 -1.12 -0.93
France 21.08 14.56 19.88 6.51 1.20
Germany 16.02 22.68 23.74 -6.67 -7.72
Greece 7.10 0.36 1.63 6.74 5.47
Hungary 1.01 0.20 0.84 0.81 0.17
ireland 2.74 1.11 1.38 1.62 1.35
italy 9.01 5.27 14.31 3.74 -5.30
luxembourg 0.14 0.57 0.28 -0.43 -0.14
netherlands 5.87 7.86 4.31 -1.98 1.56
poland 1.71 0.65 3.48 1.06 -1.77
portugal 4.95 0.57 1.53 4.38 3.42
Sweden 5.01 8.94 3.42 -3.93 1.59
UK 12.80 26.10 13.18 -13.29 -0.38
 
notes: Benefit Share 1 is based on equal weights for commercial as well as migration and security motives. 
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Table 3:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)  
 – using Benefit Share 2
Country Benefit Share 2 Burden Shares Net Benefit 2
national EU national EU
austria 1.20 1.69 2.75 -0.49 -1.55
Belgium 11.58 3.10 3.57 8.48 8.01
czech rep. 0.78 0.29 1.31 0.49 -0.54
denmark 1.16 3.97 2.37 -2.81 -1.21
Estonia 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.09 -0.04
Finland 1.22 2.04 1.85 -0.81 -0.62
France 19.33 14.56 19.88 4.76 -0.55
Germany 16.20 22.68 23.74 -6.48 -7.54
Greece 0.28 0.36 1.63 -0.08 -1.35
Hungary 0.19 0.20 0.84 -0.01 -0.64
ireland 1.00 1.11 1.38 -0.11 -0.38
italy 10.59 5.27 14.31 5.32 -3.72
luxembourg 0.08 0.57 0.28 -0.49 -0.20
netherlands 8.40 7.86 4.31 0.54 4.09
poland 1.76 0.65 3.48 1.12 -1.72
portugal 9.80 0.57 1.53 9.22 8.27
Sweden 2.32 8.94 3.42 -6.62 -1.10
UK 13.98 26.10 13.18 -12.12 0.80
 
notes: Benefit Share 2 is only based on commercial motives (equal weights for imports and exports). 
Table 4:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)  
 – using Benefit Share 3
Country Benefit Share 3 Burden Shares Net Benefit 3
national EU national EU
austria 1.29 1.69 2.75 -0.40 -1.46
Belgium 10.70 3.10 3.57 7.60 7.13
czech rep. 0.82 0.29 1.31 0.52 -0.50
denmark 1.23 3.97 2.37 -2.74 -1.14
Estonia 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.08
Finland 1.16 2.04 1.85 -0.88 -0.69
France 19.05 14.56 19.88 4.48 -0.83
Germany 18.28 22.68 23.74 -4.41 -5.46
Greece 0.30 0.36 1.63 -0.06 -1.33
Hungary 0.11 0.20 0.84 -0.08 -0.72
ireland 1.00 1.11 1.38 -0.11 -0.38
italy 11.85 5.27 14.31 6.59 -2.45
luxembourg 0.07 0.57 0.28 -0.50 -0.21
netherlands 7.30 7.86 4.31 -0.56 2.99
poland 2.00 0.65 3.48 1.35 -1.49
portugal 8.35 0.57 1.53 7.78 6.83
Sweden 1.84 8.94 3.42 -7.10 -1.58
UK 14.57 26.10 13.18 -11.53 1.38
 
notes: Benefit Share 3 is based on 75% weights for imports and 25% weights for exports.
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
137
Xii. Case Study 6: 
	 Post-secondary	&	tertiary	education
Current and future challenges
Globalisation, in particular, in addition to increased student mobility, 
increased demand for higher education, varying demographic trends in 
several regions of the world, and budgetary bottlenecks affecting the 
financing of higher education, are major challenges for today’s higher educa-
tion systems (EHEA 2016). 
Traditional higher education institutions cannot retain their national focus, 
but compete with higher education institutions in several areas of the world. 
For instance, the total number of students studying outside their home country 
amounted to approximately 5 million students in 2014. The figures have more 
than doubled since 2000 and almost quadrupled since 1990.121 The OECD 
estimates that the number of mobile students will have reached 8 million by 
2015 (Oxford University 2015). Part of this development is encouraged by (inter)
national programmes. The Bologna Process (for more details on this 
programme, see below), for instance, is an important driver of increased 
student mobility (OECD 2012), and the number of students participating in the 
programme has continuously increased since 1987 (see Figure 1). To date, over 
3 million students have benefited from the programme. The successor of this 
programme, Erasmus+, had a budget of €580 million for the 2013–2014 period, 
and continues to advance the European Commission’s aim of further enhancing 
student mobility (European Commission 2015b: 4).122 
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Figure  1:
Number of students participating in the Erasmus programme
Source: European Commission (2015b: 30).
121  See http://monitor.icef.com/2015/11/the-state-of-international-student-mobility-in-2015. The figures do 
not include students engaging in language studies.
122  Erasmus+ integrates seven existing programmes, including pupil, student and staff mobility, amongst others 
(European commission 2014a).
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Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)  
 – using Benefit Share 2
Country Benefit Share 2 Burden Shares Net Benefit 2
national EU national EU
austria 1.20 1.69 2.75 -0.49 -1.55
Belgium 11.58 3.10 3.57 8.48 8.01
czech rep. 0.78 0.29 1.31 0.49 -0.54
denmark 1.16 3.97 2.37 -2.81 -1.21
Estonia 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.09 -0.04
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notes: Benefit Share 2 is only based on commercial motives (equal weights for imports and exports). 
Table 4:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)  
 – using Benefit Share 3
Country Benefit Share 3 Burden Shares Net Benefit 3
national EU national EU
austria 1.29 1.69 2.75 -0.40 -1.46
Belgium 10.70 3.10 3.57 7.60 7.13
czech rep. 0.82 0.29 1.31 0.52 -0.50
denmark 1.23 3.97 2.37 -2.74 -1.14
Estonia 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.05 -0.08
Finland 1.16 2.04 1.85 -0.88 -0.69
France 19.05 14.56 19.88 4.48 -0.83
Germany 18.28 22.68 23.74 -4.41 -5.46
Greece 0.30 0.36 1.63 -0.06 -1.33
Hungary 0.11 0.20 0.84 -0.08 -0.72
ireland 1.00 1.11 1.38 -0.11 -0.38
italy 11.85 5.27 14.31 6.59 -2.45
luxembourg 0.07 0.57 0.28 -0.50 -0.21
netherlands 7.30 7.86 4.31 -0.56 2.99
poland 2.00 0.65 3.48 1.35 -1.49
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Sweden 1.84 8.94 3.42 -7.10 -1.58
UK 14.57 26.10 13.18 -11.53 1.38
 
notes: Benefit Share 3 is based on 75% weights for imports and 25% weights for exports.
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Another challenge is the changing labour market. While the number of jobs 
requiring high qualifications is expected to grow by 21.1 per cent between 2015 
and 2025, the number of jobs requiring low or medium qualifications will 
decrease by 16.8 and 1.7 per cent, respectively (see Figure 2). Consequently, 
promoting higher education is at top of the EU’s agenda and mentioned in the 
Europe 2020 strategy, which aims at a higher education rate of 40 per cent for 
30- to- 34-year-olds by 2020 (European Commission 2015a).
The challenge of the changing labour market is closely connected with 
Europe’s demographic situation. Between 2008 and 2050, the number of EU 
citizens is expected to fall from 500 million to 470 million (van Vught 2009). 
At the same time, the population in other parts of the world is increasing, 
and higher education systems outside Europe are becoming more and more 
competitive (Oxford University 2015). This trend, in turn, requires an improve-
ment in the EU’s education systems as well as an increase in the number of 
higher education graduates who can meet the standards of the future labour 
market. This aspect becomes all the more true with respect to the funding 
of higher education. Increased participation rates in higher education have 
increased the financial burden particularly in those countries which tradi-
tionally rely on public financing of higher education. This trend has forced 
several countries to implement reforms aimed at increasing private contri-
butions as well as at decreasing the public share of higher education financing 
(OECD 2012).
Accordingly, we investigate whether the financing of higher education 
should be located on the national level or should be shifted to being an EU 
competence.
Status quo
The previously mentioned Erasmus programme is one example of coopera-
tion in higher education in Europe. However, decision-making and budgets 
-20.00% -15.00% -10.00% -5.00% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00%
high qualificationlow qualification medium qualification
Figure  2:
Employment growth rates in the EU-28 for different skill levels (2015–2025)
Source: http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/de/publications-and-resources/data-visualisations/employment-trends.
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are still on the national or even subnational level. As a consequence, the 
framework of higher education systems varies across the EU. 
Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
states that the European Union competence on education is supportive and 
supplementary. Nevertheless, there is a movement towards European conver-
gence in higher education policy. In 1999, the Bologna Process was started, 
which aims to increase students’ employability and mobility as well as the 
compatibility and comparability of European higher education systems. As 
a result of this process, the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) was 
launched in 2010 (EHEA 2016).123 Nonetheless, while the Bologna Process is 
crucial for transitioning towards a more integrated higher education policy 
in the EU, it is important to note that the Bologna Process is intergovern-
mental and not grounded in EU law (van Vught 2009: 7).
Two aspects are important for the following analysis: a) the identification 
of the (public) good provided, and b) a discussion of its public-good charac-
teristics. Starting with the former, higher education comprises various 
dimensions (e.g. the provision of university places and learning facilities), 
but also social dimensions and mobility aspects (see, e.g., European Commis-
sion 2016). In this analysis, we particularly refer to the provision and alloca-
tion of higher education places to study. However, when analysing the 
question of whether the competences for higher education should be shifted 
to the European level, the caveat applies that higher education cannot fully 
be treated as a public good. In particular, there is excludability or, in other 
words, the possibility to exclude consumers from higher education via the 
price mechanism. For instance, only those students willing to pay tuition 
fees can sit an examination.124 The same – although to a lesser extent – holds 
true for rivalry consumption, such as with respect to crowded lecture halls 
or occupied laboratories. As a result, in addition to having public compe-
tences located on the national or the supranational level, higher education 
can also be provided via private markets. We will take this caveat into account 
when interpreting the results, such as when discussing spillover effects.
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we primarily focus on the financing of higher 
education. In contrast to a rather old-fashioned model of a benevolent planner 
that centrally allocates university places and fields of studies across Europe, 
we assume a modern competition model that is centrally financed but decen-
trally implemented (‘money follows students’).125 As under the current system 
(e.g. in Germany), the individual education institution provides higher educa-
tion and is responsible for the strategic focus of the fields of study as well as 
the number of student places provided. The counterfactual thus respects 
educational autonomy of education institutions and only changes the 
financing of higher education. We assume that the European Union would 
finance higher education in a competitive way with funds from the EU budget. 
123  The EHEa currently comprises 48 countries. For more information, see http://www.ehea.info.
124  Furthermore, one could argue that the private returns from higher education (e.g. in terms of higher income 
or lower risk of unemployment) exceed the public returns.
125  The idea is based on centrum für Hochschulentwicklung (cHE) und Stifterverband für die deutsche wissen-
schaft (1999). For further suggestions on counterfactual scenarios, see cHEpS (2004).
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market. This aspect becomes all the more true with respect to the funding 
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tionally rely on public financing of higher education. This trend has forced 
several countries to implement reforms aimed at increasing private contri-
butions as well as at decreasing the public share of higher education financing 
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In a nutshell, such a financing model could comprise three pillars based on 
fixed payments, performance-oriented fund allocations based on specific 
formulas, and additional funds based on target agreements and profiling 
(Ziegele, Tumbas and Otilija 2010). The idea behind the counterfactual is thus 
geared towards recent trends in higher education financing, such as a “greater 
targeting of resources, performance-based funding and competitive proce-
dures” (OECD 2012: 26).126
However, while the major change would be on the financing side, some 
side aspects would accompany this shift in competences. For instance, such 
a system would require the definition of common European standards, such 
as with respect to the recognition of qualifications.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 2 Spillover effects are present if member states finance higher education but do not receive the 
benefits from these studies because of post-graduation migration. we calculate national benefits 
from higher education based on information from the OEcd, and adjust these figures for migration 
of higher education graduates. we then calculate the distribution of higher education net benefits 
by subtracting the costs of higher education (both under the status quo and in the counterfactual 
situation) from our measure of higher education benefits. Our indicator of free riding increases when 
moving from a national to a European competence, which indicates that keeping the competence on 
the national level would be preferable.
Economies of scale
 1 we use OEcd data to perform input-, output- and input-output-oriented analyses. For input data, 
we refer to expenditures per student, while the staff-per-student ratio is employed for the output-
oriented analysis. Finally, we combine both indicators and investigate expenditures per staff for the 
input-output analysis. There is no evidence of and only limited theoretical arguments for the presence 
of economies of scale when shifting the funding of higher education to the European level.
Preference heterogeneity
 4 we conduct a system analysis on national student fees and use information from the Flash 
Eurobarometer questionnaire 260 on students and higher education reform. For the latter, three 
questions focusing on the admission and selection of students by universities and the role of 
student fees are investigated. The corresponding heterogeneity ranges from 20.8 to 33.4 per cent. 
Furthermore, the system analysis points to rather smooth patterns of national student fees, implying 
that differences in revealed preferences would not prevent a European competence from being 
efficient.
Internal market consistency
 3 The persistent lack of harmonisation of recognition procedures for academic qualifications, in 
particular, is a hindrance to the completion of the internal market. The free movement of people with 
respect to education and training is not yet completed. This fosters uncertainty and makes highly 
skilled university graduates prefer to pursue their careers in their home countries. nonetheless, the 
current obstacles to the internal market do not render a decentralised solution infeasible, i.e., the 
internal market could also be achieved via increased cooperation.
Competition
 3 The EU may benefit from increased competition among internationally mobile students due to a 
higher quality of and lower prices for higher education. Furthermore, centralisation strengthens the 
EU’s position to compete against higher education markets across the world. in contrast, the threat 
of a race to the bottom is negligible. However, this does not result in the necessity of a competence 
reallocation. current (and, in the future, potentially increased) collaboration seems sufficient to gain 
advantages from competition.
126  additionally, a clearing component could be added, such as the one implemented in Switzerland. while each 
Swiss canton offers higher education for all Swiss students, the cantons of a student’s origin “pay the canton in 
which the educational establishment is located a specific fixed amount for the purposes of burden equalisation”; 
see https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/Switzerland:Higher_Education_Funding.
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Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data source
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127  Figures are expressed in equivalent USd converted using ppps for Gdp. we use average figures for 2010 
and 2011 for our calculations.
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131  Figures are taken from Eurostat. we use emigration and immigration rates to and from the European Union 
without the respective emigration/immigration country at hand.
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figures to higher-educated migration (i.e., those graduates who achieve 
additional public benefits from higher education), we use the shares of 
students enrolled in higher education per country.132 As Eurostat does not 
provide information on intra-European migration for several countries 
(including Portugal, France and the United Kingdom), we start by calculating 
the adjusted benefit shares without these countries (benefit shares with 
missing values). In a second step, we use the proportion of migrants aged 20 
to 29 years in comparable countries (such as Germany in the case of France, 
and the UK or Spain in the case of Portugal) to calculate adjusted benefit 
shares for all member states (benefit shares with filled missing values).
Cost shares in the case of the status quo are calculated using the sum of 
private and public costs for a man or woman attaining higher education. The 
indicator is taken from the OECD and comprises “all expenditures on  education 
for all levels of government combined (public direct cost) and all 
 education-related household expenditure (private direct cost)” (OECD 2015: 
139).133 Regarding benefits, the figures are calculated as the difference between 
a man (woman) attaining tertiary education compared to a man (woman) 
attaining upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary education. We use 
both public and private costs to deal with different ways of funding higher 
education (e.g. systems with and without private contributions, such as student 
fees). The figures are multiplied by the average number of higher education 
graduates in 2013 to calculate cost shares in the case of the status quo. In 
contrast to the calculation of the benefit share, we do not adjust these shares 
for migration, as only the educating country bears the costs of higher 
education.134
For the counterfactual situation, we assume that higher education is financed 
out of the EU budget. We use the current distribution of the budget’s financing 
structure as a hypothetical cost share in the case of a European responsibil-
ity.135 In doing so, we do not distinguish between private and public costs. On 
the one hand, this could be interpreted as a situation without private contri-
butions, such as student fees. On the other hand, however, we argue that this 
procedure should instead be treated as the comparable equivalent. Whether 
higher education is financed via taxpayers’ money or via private contributions 
is a question of national preference. The cost distribution and thus the cost 
shares of higher education, however, are not affected by this decision.136 
Finally, we calculate net benefits of higher education under the status quo 
and in the counterfactual situation by subtracting the costs shares from the 
benefit shares (see Table 1 in the Appendix).
132  Migration rates are divided into cohorts of 20- to 24-year-olds and 25- to 29-year-olds. For the former, 
Eurostat provides average figures for the percentage of students enrolled in higher education. For the latter, 
we calculate average figures based on indicators for students aged 26 and 28 years that are provided by 
Eurostat.
133  a caveat using these figures is that private direct costs are net of loans, and that public loans are not included 
in public direct costs (see OEcd 2015: 139). However, we are not aware of any source providing better data 
on the sum of private and public costs for higher education studies.
134  The figures do not account for short-term student exchange programmes, such as Erasmus. 
135  due to missing information for the czech republic, latvia, lithuania, luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia, the 
budget structure is recalculated to add up to 100 per cent. 
136  in the case of missing values for adjusted benefit shares, we also adjust the counterfactual cost shares and 
exclude EU budget contributions from those countries with missing benefit shares.
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Results
The results of the calculation of net benefits with filled missing values for 
national benefit shares are presented in Figure 3. Poland and the United 
Kingdom, in particular, would benefit from a shifting of competences to the 
European level. The opposite holds true, in particular, for France, Germany 
and Italy, with the latter changing from a net-receiver to a net-payer country. 
That is, if paying for higher education were to become an EU competence, and 
if the current distribution of the EU budget were used to finance it, the rela-
tively high financial burden in these countries would cause a disproportion-
ately high cost share and create negative net benefits. Taken together, the 
standard deviation increases from 2.28 to 3.58 when shifting the competence 
from the national to the European level, with the corresponding relative 
increase being equal to 57 per cent. 
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Figure  3:
Net benefits from tertiary education, by country (in per cent)
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat.
In the Appendix, we also present the results for the calculation of net benefits 
without making an adjustment for missing values of national benefit shares. 
In particular, information is missing for large member states, such as France 
and the UK. As in the results presented above, the standard deviation 
increases when moving from a national to a European competence. The rela-
tive increase, however, is much smaller and only amounts to 18 per cent. 
Combining these results and the scoring decision for spillover effects (see 
‘Spillover effects’ in the ‘Method and indicator description’ section above), 
we assign a pro-national score equal to 2. While the former result would also 
justify assigning a score equal to 1, several caveats – such as the assumption 
of comparable migration relative to total population for several country pairs 
(e.g. Spain and Portugal or Germany and France) – point towards a rather 
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and the UK or Spain in the case of Portugal) to calculate adjusted benefit 
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education (e.g. systems with and without private contributions, such as student 
fees). The figures are multiplied by the average number of higher education 
graduates in 2013 to calculate cost shares in the case of the status quo. In 
contrast to the calculation of the benefit share, we do not adjust these shares 
for migration, as only the educating country bears the costs of higher 
education.134
For the counterfactual situation, we assume that higher education is financed 
out of the EU budget. We use the current distribution of the budget’s financing 
structure as a hypothetical cost share in the case of a European responsibil-
ity.135 In doing so, we do not distinguish between private and public costs. On 
the one hand, this could be interpreted as a situation without private contri-
butions, such as student fees. On the other hand, however, we argue that this 
procedure should instead be treated as the comparable equivalent. Whether 
higher education is financed via taxpayers’ money or via private contributions 
is a question of national preference. The cost distribution and thus the cost 
shares of higher education, however, are not affected by this decision.136 
Finally, we calculate net benefits of higher education under the status quo 
and in the counterfactual situation by subtracting the costs shares from the 
benefit shares (see Table 1 in the Appendix).
132  Migration rates are divided into cohorts of 20- to 24-year-olds and 25- to 29-year-olds. For the former, 
Eurostat provides average figures for the percentage of students enrolled in higher education. For the latter, 
we calculate average figures based on indicators for students aged 26 and 28 years that are provided by 
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133  a caveat using these figures is that private direct costs are net of loans, and that public loans are not included 
in public direct costs (see OEcd 2015: 139). However, we are not aware of any source providing better data 
on the sum of private and public costs for higher education studies.
134  The figures do not account for short-term student exchange programmes, such as Erasmus. 
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budget structure is recalculated to add up to 100 per cent. 
136  in the case of missing values for adjusted benefit shares, we also adjust the counterfactual cost shares and 
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careful interpretation. For instance, the result without these adjustments 
would justify a score equal to 2.
Our result is thus in line with findings from other studies. For example, 
in a recent analysis, Fischer and Wigger (2016: 246) find that German states 
“do not free-ride on each other’s higher education spending.” The results thus 
suggest that the degree of free riding resulting from a decentralised organ-
isation of tertiary education is less severe than expected.
eConomieS oF SCAle
Data source
Economies of scale in higher education may arise from both the input and 
output perspectives. On the input side, cost savings may be achieved by 
reducing overhead costs. Nations administering to more students may 
achieve potential cost savings due to an improved workload; in other words, 
less administrative staff per student may be needed on average, resulting 
in lower costs per student. A similar argument can be made for the output 
side: If more students are enrolled, the employment of additional teaching 
staff or the purchase of specific information technology may be efficient 
due to an increased average utilization, which may lead to an increased 
output per student. 
However, while both perspectives may be true in general, the arguments 
are weaker compared to potential economies of scale in other policy fields, 
such as defence or transport policy. Under the current system, higher educa-
tion students are primarily administered to by single education institutions, 
such as universities. The question thus arises of whether a European compe-
tence could achieve economies of scale given that national overhead costs, 
and thus fixed cost degression at the national level, only play a limited role. 
This becomes all the more true as the counterfactual situation underlying 
this study particularly refers to a competitive allocation of financial means 
instead of centralising higher education administration. 
With these caveats in mind, we will nonetheless present evidence on 
potential economies of scale using data on higher education expenditures as 
well as staff and student numbers. The data are taken from the OECD (2015) 
and refer to 2012 (the exception is the staff-per-student ratio, which refers 
to 2013).137 For all figures, we refer to levels 5 to 8 from the International 
Standard Classification of Education 2011 (UNESCO 2011), which comprises 
all tertiary education.
Methodology
In our analysis, we consider input-, output- and input-output-oriented indi-
cators. All indicators are plotted against a country’s total number of enrolled 
students.138
137  The data are downloaded from the OEcd economic statistics database.
138  another possibility would be to use the total number of inhabitants. However, in several countries, higher 
education is financed by subnational jurisdictions and administered by individual universities or other higher 
education institutions (as it is the case, e.g., in Germany). Furthermore, the share of citizens enrolled in higher 
education differs between countries. Using population figures would therefore result in biased outcomes.
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With the input-oriented indicator, we focus on expenditures per student. If 
there are economies of scale, this indicator should decrease given an 
increasing number of students. To investigate economies of scale based on 
capability advantages of larger higher education systems, we instead use the 
staff-per-student ratio. Accordingly, the indicator should increase given an 
increasing number of students. 
However, both indicators may suffer from the problem that the counter-
part is missing. Larger (smaller) expenditures per student may be associated 
with a higher (lower) staff-per-student ratio. In a third step, we therefore 
combine both indicators and look at expenditures per staff. This indicator is 
derived by a division of input- and output-oriented indicators, and measures 
expenditures per staff underlying a comparable number of students.
Results
Results for the input-oriented indicator are presented in Figure 4, while those 
for the output-oriented indicator are shown in Figure 5.139 In both figures, we 
do not detect (dis)economies of scale, meaning that there is neither a posi-
tive nor a negative relationship between our indicators and the number of 
enrolled students.
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Figure  4:
Input-oriented indicator: Expenditures per student
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2015). Data are available for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Outliers are denoted.
139  a staff-per-student ratio equal to 0.09 implies that there are nine academic staff members for every  
100 students. 
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Results of the input-output-oriented analysis are presented in Figure 6. While 
there is a slightly positive relationship between expenditures per staff and 
the number of enrolled students, the validity of the analysis is questionable. 
Due to missing figures, the number of observations decreases to nine, 
meaning that there are too few observations to draw strong inferences. 
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Figure  5:
Output-oriented indicator: Staff per student
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2015). Data are available for Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Figure  6:
Input-output-oriented indicators: Expenditures per staff
Source: Own calculations based on OECD (2015). Data are available for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Outliers are denoted.
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Taken together, the analysis does not point to either economies or disecon-
omies of scale, which is plausible given that the cost issue is determined on 
the university level. Economies of scale may be prevalent with respect to the 
size of universities, but this would be irrespective of a national or European 
competence allocation as described above.140 Furthermore, the methodology 
suffers from various drawbacks. First, the output indicator may be questioned. 
As was mentioned in the data subsection, there are arguments both in favour 
of and against the effects of the number of students enrolled on the number 
of staff employed (i.e. having many students may lead to relatively few 
administrative staff but relatively more teaching staff). Since the output 
indicator does not distinguish between both types of staff, it is unclear 
whether a higher staff-to-student ratio is positive or negative. Second, the 
analysis suffers from missing information on expenditure data. While we 
include both public and private expenditures to cope with different ways of 
funding higher education (e.g. systems with and without private contribu-
tions, such as student fees), we cannot distinguish between teaching and 
research expenditures. As a result, to interpret the results of Figure 4 and 
Figure 6 correctly, we need to assume that the distribution of both types of 
expenditures is identical in all countries. This assumption, however, is highly 
doubtful. Third, the average figures do not distinguish between relatively 
‘expensive’ and ‘cheap’ courses of study. National higher education systems 
that primarily offer natural science-oriented courses of study (which require, 
among other things, costly laboratories) are much more expensive than 
systems offering courses of study in the human sciences. Thus, another 
assumption underlying these figures is that the distribution of human and 
natural sciences among countries is rather comparable. Again, this assump-
tion is highly questionable. Fourth, the individual states in federal countries 
can have different systems. Germany, for example, is plotted using the total 
number of university-level students (ca. 270,000), but these students are 
enrolled in 16 different systems for each of the 16 federal states. Finally, as 
already argued above, there are only limited arguments for economies of 
scale from a theoretical point of view.
Nonetheless, there is still one argument in favour of the presence of econo-
mies of scale, as there probably is a minimum size for higher education insti-
tutions to be able to offer specific services. For instance, medical laboratories 
or scientific testing facilities cannot fully be implemented if a critical mass 
of students (and funds) is not reached. A centralised allocation of funds may 
tackle this issue and contribute to an improved distribution of higher educa-
tion facilities across Europe. This argument, however, is only relevant for 
relatively poor member states.
Combining these arguments, there is both limited evidence of and limited 
theoretical arguments for the presence of economies of scale when shifting 
the competence for the funding of higher education to the European level. 
We therefore assign a score indicating a competence allocation on the national 
level (score = 1).
140  a similar result has been found by the OEcd (2012: 26). Furthermore, the authors of a study on EU spending 
find that “(i)n the area of tertiary education, arguments point towards the same conclusion: there is hetero-
geneity in the quality of universities, and evidence of scale economies and externalities is absent” (EcOrYS 
nederland Bv, netherlands Bureau for Economic policy analysis (cpB) and institute for Economic research 
(iFO) 2008: 34).
Results of the input-output-oriented analysis are presented in Figure 6. While 
there is a slightly positive relationship between expenditures per staff and 
the number of enrolled students, the validity of the analysis is questionable. 
Due to missing figures, the number of observations decreases to nine, 
meaning that there are too few observations to draw strong inferences. 
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding higher 
education policy, we conduct a system analysis on national student fees based 
on the information sheet ‘National Student Fee and Support Systems’ (Eury-
dice 2015) and analyse questions from the Flash Eurobarometer questionnaire 
‘Students and Higher Education Reform’ (European Commission 2009). For 
the latter, we specifically investigate questions Q1A, Q1B and Q1C. For each 
of these three questions, higher education students were asked which state-
ment they agree with more:
Q1A: “All qualified students should have the right to study.” (or)
  “Only the very best students should have the right to study.”
Q1B: “Universities should admit all students.” (or)
  “Universities should have the right to select students which match 
   their profile.”
Q1C: “Higher education should be free of charge.” (or)
  “Student fees are acceptable, when combined with grants and loans.” 141
Methodology
Regarding the Eurobarometer questions, all participants who did not submit 
an answer are dropped. As a result, the overall sample size decreases by 0.9 
per cent for Q1A, 2.1 per cent for Q1B, and 1.7 per cent for Q1C.142 The results 
are calculated in a two-step procedure: First, we select one of the two state-
ments per question and calculate the percentage of answers agreeing with 
each statement. Second, we aggregate the results per question at the country 
level and calculate measures of dispersion on the EU level.
Regarding the system analysis on national student fees, we assume that 
rather equal tuition fees imply similar preferences across countries, while 
rather diverse fees show the contrary. As most countries do not impose a 
uniform fee for all kinds of students and fields of study, we use average 
regular and average actual student fees. The latter takes account of the fact 
that student fees are not paid by all students owing to exemptions. The proce-
dure for the calculation of regular average fees is as follows: When the 
primary source already states average fees (so-called ‘common values’ ; see 
Eurydice 2015), we refer to these figures. If no average fee is stated but there 
is information on minimum and maximum figures for both full- and 
part-time students, we compute the arithmetic mean for full- and part-time 
students and compute a weighted average fee based on the proportion of full- 
and part-time students.143 If no information on full- and part-time student 
141  a critical comment to this question may refer to the fact that some countries, such as the United Kingdom, 
have a long tradition of student fees. Therefore, respondents in these countries might not imagine a system 
without student fees at all, which could result in a biased outcome. we therefore also include a system analy-
sis on national student fees to investigate revealed preferences, as well.
142  The most noticeable reductions of sample size of individual countries are: for Q1a, cyprus with 3.2 per cent; 
for Q1B, Sweden with 4.6 per cent, the UK with 4.5 per cent, and Malta with 4.3 per cent; and for Q1c, italy 
with 5.8 per cent and Spain with 5.2 per cent. nonetheless, as the overall reduction is rather small, the analy-
sis is unlikely to be biased. 
143  The percentage of enrolled full-time students is extracted from OEcd (2015, Table B5.1a) data. Missing 
information about the share of full-time students is replaced by the average proportion of full-time students 
(= 80 per cent; see Table 2 to Table 5).
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fees is available but there is information on the range of student fees for all 
students, we compute the arithmetic mean for these figures. 
To compute actual average student fees, we additionally account for the 
share of students paying tuition fees and multiply this share by the average 
general student fees. An overview of the data is presented in Table 2 and 
Table 3 (bachelor’s degree students) as well as Table 4 and Table 5 (master’s 
degree students) in the Appendix. Tables 2 and 4 include those countries 
where an average fee is stated in the primary source (Eurydice 2015), whereas 
Tables 3 and 5 include those countries where the average fee is based on the 
fees for and proportions of full- and part-time students. Countries which 
have no fees at all (Austria, Finland, Greece (bachelor’s degree students)) and 
Sweden are not listed in the tables.
Results
The results for the Eurobarometer questionnaire analysis are presented in 
Figure 7 to Figure 9, whereas Figure 10 and Figure 11 depict the results of the 
system analysis on national student fees. With regard to the former, the 
heterogeneity indicator varies from 20.2 per cent (Q1A) over 28.8 per cent 
(Q1C) to 33.4 per cent (Q1B), which results in scores equal to 5 (Q1A & Q1B) and 
4 (Q1C), according to our assessment criteria.
Considering the results of the system analysis, Figure 10 points to a rather 
comparable structure of yearly average regular student fees. Neglecting the 
exceptions (e.g. in England, Ireland and Lithuania), average regular student 
fees for bachelor’s degree programmes are highly comparable across the EU, 
and most member states do not charge fees at all. In general, a similar result 
is found for master’s degree programmes – though with a wider dispersion. 
Several member states do not charge fees at all or only charge fees of €2,000 
per year, while other member states charge yearly fees equal to €6,000 on 
average (e.g. Ireland, Lithuania and the parts of the UK).
This result is confirmed by the comparison of average actual student fees, 
as shown in Figure 11. For a bachelor’s degree programme, 24 out of 28 
member states charge less than €2,000 per year. 
The smooth patterns in both graphs therefore imply that, on average, 
differences in revealed preferences for student fees are not an obstacle to a 
common financing of higher education. While some countries (e.g. the UK) 
deviate from the general trend, the preferences in other member states are 
rather comparable.
Taking both analyses together, we assign a score equal to 4 for preference 
heterogeneity.
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Figure 7:  
preferences regarding the right to study
Education
Flash Eurobarometer 260 Q1a: “i would like to ask you a few questions on your opinion about the higher 
education system in general. which statement do you agree with more?”
a. All qualified students should have the right to study.
b. Only the very best students should have the right to study.
results are shown for answer category a).
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Figure  7
Preferences regarding the right to study
Median 0.926
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.101
Heterogeneity 20.2 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with “all qualified students should have the right to study” in a 
country. respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population 
size as weights, the standard deviation = 0.078, resulting in a heterogeneity of 15.6 per cent.
 
Figure 8:  
preferences regarding university selection
Education
Flash Eurobarometer 260 Q1B: “i would like to ask you a few questions on your opinion about the higher 
education system in general. which statement do you agree with more?”
a. Universities should admit all students.
b. Universities should have the right to select students which match their profile.
results are shown for answer category a).
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Figure  8
Preferences regarding university selection
Median 0.483
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.167
Heterogeneity 33.4 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with “Universities should admit all students” in a country. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size as 
weights, the standard deviation = 0.167, resulting in a heterogeneity of 32.3 per cent.
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Figure 9:  
preferences regarding student fees
Education
Flash Eurobarometer 260 Q1c: “i would like to ask you a few questions on your opinion about the higher 
education system in general. which statement do you agree with more?”
a. Higher education should be free of charge.
b. Student fees are acceptable, when combined with grants and loans.
results are shown for answer category a).
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Figure  9
Preferences regarding student fees
Median 0.680
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.144
Heterogeneity 28.8 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with “Higher education should be free of charge” in a country. 
respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size as 
weights, the standard deviation = 0.109, resulting in a heterogeneity of 21.9 per cent.
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Figure  10:
Distribution of yearly average regular student fees across EU member states
Notes: The UK (England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland) and Belgium (French, 
German and Flemish) are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year.
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inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
In addition to the free movement of goods, services and capital, the internal 
market also entails the free movement of persons. This freedom is particularly 
exercised via the right to carry out work as an employee or in a self-employed 
capacity as well as the right for young people and students to be trained in 
countries belonging to the European Economic Area. Accordingly, the question 
arises of whether the current allocation of the higher education competence to 
the national level is sufficient to achieve this labour mobility. Furthermore, if 
this is not the case, there is the question of whether a reallocation of 
 competences or increased harmonisation of rules are better solutions.
As Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann (2014) show, a quick recognition of 
qualifications is particularly mentioned when experts in the field of labour 
market policy are asked about determinants that could enhance labour 
mobility in Europe (see Figure 12). The analysis is based on an IZA Expert 
Opinion Survey on the Single European Labour Market, which was conducted 
in early 2014 and received responses from 284 of the more than 1,300 labour 
economists worldwide contacted for the survey (Krause, Rinne and Zimmer-
mann 2014: 11).
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Figure  11:
Distribution of yearly average actual student fees across EU member states
Notes: The UK (England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland) and Belgium (French, 
German and Flemish) are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year.
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Figure  12:
Determinants for enhanced labour mobility in Europe
Source: Krause, Rinne and Zimmermann (2014).
In this case, recognition of qualifications refers to both education (i.e. academic 
qualifications) and profession (i.e. professional qualifications) (European Area 
of Recognition 2016: 19).144 While both aspects are important for labour mobility, 
the recognition of academic qualifications is particularly relevant with respect 
to tertiary education, as exercising the right of freedom of movement is directly 
connected with gaining academic recognition of qualifications obtained in 
European countries. However, the recognition of qualifications in case of indi-
vidually organised foreign studies especially depends on national rulings and 
institutional practises.145 In Germany, for instance, 16 state ministries decide 
on the recognition of academic qualifications depending on the state of resi-
dence of the respective German university.146
Although a ‘Convention on the recognition of qualifications concerning 
higher education in the European region’ (the so-called Lisbon Recognition 
Convention (LRC) initiated by the Council of Europe and UNESCO) was passed 
by several European states on 11 April 1997,147 “recognition culture and proce-
dures differ between countries and institutions and may involve a wide range 
of competent authorities” (European Area of Recognition 2016: 19). Instead 
of having a guarantee of automatic acknowledgment, there are still case-by-
case reviews, resulting in different recognition procedures amongst European 
states (Kultusministerkonferenz 2011: 4). The LRC “lays down the funda-
mental principles of the fair recognition of qualifications and periods of study 
(…) and requires that each country shall recognise foreign qualifications 
unless it can show that there are substantial differences between the foreign 
qualification (...) and the corresponding qualification of the host country” 
(European Area of Recognition 2016: 15).148 
144  recognition of professional qualifications is only necessary if the profession is regulated. For seven 
 professions, there is an automatic procedure (stipulated by directive 2005/36/Ec) which harmonises 
required minimum qualifications. This applies to nurses, midwives, doctors, dentists, pharmacists, architects 
and  veterinary surgeons. However, whether a profession is regulated varies by country. if a profession is 
regulated, minimum standards are set by national or subnational authorities (European commission 2011).
145  http://www.ciep.fr/en/enic-naric-france/recognition-of-qualifications-in-the-european-union.
146  https://www.daad.de/ausland/studieren/bewerbung/de/64-anerkennung-von-leistungen-und-abschluessen/.
147  https://www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de/html/en/lisbon_convention.php.
148  a consortium of national academic recognition information centres in the European Union (narics), the 
 European network of information centres in the European region (Enics), and associations of higher 
 education institutions have published a ‘recognition manual for higher education institutions’, which 
 postulates best practices and standard solutions for the recognition of academic qualifications (see 
 European area of recognition 2016). 
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On the whole, although some improvements have been made since the start 
of the Bologna Process, there is still uncertainty and sufficient leeway for 
national policies to pursue their own goals.149 This also holds true for the 
market of academic professionals. Based on the exploration of two empirical 
studies for France, Germany, the UK (all conducted in 1995) and France (in 
2004), Musselin (2004: 55) finds that “most post-docs conceived their foreign 
experience as a personal strategy and aimed at improving their chances for 
recruitment in their own country.” In other words, although there is academic 
mobility in Europe, only a few top academics pursue careers abroad. This can 
be attributed in part to the varying requirements and informal rules in the 
individual national labour markets (Musselin 2004: 72).150 
Furthermore, uncertainty is demonstrated by the special Eurobarometer 
questionnaire 417 on ‘European Area of Skills and Qualifications’ , conducted 
in June 2014. In question QB9 respondents were asked: “Do you think that 
qualifications from your education or training would be recognised in other 
EU member states? By ‘recognised’ , we mean that they can be used for work 
or further education.” Possible responses were: ‘Yes’ , ‘No’ , ‘Not applicable/
no qualifications’ , and ‘Don’t know’.
As Figure 13 shows, while 23 per cent of respondents do not think that 
their qualifications would be recognised, 56 per cent assume that they would 
be recognised. As a result, there is still room for improvement in terms of 
reduced uncertainty. However, if only the answers 
of participants who already finished higher educa-
tion are taken into account, the result looks 
somewhat different. In this specific subgroup, 
while only 16 per cent of respondents do not 
expect recognition, 77 per cent of them do 
(European Commission 2014b: 44). 
To conclude, although there have been some 
improvements towards a common recognition 
procedure for higher education qualifications 
decisions are still taken at the national level. The 
free movement of people with respect to educa-
tion and training is accordingly not yet completed. 
As a result, the question arises of whether this 
hindrance to the completion of the internal 
market could be better solved by a reallocation of 
competences or through increased cooperation. 
Referring to the counterfactual situation of a 
competitive European higher education financing, 
the latter aspect seems to be sufficient. While 
changing the financing structure towards a 
European competence would also imply that 
standards would be harmonised, the issue could also be resolved via multi-
lateral agreements. Or, put differently, the abovementioned obstacles to the 
internal market with respect to higher education do not render a 
149  another example are different national standards concerning the hours range per academic year and the 
hours range per credit within the European credit transfer system (EcTS) (European communities 2009: 59f).
150  One should note that the results of this study are based on rather old information, and that a lot of progress 
has been made in recent years. in the end, more comprehensive and up-to-date research on this topic would 
be necessary.
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recognised in other EU member states? 
Figure  13:
Expectations regarding recognition of qualifications
Source: European Commission (2014b).
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decentralised solution infeasible (or implausible). We therefore assign an 
indifferent score equal to 3, pointing towards the need for increased cooper-
ation on the basis of a national competence.
ComPetition
The effects of competition can be divided into intra-European and interna-
tional competition. Starting with the former, from a theoretical perspective, 
competition for students between universities and European countries can 
increase educational quality, lower prices and foster greater diversification 
of educational programmes (Thissen and Ederveen 2006). However, in 
contrast to the assumption that this argument also holds true for a decen-
tralised solution, these benefits could particularly be achieved if higher 
education were centralised (or, at least, if there were sufficient cooperation 
across countries). Furthermore, students have to be mobile. As Thissen and 
Ederveen (2006: 26) note, “when student mobility is absent, creating a single 
European market for higher education may not lead to increased competi-
tion” , which would impede the realisation of centralisation gains. But if there 
is sufficient intra-European student mobility and students use educational 
quality as the basis for deciding where to study, the universities’ incentives 
to raise their quality increase.151 
Furthermore, due to centralisation and specialisation, prices for educa-
tion could fall and diversification of studies could be triggered (Thissen and 
Ederveen 2006). With respect to the latter arguments, however, Amaral and 
Magalhaes (2004) argue that particularly due to increased cooperation within 
the Bologna Process, diversification may decrease as a result of potentially 
harmonised curricula. Furthermore, using historical data for higher educa-
tion in the United States, Hoxby (1997: 40) finds that a “competitive market 
structure (…) has caused American colleges to raise their quality, their 
tuitions, and their expenses” but also “to become more diverse.” However, 
it is important to note that the US higher education system is not regulated 
on the national level. Instead, authority is shared among the national govern-
ment, state governments, local governments and the higher education insti-
tutions themselves, with the latter two being the main bodies. Six regional 
associations are in charge of accreditation of higher education institutions.152 
Taken together, the experiences of the US higher education system do not 
provide us with information on whether higher education competition in 
Europe would be enhanced by centralisation. 
Concerning the threat of a potential race to the bottom, there are few 
theoretical arguments for eroding standards, meaning that the chance that 
universities would reduce education standards (or spending) to attract (foreign) 
students is limited. Nonetheless, a critical aspect remains: While centralisa-
tion and specialisation may increase welfare for the European Union as a whole, 
both aspects may contribute to a spatial desolation of the European higher 
education area. In particular, sparsely populated areas may lose education insti-
tutions and may become even less attractive to present or potential residents.
On the whole, the advantages of competition in the area of higher 
151  in this regard, centralisation (or collaboration) is needed with respect to the recognition of academic 
 qualifications (see also the ‘internal market consistency’ section above).
152  https://www.daad.de/laenderinformationen/usa/land/de/4470-hochschul-und-bildungswesen.
On the whole, although some improvements have been made since the start 
of the Bologna Process, there is still uncertainty and sufficient leeway for 
national policies to pursue their own goals.149 This also holds true for the 
market of academic professionals. Based on the exploration of two empirical 
studies for France, Germany, the UK (all conducted in 1995) and France (in 
2004), Musselin (2004: 55) finds that “most post-docs conceived their foreign 
experience as a personal strategy and aimed at improving their chances for 
recruitment in their own country.” In other words, although there is academic 
mobility in Europe, only a few top academics pursue careers abroad. This can 
be attributed in part to the varying requirements and informal rules in the 
individual national labour markets (Musselin 2004: 72).150 
Furthermore, uncertainty is demonstrated by the special Eurobarometer 
questionnaire 417 on ‘European Area of Skills and Qualifications’ , conducted 
in June 2014. In question QB9 respondents were asked: “Do you think that 
qualifications from your education or training would be recognised in other 
EU member states? By ‘recognised’ , we mean that they can be used for work 
or further education.” Possible responses were: ‘Yes’ , ‘No’ , ‘Not applicable/
no qualifications’ , and ‘Don’t know’.
As Figure 13 shows, while 23 per cent of respondents do not think that 
their qualifications would be recognised, 56 per cent assume that they would 
be recognised. As a result, there is still room for improvement in terms of 
reduced uncertainty. However, if only the answers 
of participants who already finished higher educa-
tion are taken into account, the result looks 
somewhat different. In this specific subgroup, 
while only 16 per cent of respondents do not 
expect recognition, 77 per cent of them do 
(European Commission 2014b: 44). 
To conclude, although there have been some 
improvements towards a common recognition 
procedure for higher education qualifications 
decisions are still taken at the national level. The 
free movement of people with respect to educa-
tion and training is accordingly not yet completed. 
As a result, the question arises of whether this 
hindrance to the completion of the internal 
market could be better solved by a reallocation of 
competences or through increased cooperation. 
Referring to the counterfactual situation of a 
competitive European higher education financing, 
the latter aspect seems to be sufficient. While 
changing the financing structure towards a 
European competence would also imply that 
standards would be harmonised, the issue could also be resolved via multi-
lateral agreements. Or, put differently, the abovementioned obstacles to the 
internal market with respect to higher education do not render a 
149  another example are different national standards concerning the hours range per academic year and the 
hours range per credit within the European credit transfer system (EcTS) (European communities 2009: 59f).
150  One should note that the results of this study are based on rather old information, and that a lot of progress 
has been made in recent years. in the end, more comprehensive and up-to-date research on this topic would 
be necessary.
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Figure  13:
Expectations regarding recognition of qualifications
Source: European Commission (2014b).
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education outweigh the disadvantages. The question arises of whether these 
gains can only be achieved through centralisation and thereby a reallocation 
of competences. As already stated above, this is not the case. Figure 1 in the 
introduction already shows that student mobility has increased significantly 
in recent decades. Furthermore, European higher education institutions 
already compete for students. Finally, the described counterfactual situation 
underlying this study refers to a competitive allocation of financial means, 
which does not include a centralisation of the local allocation decisions of 
higher education institutions. To sum up, from this perspective, the compe-
tence of higher education can also remain at the national level and still gain 
competition advantages.
Concerning international competition, pro-centralisation arguments seem 
to outweigh anti-centralisation positions. Due to the increased collaboration 
(e.g. with respect to the implementation of the European credit transfer 
system (ECTS) and the introduction of bachelor’s and master’s degree 
programmes), the European market for higher education has increased 
tremendously. As a result, Europe can better compete with other higher 
education markets and can better export its standards to other parts of the 
world. For instance, the ECTS “has inspired the development of credit systems 
in other regions, for example in Southeast-Asia, Latin America and most 
recently in Africa” (European Union 2015: 14). Nonetheless, while this 
argument points in favour of increased centralisation, the current situation 
of European collaboration seems to be sufficient. Based on this argument, 
there is no need for a unified European competence. 
We therefore assign an indifferent score equal to 3, indicating that neither 
a sole national nor a sole European competence is advisable.
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APPenDix
Spillover effects
Table 1:  
Benefit- and burden-sharing among EU member states (in per cent)
Country Benefit share Burden share Burden share Net benefits Net benefits
    national European national European
austria 2.70% 2.93% 2.55% -0.22% 0.15%
Belgium 3.46% 1.59% 3.31% 1.88% 0.15%
denmark 1.57% 3.47% 2.20% -1.90% -0.63%
Estonia 0.08% 0.14% 0.16% -0.06% -0.08%
Finland 1.23% 1.98% 1.71% -0.75% -0.48%
France 14.20% 15.13% 18.43% -0.93% -4.23%
Germany 16.87% 17.42% 22.01% -0.55% -5.14%
Greece 0.76% 0.37% 1.51% 0.39% -0.75%
Hungary 2.23% 1.19% 0.78% 1.04% 1.45%
ireland 2.41% 1.15% 1.28% 1.27% 1.13%
italy 9.27% 7.49% 13.27% 1.78% -4.00%
netherlands 4.66% 5.30% 4.00% -0.64% 0.66%
poland 10.03% 8.11% 3.23% 1.91% 6.80%
portugal 2.12% 1.41% 1.41% 0.71% 0.71%
Spain 5.65% 12.40% 8.74% -6.75% -3.09%
Sweden 0.97% 2.67% 3.18% -1.69% -2.20%
UK 21.79% 17.26% 12.23% 4.53% 9.56%
-12.00
-8.00
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status quo (national) counterfactul (EU)
net benefit (in per cent) = benefit share - cost share  
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Std. Dev. Nat. = 4.03
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Figure  14:
Net benefits from tertiary education with missing values, by country (in per cent)
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat.
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Table 2:  
average regular and actual student fees for bachelor’s degree students – countries 
where average fee is stated in the primary source (Eurydice 2015)
Countries Code Range of Student  Fees Per cent
full-time
Av. Regular
Student Fee
Students paying av. actual
Student Fee
min max
Belgium BE          
 French BE-F 0 836 88% 418 70% (max) 711
 German BE-G 100 600 . 450 (1) . 450
 Flemish BE-Fl 105 890 65% 890 (1) 77% (max), 22% (min) 708
Germany dE 40 75 86% 50 (1) . 50
France Fr 399 399 96% 399 65% 259
italy iT 199 2,065 100% 1,220 (1) 88% 1,074
croatia Hr 661 1,324 . 993 60% 596
luxembourg lU 400 800 83% 400 (1) 85% 340
poland pl 41 41 53% 41 . 41
portugal pT 656 1,063 95% 1,063 (1) . 1,063
romania rO 558 4,688 . 977 (1) 37% 361
Spain ES 713 2,011 69% 1,110 (1) 72% 799
czech rep. cZ 18 21 97% 18 (1) . 18
Hungary HU 740 5,150 68% 2,945 37% 1,090
UK GB     78%    
 Wales GB-w 5,669 12,755 . 5,669 (1) . 5,669
 N. Ireland GB-ni . 5,393 . 5,393 (1) . 5,393
 Scotland GB-S 2,578 12,755 . 2,578 (1) 0% 0
cyprus cY 3,417 3,417 . 3,417 0% 0
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme. 
(1) For accuracy, the regular student fee is based on the indication of a ‘most common value’ (Eurydice 2015) 
rather than on the average value of the minimal and maximal figures.
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Table 3:  
average regular and actual student fees for bachelor’s degree students – 
countries where average fee is calculated based on the fees for and proportions of 
full- and part-time students
Countries Code Range of Student Fees Per cent
full-time
Av.
Regular
Student 
Fee
Students
paying
Av.
Actual
Student 
Fee
part-Time Full-Time
min max min max
Bulgaria BG 59 511 153 741 . 415 . 415
denmark dK 268 12,000 0 0 90% 613 . 613
Estonia EE 1,500 3,000 0 0 85% 338 . 338
ireland iE 1,500 1,500 3,000 3,000 88% 2,820 . 2,820
latvia lv 700 2,700 1,280 7,000 78% 3,603 63% 2,270
lithuania lT 702 7,725 1,053 11,587 . 5,899 51% 3,008
Malta MT 900 900 0 0 . 180 . 180
netherlands nl 1,135 1,951 1,951 1,951 91% 1,914 . 1,914
Slovakia SK 10 1,960 10 100 69% 343 . 343
Slovenia Si 1,210 8,110 16 29 81% 904 . 904
UK GB     78%    
 England GB-E . 9,566 12,190 12,755 . 11,833 . 11,833
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. For poland, wales, northern ireland, and Scotland possible 
student fees for part-time students are not rated. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme.
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Table 4:  
average regular and actual student fees for master’s degree students – countries 
where average fee is stated in the primary source (Eurydice 2015)
Countries Code Range of Student Fees Per cent
full-time
Av. Regular  
Student Fee
Students paying Av. Actual
Student Fee
min max
Belgium BE            
 French BE-F 0 836 88% 418 70% (max) 711
 German BE-G 100 600 . 450 (1) . 450
 Flemish BE-Fl 105 890 65% 890 (1) 77% (max), 22% (min) 708
Germany dE 40 75 86% 50 (1) . 50
France Fr 471 471 96% 471 65% 306
Greece Gr 3,625 12,000 . 3,625 (1) . 3,625
ireland iE 4,000 30,000 88% 6,000 (1) 60% 3,600
italy iT 195 2,065 100% 1,220 (1) 88% 1,074
croatia Hr 661 1,324 . 993 60% 596
luxembourg lU 400 17,500 83% 3,820 (2) 85% 3,247
Malta MT 400 9,666 . 400 (1) . 400
poland pl 41 41 53% 41 . 41
portugal pT 656 6,233 95% 1,063 (1) . 1,063
romania rO 1,070 7,924 . 2,024 (1) 28% 567
Spain ES 984 3,952 69% 2,020 (1) 72% 1,454
czech rep. cZ 18 21 97% 18 (1) . 18
Hungary HU 1,449 6,117 68% 3,783 37% 1,400
UK GB     78%      
 England GB-E 5,743 5,743 . 5,743 . 5,743
 Wales GB-w 5,743 5,743 . 5,743 . 5,743
 N. Ireland GB-ni 5,766 5,766 . 5,766 . 5,766
 Scotland GB-S 4,818 4,818 . 4,818 . 4,818
cyprus cY 4,100 10,250 . 4,100 (1) . 4,100
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme.
(1) For accuracy, the regular student fee is based on the indication of a ‘most common value’ (Eurydice 2015) 
rather than on the average value of the minimal and maximal figures.
(2) The regular student fee is based on a weighted mean from the minimal and maximal figures, as only 20 per 
cent of students are registered in the course with the maximal student fee.
Table 3:  
average regular and actual student fees for bachelor’s degree students – 
countries where average fee is calculated based on the fees for and proportions of 
full- and part-time students
Countries Code Range of Student Fees Per cent
full-time
Av.
Regular
Student 
Fee
Students
paying
Av.
Actual
Student 
Fee
part-Time Full-Time
min max min max
Bulgaria BG 59 511 153 741 . 415 . 415
denmark dK 268 12,000 0 0 90% 613 . 613
Estonia EE 1,500 3,000 0 0 85% 338 . 338
ireland iE 1,500 1,500 3,000 3,000 88% 2,820 . 2,820
latvia lv 700 2,700 1,280 7,000 78% 3,603 63% 2,270
lithuania lT 702 7,725 1,053 11,587 . 5,899 51% 3,008
Malta MT 900 900 0 0 . 180 . 180
netherlands nl 1,135 1,951 1,951 1,951 91% 1,914 . 1,914
Slovakia SK 10 1,960 10 100 69% 343 . 343
Slovenia Si 1,210 8,110 16 29 81% 904 . 904
UK GB     78%    
 England GB-E . 9,566 12,190 12,755 . 11,833 . 11,833
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. For poland, wales, northern ireland, and Scotland possible 
student fees for part-time students are not rated. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme.
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Table 5:  
average regular and actual student fees for master’s degree students – countries 
where average fee is calculated based on the fees for and proportions of full- and 
part-time students
Countries Code Range of Student Fees Per cent
full-time
Av.
Regular
Student 
Fee
Students
paying
Av.
Actual
Student 
Fee
part-Time Full-Time
min max min max
Bulgaria BG 59 511 153 792 . 435 . 435
denmark dK 20,101 53,000 0 0 90% 3,655 . 3,655
Estonia EE 1,500 3,000 0 0 85% 338 . 338
latvia lv 880 12,500 1,080 8,626 78% 5,257 49% 2,576
lithuania lT 1,495 8,387 2,242 12,581 . 6,917 51% 3,528
netherlands nl 1,135 1,951 1,951 1,951 91% 1,914 . 1,914
Slovakia SK 10 2,940 10 100 69% 495 . 495
Slovenia Si 2,068 15,831 16 29 81% 1,719 . 1,719
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme.
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Xiii. Case Study 7: 
 Railway freight transport
Current and future challenges
Since the mid-1990s, with the exception of the recession during the economic 
and financial crisis in 2009, total freight transport in the European Union 
has been constantly increasing (see Figure 1).
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
140
145
1995=100
passengers (1) (pkm) goods (2) (tkm) GDP (at constant year 2000 prices)
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
passengers, goods, GDP
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Figure  1:
Development of passenger and goods transport in the EU (1995–2013)
Source: European Commission 2015.
Notes: (1) passenger cars, powered two-wheelers, buses & coaches, tram & metro, railways, intra-EU air, intra-EU sea; (2) road, rail, inland 
waterways, oil pipelines, intra-EU air, intra-EU sea.
The increase in freight transport, however, is particularly driven by road and 
sea transport, whereas the amount of goods transported on railways remains 
more or less constant, at 400 billion tonne-kilometres (see Figure  2). The 
corresponding market share of railway freight transport in 2013 is equal to 
11.7 per cent of total freight transport.
Table 5:  
average regular and actual student fees for master’s degree students – countries 
where average fee is calculated based on the fees for and proportions of full- and 
part-time students
Countries Code Range of Student Fees Per cent
full-time
Av.
Regular
Student 
Fee
Students
paying
Av.
Actual
Student 
Fee
part-Time Full-Time
min max min max
Bulgaria BG 59 511 153 792 . 435 . 435
denmark dK 20,101 53,000 0 0 90% 3,655 . 3,655
Estonia EE 1,500 3,000 0 0 85% 338 . 338
latvia lv 880 12,500 1,080 8,626 78% 5,257 49% 2,576
lithuania lT 1,495 8,387 2,242 12,581 . 6,917 51% 3,528
netherlands nl 1,135 1,951 1,951 1,951 91% 1,914 . 1,914
Slovakia SK 10 2,940 10 100 69% 495 . 495
Slovenia Si 2,068 15,831 16 29 81% 1,719 . 1,719
 
notes: The UK and Belgium are divided by regions. Figures are given in €/year. Figures refer to public 
educational institutions and comprise administration costs (e.g. registration, admission and certification) but 
no student union contributions as well as accommodation, transportation or canteen costs. it is assumed that 
students accomplish the predetermined workload and are enrolled in only one programme.
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This relatively low market share stands in contrast to the various merits of 
freight transport on railways. For instance, freight transport on railways 
uses six times less energy than road transport, and emits just one-fifth the 
amount of carbon dioxide (Ivaldi 2007; Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004). 
Taking passenger and freight transport together, 
the relative CO2 emissions of  railways compared 
to other transport modes are even more negli-
gible (see Figure 3).
A similar pattern is found when the total external 
costs per transport mode are taken into account. 
These external costs include, for example, costs of 
air pollution and climate change, noise, congestion 
and accidents. Again, railways have the lowest costs, 
which are six times lower than the average external 
costs for road transport (see Figure 4).
Taken together, the comparatively low market 
share in rail freight transport contravenes the 
comparatively low (external) costs of this trans-
port mode. This contrast becomes even more 
striking with respect to Europe’s major challenges 
concerning transport policy as defined by the 
European Commission (see European Commission 
2014a: 18 and http://europa.eu/pol/trans/
index _en.htm):
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Figure  2:
EU–28 transport performance by mode for freight transport (1995–2013)
Source: European Commission 2015.
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Figure  3:
Share of total transport greenhouse gas emissions 
by mode in EU–28 (2012)
Source: European Commission 2015.
Notes: Excluding international bunkers (international traffic departing 
from the EU). *Excluding indirect emissions from electricity consumption.
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•	 Congestion affects both road and air traffic. It costs Europe around 1 per 
cent of annual GDP.
•	 Oil dependency: Despite improvements in energy efficiency, transport still 
depends on oil for 96 per cent of its energy needs. Oil will become scarcer 
in future, increasingly sourced from unstable parts of the world. 
•	 Greenhouse gas emissions: By 2050, the EU must cut transport emissions 
by 60 per cent compared with 1990 levels if we are to limit global warming 
to an increase of just 2º C.
•	 Infrastructure quality is uneven across the EU.
•	 Competition: The EU’s transport sector faces growing competition from 
fast-developing transport markets in other regions.
Most of these challenges directly point towards a reallocation of freight trans-
port from road and air traffic to railways. Accordingly, we investigate whether 
the competence for railway freight transport policies should be allocated 
primarily to the national or the European level.
Status quo
According to Article 4 TFEU, transport policy belongs to the field of shared 
competences between the EU and its member states. In other words, both the 
EU and the member states have the competence to pass binding legal acts. 
This relatively low market share stands in contrast to the various merits of 
freight transport on railways. For instance, freight transport on railways 
uses six times less energy than road transport, and emits just one-fifth the 
amount of carbon dioxide (Ivaldi 2007; Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004). 
Taking passenger and freight transport together, 
the relative CO2 emissions of  railways compared 
to other transport modes are even more negli-
gible (see Figure 3).
A similar pattern is found when the total external 
costs per transport mode are taken into account. 
These external costs include, for example, costs of 
air pollution and climate change, noise, congestion 
and accidents. Again, railways have the lowest costs, 
which are six times lower than the average external 
costs for road transport (see Figure 4).
Taken together, the comparatively low market 
share in rail freight transport contravenes the 
comparatively low (external) costs of this trans-
port mode. This contrast becomes even more 
striking with respect to Europe’s major challenges 
concerning transport policy as defined by the 
European Commission (see European Commission 
2014a: 18 and http://europa.eu/pol/trans/
index _en.htm):
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Figure  4:
Average external costs by transport mode in 2008 for EU–27, distinguished between a high- and low-cost scenario
Notes: Low and high scenarios refer to two different CO2 prices (25 €/t CO2 vs. 146€/t CO2) for up- and downstream and climate change. 
Other cost categories comprise costs for nature and landscape, biodiversity losses (due to air pollution), soil and water pollution costs, and 
additional costs in urban areas. Congestion costs are excluded. Data refer to 2008 and include the EU–27 with the exemption of Malta and 
Cyprus, but including Norway and Switzerland. For more information regarding the computation of figures, see CE Delft, INFRAS and 
Fraunhofer ISI 2011: 29ff.  Source: CE Delft, INFRAS and Fraunhofer ISI 2011: 9.
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With respect to rail transport, “national considerations have historically 
prevailed over international ones. Even today, some 200 years after the inven-
tion of the train, many member states still own the national rail operator 
and organise rail transport on a national basis” (European Commission 
2014a:  10). As a result, the European railway system is highly fragmented, 
and various standards and procedures are used (e.g. different signalling and 
electrification systems as well as track gauges; see in greater detail below), 
which hinders smooth cross-border rail operations.
So far, four railway packages have been initiated with the aim of increasing 
liberalisation and creating a Single European Railway area. These packages 
include, for instance, the separation of infrastructure managers who run the 
network and railway companies using the network for transportation153, a 
competitive tendering for public service rail contracts, and common safety 
and regulatory standards.154 
However, when investigating the question of whether railway freight trans-
port policies should be fully reallocated to the European level, the caveat 
applies that railway transport cannot be treated entirely as a public good 
(this is a distinct feature compared to, e.g., the area of defence policy). Both 
characteristics of public goods are not completely fulfilled: First, there is at 
least a certain degree of rivalry consumption, meaning that the use of 
railways by one operator affects railway use by another operator. Second, 
there is excludability, as users can be excluded from consumption via the 
price mechanism, meaning that only those who pay for the use of railways 
can actually use it. As a result, in addition to being public competences located 
at the national or the supranational level, railway transportation could also 
be handled via private markets (and, indeed, already is handled via regulated 
markets). We will take this caveat into account when interpreting the results, 
such as with respect to spillover effects.
Counterfactual situation
For the counterfactual situation, we assume a single EU-financed railway 
system without technical or operational barriers. This includes, for example, 
technical standardisation and non-discriminatory, European-wide access to 
infrastructure as well as no missing links at borders.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
 2 we compute the member states’ net benefits of domestic freight transport for both the status 
quo and the counterfactual situation of an integrated European railway. The cost share of national 
railway provision is adjusted, with a cost coverage ratio capturing private vs. public good provision 
of railways. Free riding would increase if the competence is reallocated from the national to the 
European level. Our indicator of free riding rises by approximately 41%, which points to the merits 
of national provision.
153  criticism of this approach is presented in drew and nash (2011) and laabsch and Sanner (2012).
154  For more detailed information on various steps in rail legislation, see, e.g., Steer davies Gleave (2014) and 
dehousse and Marsicola (2015).
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Economies of scale
 4 we refer to both cost savings based on fixed cost degression in rail maintenance and cost savings 
due to the harmonisation of technical standards. For the former, we use information on maintenance 
expenditures and total rail kilometres from the OEcd and Eurostat, and depict a country’s 
maintenance expenditures per rail kilometre in relation to total rail kilometres. The results point 
to the presence of a marginal cost advantage for larger entities, i.e., per kilometre maintenance 
expenditures decrease with an increasing rail network. concerning cost savings due to the 
harmonisation of technical standards, the various different standards currently in use act as barriers 
hindering cross-border transport and causing additional costs for providers. 
Preference heterogeneity
 4 we use Eurostat information on modal split in freight transport between EU countries and 
information from the Eurobarometer questionnaire no. 388 on rail competition to measure 
preference heterogeneity. in case of Eurobarometer questions, the corresponding heterogeneity 
ranges from 16.4% to 29.2%, which would result in a score equal to 5. For modal split, heterogeneity 
is equal to 41%, suggesting a score equal to 4. Given the caveats for revealed preferences, we assign 
a score equal to 4.
Internal market consistency
 4 There are several examples of exceptions from internal market standards as well as national 
standards hindering the completion of the internal market. For instance, domestic transport is not 
subject to competition in many member states, and heavy rail transport is exempted from public 
tendering. different technical standards (e.g. different track gauges and electrification systems) and 
nationally organised vehicle authorisation act as barriers for cross-border railway undertakings. 
while the EU aims at resolving these problems, the negotiation process between the EU and its 
member states casts doubts on the efficiency of this procedure.
Competition
 3 we compare potential merits from policy innovations (‘yardstick competition’) with the threat of 
eroding standards (‘race to the bottom’) to assess the effects of competition. while there might be 
some examples of policy innovations between different systems (e.g. concerning the liberalisation of 
the rail market), examples within systems are rather scarce and in most cases limited by enormous 
sunk costs. Furthermore, these innovations would particularly hinder the completion of the internal 
market. There are also limited arguments for a ‘race to the bottom’, i.e., the threat of eroding 
standards seems to be less severe.
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data source
We calculate member states’ net benefits for both the status quo and the 
counterfactual to assess the extent of free riding in the cases of a national 
and a European provision of freight transport on railways.
The relative benefit of railway freight transport is approximated by a 
member state’s share of domestic railway traffic in total European domestic 
railway traffic (measured in tonnes).155 Since an assessment of how benefits 
would change in the case of European provision of freight transport is highly 
speculative, we assume that the benefit distribution across member states 
will remain unchanged (at least in the short run) if the competence is reallo-
cated to the European level.
In contrast, we distinguish between the member states’ individual costs 
of railway freight transport in the case of national and European responsi-
bility. For the counterfactual situation of a European responsibility, we assume 
that the single European railways are financed out of the EU budget and use 
the member states’ share of the EU budget as an indicator for the cost distri-
bution. The costs for the member states in the case of national provision are 
155  domestic railway traffic is equal to a member state’s total railway traffic minus transit traffic, i.e., it comprises 
intrastate traffic as well as interstate traffic with start or end in the member state.
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approximated by each member state’s share of total European rail tracks 
(measured in kilometres). A member state provides rail tracks and has to bear 
these costs by itself. To measure these costs, however, we cannot rely on 
maintenance or investment figures, as these costs are rather arbitrary and 
depend on the discretionary decisions of each member state. For instance, 
there might be some member states that spend too little on maintenance 
compared to what would be needed (and vice versa). We therefore compute a 
member state’s share of national rail kilometres in Europe’s total rail 
kilometres to derive a member state’s cost share in the case of national provi-
sion of railway tracks. The procedure relies on the assumption that the costs 
for providing railway tracks are comparable across member states.156
Since benefits and costs are both expressed in percentage shares, we can 
directly infer the extent of free riding. For instance, if a member state’s 
relative benefit from domestic traffic is equal to 20 per cent and the member 
state bears 20 per cent of Europe’s total railway costs, the cost-benefit ratio 
is balanced and no free riding is occurring. 
However, as noted above, the caveat applies that railways cannot be fully 
characterised as a public good, as non-rivalry in consumption and non-ex-
cludability are both not fulfilled.157 If a national railway company charges 
track access fees that cover the total costs of railway provision, spillover 
effects are completely internalised and railway services can be treated entirely 
as a private good. We therefore adjust the cost share of national railway provi-
sion with a cost coverage ratio capturing the share of private vs. public good 
provision in railways. The ratio compares a member state’s actual track access 
charges for freight transport on railways with the total external costs induced 
by the provision of railway services (see the formula below).158
Both measures are expressed in average access charges for a 1,000-tonne train 
kilometre. Total external costs include, for example, the usage of railways, air 
pollution and climate change, noise and accidents. The data stem from an 
update study of a research consortium comprising the research and consul-
tancy organisation CE Delft, the business management consultancy INFRAS 
and the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (see CE 
Delft, INFRAS and Fraunhofer ISI 2011).159 Figures for actual track access 
charges are based on the fourth report of the European Commission on 
monitoring development of the rail market (European Commission 2014b).160 
156  data refer to 2012 and are downloaded from Eurostat. Missing figures are replaced with information from 
national websites (e.g. for austria, denmark and the netherlands) or figures from previous years (e.g. for 
 Belgium, lithuania and the UK). in some countries, high-speed trains operate on specific tracks (e.g. TGv 
tracks in France); however, we cannot distinguish between passenger-only tracks and combined passenger- 
and-freight tracks. as a result, benefit shares in these countries might be overestimated.
157  due to the price mechanism in private markets, excludability is possible and rivalry in consumption may be 
prevalent if too many users transport goods at the same time.
158  cost coverage ratios are capped at 100 per cent.
159  dings, Sevenster and davidson (2003) present a comparison of various study results for measuring external costs.
160  data for external costs refer to 2008, and data for current track access charges refer to 2014. However, 
instead of comparing exact euro figures, we use the relative distribution across countries. There are no more 
recent data for external costs available. For details on applied railway access charge systems in Europe, see 
vidaud and de Tilière (2010).
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We then use the cost coverage ratio as a scaling factor to calculate the private 
and public parts of national railways. For instance, if a member state’s 
complete external railway costs are covered by track access charges, railway 
is treated as a pure private good. If this is not the case (e.g. if only 80 per 
cent of external costs are covered), the part not covered has the character of 
a public good. In a final step, the adjusted cost ratios are rescaled to sum up 
to 100 per cent.161 The figures are presented in Table 1 in the Appendix.
We then calculate the cost-benefit ratios in the cases of national and supra-
national responsibility by subtracting the national/European cost share from 
the benefit share. The results are presented in Figure 5.
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Figure  5:
Distribution of net benefits from railway freight transport
Source: Own computations based on CE Delft, INFRAS and Fraunhofer ISI 2011; Eurostat; and European Commission 2014b.
Positive figures indicate potential free riding, meaning that national benefits 
exceed national costs, with the opposite being true for negative figures. In 
the case of a national provision, Germany particularly benefits from compa-
rably low costs for railway provision. Free riding would be reduced if the 
competence were reallocated to the European level. However, this is not true 
for each member state. Taken together, spillover effects would increase if the 
competence were reallocated. This can be seen, for instance, in the large 
amplitudes of France, Italy and Poland. The increase is also reflected in an 
increased standard deviation: The measure of dispersion rises from 3.08 to 
4.33, resulting in an increase of 40.58 per cent. We therefore assign a score 
equal to 2, indicating that a European competence would not reduce problems 
of spillover effects and free riding.
161  This procedure is necessary because we compare percentage shares, which – by definition – sum up 
to 100 per cent. Otherwise, we could not subtract cost and benefit shares and compare changes in the 
standard deviation.
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eConomieS oF SCAle
Data source and methodology
To detect economies of scale in freight transport policy, we refer to both cost 
savings based on fixed cost degression in rail maintenance and cost savings 
due to the harmonisation of technical aspects.162 For the former, we use infor-
mation on maintenance expenditures and total rail kilometres for 2011 from 
the OECD and Eurostat.163 We then depict a member state’s maintenance 
expenditures per rail kilometre in relation to total rail kilometres per country. 
If economies of scale due to fixed cost degression are present, there should 
be a disproportional decrease in the cost per kilometre, as countries with 
larger rail networks might use maintenance vehicles more productively, for 
example, and could thereby achieve a higher degree of utilisation.
For the latter, we refer to information from a recent study on the cost of 
non-Europe in the single market in transport and tourism (Steer Davies 
Gleave 2014). The authors present various examples of potential cost savings 
resulting from a harmonisation of technical barriers (explained below).
Results
Results for potential economies of scale in rail maintenance expenditure are 
presented in Figure 6. We plot a member state’s total maintenance expenditure 
per rail kilometre in relation to a member state’s total rail kilometres. Further-
more, we include a logarithmic line of best fit. The results point to the presence 
of a cost advantage of larger entities (i.e. per kilometre maintenance expendi-
tures decrease with an increasing rail network). However, the cost advantage 
is rather marginal. There are many countries facing low per kilometre main-
tenance expenditures even if rail networks are rather small. Furthermore, the 
investigation suffers from several caveats that should be stressed. First, we 
only use observations for 2011. As already mentioned before, maintenance deci-
sions are rather arbitrary, meaning that it could be the case that our results are 
flawed because some countries invested too little (or more than necessary) in 
this particular year. To resolve this problem, we have plotted the relationship 
using average maintenance figures for the 2008–2011 period. The results are 
presented in the Appendix (see Figure 15) and remain unaffected by this modi-
fication. Second, various – and, in particular, large – countries are missing, as 
we were unable to collect information on maintenance expenditures for 
Germany, Spain and the UK, for example. We therefore interpret the results 
with caution and refer to the second part of the investigation: the detection of 
potential cost savings resulting from improved harmonisation.
162  in a narrow sense, only cost savings due to fixed cost degression in rail maintenance indicate pure economies 
of scale. However, as we will show below, there are enormous potential cost savings with respect to technical 
aspects, which could be more easily achieved if the competence were reallocated to the European level.
163  another possibility would have been to use investment expenditures. However, it is not clear why there 
should be a cost advantage in the creation of rail tracks by larger entities. Furthermore, investment decisions 
are rather discretionary, as some countries invest more than they should while others invest less. while this 
is also true in principle for maintenance, we assume that biases are larger for investment decisions than for 
maintenance decisions.
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Figure  6:
Maintenance expenditure per rail kilometre in EUR in relation to total rail kilometres (2011)
Source: Own computation based on OECD and Eurostat. Missing information for Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Malta, Romania, Spain and the UK. A logarithmic function is calculated to detect the best fit.
While some improvements regarding a single European railway market have 
been achieved, there still remain substantial gaps which hinder the realisation 
of the full potential of a European railway system. Interoperability of European 
railways suffers from a lack of harmonisation of technical standards. These 
comprise, inter alia, different signalling systems, track gauges (distance 
between rails on the track) and electrification systems (Steer Davies Gleave 
2014). These technical constraints act as barriers, as they hinder cross-border 
transport and cause additional costs for providers.
Different signalling systems
If, for instance, a train travels from one member state to another, the signalling 
system changes. There are currently more than 20 different  signalling systems 
used across the EU, implying that operators must implement various systems per 
train or have to change engines – both being time-consuming and costly (ibid.).164
164  The EU has started moving towards standardisation, as three memorandums of understanding have been 
signed since 2005. The realisation, however, is far behind schedule (Steer davies Gleave 2014).
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Different track gauges
An overview of different track gauges across Europe is presented in Figure 7. 
The standard track gauge is 1,435 mm, while there are differences in Spain and 
Portugal (both 1,668 mm), Finland (1,524 mm), and Ireland (1,600 mm) (ibid.).
Different electrification systems
An even more disturbing example of different standards can be seen in the 
overview of national electrification systems provided in Figure 8. While most 
member states’ railway tracks are now electrified, there are still five different 
electrification systems with a quite heterogeneous distribution across coun-
tries. Furthermore – and even more astonishingly – France applies two 
different standards, which requires that all electrical equipment ordered by 
the national railway provider can use both standards.165
165  although there are obvious efficiency gains from moving to only one standard, the application of different 
standards (even within a country) already points to enormous and potentially even prohibitive changeover 
costs. we will discuss this matter in the summary of our study.
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Different track gauges across Europe (in mm)
Source: Steer Davies Gleave 2014: 41.
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Figure  8:
Different electrification systems across Europe
Source: Steer Davies Gleave 2014: 42.
The estimated potential cost savings from dissolving these barriers, as net 
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Finally, there is the caveat that these savings could potentially also be 
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ences from the recent past, however, cast some doubt on the practicability 
of this suggestion (see also the description in the ‘Internal market consist-
ency’ section below). 
166  The figures consist of: (a) €4 billion (standardisation of rolling stock) + €0.2 billion (common signalling 
 system) + €1.6 billion (reduced maintenance of parallel signalling systems (10% of total maintenance costs 
equal to €16 billion)) + €0.7 billion (increased capacity due to single signalling system) = €6.5 billion (lower 
bound); and (B) €9 billion (standardisation of rolling stock) + €1.3 billion (common signalling system) + €2.4 
billion (reduced maintenance of parallel signalling systems (15% of total maintenance costs equal to €16 
billion)) + €0.9 billion (increased capacity due to single signalling system) = €13.6 billion (upper bound) (see 
Steer davies Gleave 2014: 70f).
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do not have information for various large member states and therefore use the lower bound of €16 billion for 
maintenance costs.
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Taken together, we detect potential cost savings from reallocating railway 
transport policy from the national to the European level. Both results, however, 
must be viewed with reservations. We therefore only assign a slightly pro-cen-
tralisation score equal to 4.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding transport 
policy, we use Eurostat information on the modal split in freight transport 
between EU countries (revealed preferences analysis) and information from 
a Eurobarometer questionnaire. For the latter, we refer to the 2012 Special 
Eurobarometer questionnaire no. 388 on rail competition (European Commis-
sion 2012), and investigate the following four questions:
•	 QC7a.1: “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for passengers?”
•	 QC7a.2: “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for private rail operators?”
•	 QC7a.3 “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for employees of rail transport operators?”
•	 QC5: “In general, do you support or oppose opening the national and 
regional rail system in (OUR COUNTRY) to competition provided that all 
operators must meet the same safety standards?”
For the first three questions, answers were given on a four-level scale 
comprising ‘bad’ , ‘fairly bad’ , ‘fairly good’ to ‘very good’. For the last ques-
tion, answer categories comprised ‘totally support’ , ‘tend to support’ , ‘tend 
to oppose’ and ‘totally oppose’.168
With respect to revealed preferences based on information on modal split 
in freight transport, we use Eurostat data from 2013 on the share of inland 
rail transport in total transport (measured in per cent of total tonne-kilo-
metres; see Figure 9).
168  note that cyprus and Malta were excluded because they do not have a railway system. croatia did not partic-
ipate in the 2012 survey because it only joined the EU in 2013. Furthermore, citizens of the United Kingdom 
were not asked questions Qc7.1 to 3.
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Figure  9:
Modal split of inland freight transport in 2013 (per cent of total tonne-kilometres)
Source: Own computation based on Eurostat.
Note: Information is missing for rail transport in Belgium and for waterway transport in Italy.
Methodology
For Eurobarometer questions, we reduce the scale from four to two levels by 
merging the answer levels ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ as well as ‘fairly bad’ 
and ‘bad’. The same is done for the answer levels ‘totally support’ and ‘tend to 
support’ as well as ‘tend to oppose’ and ‘totally oppose’. We then calculate the 
share of answers with either ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ per country and measure 
the dispersion of preferences on the European level.
In the case of modal split information, we directly use the share of national 
inland freight rail transport to measure citizens’ preferences. The procedure 
is based on the assumption that rather equal shares of national rail trans-
port imply similar preferences, while rather diverse shares suggest the 
opposite. However, the share of national rail transport might also reveal 
special national circumstances, such as geographic conditions. For instance, 
there are no railways in Malta and Cyprus, and railways are used less often 
in the Netherlands due to the large number of inland waterways. We will 
come back to this caveat when interpreting the results.
Results
The results are presented in Figure 10 to Figure 13 (Eurobarometer questions) 
and Figure 14 (modal split). For the Eurobarometer questions, the corresponding 
heterogeneity ranges from 16.4 to 29.2 per cent, which results in scores equal 
to 7 and 8, respectively. For the modal split analysis, the heterogeneity measure 
is equal to 41 per cent, resulting in a score equal to 6. However, as already 
Taken together, we detect potential cost savings from reallocating railway 
transport policy from the national to the European level. Both results, however, 
must be viewed with reservations. We therefore only assign a slightly pro-cen-
tralisation score equal to 4.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
Data source
For determining preference heterogeneity of EU citizens regarding transport 
policy, we use Eurostat information on the modal split in freight transport 
between EU countries (revealed preferences analysis) and information from 
a Eurobarometer questionnaire. For the latter, we refer to the 2012 Special 
Eurobarometer questionnaire no. 388 on rail competition (European Commis-
sion 2012), and investigate the following four questions:
•	 QC7a.1: “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for passengers?”
•	 QC7a.2: “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for private rail operators?”
•	 QC7a.3 “Do you think that more competition in the rail market will be 
good or bad for employees of rail transport operators?”
•	 QC5: “In general, do you support or oppose opening the national and 
regional rail system in (OUR COUNTRY) to competition provided that all 
operators must meet the same safety standards?”
For the first three questions, answers were given on a four-level scale 
comprising ‘bad’ , ‘fairly bad’ , ‘fairly good’ to ‘very good’. For the last ques-
tion, answer categories comprised ‘totally support’ , ‘tend to support’ , ‘tend 
to oppose’ and ‘totally oppose’.168
With respect to revealed preferences based on information on modal split 
in freight transport, we use Eurostat data from 2013 on the share of inland 
rail transport in total transport (measured in per cent of total tonne-kilo-
metres; see Figure 9).
168  note that cyprus and Malta were excluded because they do not have a railway system. croatia did not partic-
ipate in the 2012 survey because it only joined the EU in 2013. Furthermore, citizens of the United Kingdom 
were not asked questions Qc7.1 to 3.
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mentioned, the rather low score for the latter result might not only reflect 
revealed preferences, but can also result from specific national geographic 
conditions. Furthermore, there might be the problem that responses to Euro-
barometer questions are influenced by the current provision of national railway 
systems, meaning that respondents in countries with a rather high share of 
freight transport on railways might respond differently to respondents in 
countries with a comparatively low share (and vice versa). However, the direc-
tion of this influence is not clear.
Taken together, the results point to rather aligned preferences. Consid-
ering potential caveats, however, we do not assign the maximum score, but 
instead allocate a score equal to 4.
Figure 10:  
preferences regarding rail competition (passengers)
transport
Eurobarometer question EB77.2 Qc7a.1: “do you think that more competition in the rail market will be good or 
bad for passengers?”
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Figure  10
Preferences regarding rail competition (passengers)
Median 0.887
iQr 0.111
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.086
Heterogeneity 17.2 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ in a country. The answer 
choice ‘very good’ is merged with ‘fairly good’, and ‘fairly bad’ is merged with ‘bad’. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not  considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.072, resulting in a heterogeneity of 14.4 per cent.
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
177
Figure 11: 
preferences regarding rail competition (private rail operators)
transport
Eurobarometer question EB77.2 Qc7a.2: “do you think that more competition in the rail market will be good or 
bad for private rail operators?”
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Figure  11
Preferences regarding rail competition (private rail operators)
Median 0.793
iQr 0.110
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.082
Heterogeneity 16.4 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ in a country. The answer 
choice ‘very good’ is merged with ‘fairly good’, and ‘fairly bad’ is merged with ‘bad’. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.068, resulting in a heterogeneity of 13.6 per cent.
Figure 12:  
preferences regarding rail competition (employees)
transport
Eurobarometer question EB77.2 Qc7a.3: “do you think that more competition in the rail market will be good or 
bad for employees of rail transport operators?”
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Figure  12
Preferences regarding rail competition (employees)
Median 0.687
iQr 0.250
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.146
Heterogeneity 29.2 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ in a country. The answer 
choice ‘very good’ is merged with ‘fairly good’, and ‘fairly bad’ is merged with ‘bad’. respondents with no opinion 
about this question are not considered. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard 
deviation = 0.156, resulting in a heterogeneity of 31.3 per cent.
mentioned, the rather low score for the latter result might not only reflect 
revealed preferences, but can also result from specific national geographic 
conditions. Furthermore, there might be the problem that responses to Euro-
barometer questions are influenced by the current provision of national railway 
systems, meaning that respondents in countries with a rather high share of 
freight transport on railways might respond differently to respondents in 
countries with a comparatively low share (and vice versa). However, the direc-
tion of this influence is not clear.
Taken together, the results point to rather aligned preferences. Consid-
ering potential caveats, however, we do not assign the maximum score, but 
instead allocate a score equal to 4.
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Figure 13:  
preferences regarding rail competition (opening the rail system)
transport
Eurobarometer question EB77.2 Qc5: “in general, do you support or oppose opening the national and regional 
rail system in (OUr cOUnTrY) to competition provided that all operators must meet the same safety standards?”
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Figure  13
Preferences regarding rail competition (opening the rail system)
Median 0.791
iQr 0.122
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.104
Heterogeneity 20.8 %
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of answers with ‘totally support’ and ‘tend to support’ in a country. The 
answer choice ‘totally support’ is merged with ‘tend to support’, and ‘tend to oppose’ is merged with ‘totally 
oppose’. respondents with no opinion about this question are not considered. if we use the country population 
size in 2014 as weights, the standard deviation = 0.094, resulting in a heterogeneity of 18.8 per cent.
Figure 14:  
revealed preferences in transportation based on modal split
transport
railway inland freight transport in per cent of total tonne-kilometres
Mean (μ) 0.230
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Figure  14
Revealed preferences in transportation based on modal split
Median 0.178
iQr 0.225
Std. Dev. (σ) 0.205
Heterogeneity 41.0%
notes: The X-axis denotes the share of railway inland freight transport in per cent of total tonne-kilometres of 
all inland freight transport. if we use the country population size in 2014 as weights, the standard deviation = 
0.106, resulting in a heterogeneity of 21.3 per cent.
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inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
The primary principles of the internal market comprise basic freedoms and 
the guarantee of identical rules. If these principles are hurt (e.g. due to excep-
tions based on national standards) and the competence is allocated primarily 
to the national level, the competence should be reallocated to the European 
level. However, the caveat applies that this is only true if a national provi-
sion with identical rules cannot ensure consistency with the principles of the 
internal market.
The EU has launched numerous initiatives to strengthen the free movement 
of goods and persons with respect to transportation (see above). However, 
several gaps concerning the completion of the internal market still persist 
(Steer Davies Gleave 2014).169 
First, market liberalisation is far from completed. For instance, domestic 
passenger services are closed to competition in the majority of member states. 
There is a continuum ranging from very liberal states (e.g. the UK has a highly 
competitive system for franchised services and has installed a fully 
independent infrastructure manager) to completely closed states (e.g. the 
Republic of Ireland has not separated infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings). While the 4th railway package aims at opening market access 
(for details, see, e.g., Dehousse and Marsicola 2015), the implementation is 
far from complete.
Second, heavy rail is excluded from public tendering. While approximately 
two-thirds of domestic rail services are operating under public service 
contracts, Art. 5.6 of Regulation (EC) 1370/2007 allows for direct awards if 
national law permits it. As a consequence, the vast majority of heavy rail 
undertakings are directly awarded without competitive tendering. 
Third, various bidding procedures based on national standards hinder an 
efficient competitive tendering procedure in the EU. As Steer Davies Gleave 
(2014: 34) notes, “competitive tendering is fully or partially used in eleven 
member states, and a further five only reverted to direct awards after the 
competitive tendering process failed.” A consistent European approach with 
uniform business conditions is not yet existent, but it could help to encourage 
new players to enter the transport market.
Fourth, the different technical standards discussed above (e.g. different 
track gauges and electrification systems) hinder the free movement of goods 
and passengers. This becomes particularly true for missing cross-border 
links. For instance, Steer Davies Gleave (2014: 67) cite the example of how 
“freight trains travelling on the Rotterdam to Genoa corridor can travel for 
90 per cent of the corridor with maximum lengths exceeding 700 meters. The 
maximum length allowed in the Italian section is below 600 meters, meaning 
that a train that needs to go as far as Italy needs to be shorter than what is 
allowed for most other networks along the corridor.”
Fifth, national standards are applied for vehicle authorisation. In other 
words, the current system requires the applicant to comply with diverse 
national technical standards, which leads to high costs for multiple certifi-
cates in various countries.170 
169  if not indicated otherwise, all examples refer to Steer davies Gleave (2014: 33ff) (in particular, Gap 1, Gap 2, 
Gap 3, Gap 8 and Gap 12).
170  For further examples on different standards, see Steer davies Gleave 2014.
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Again, the 4th railway package aims at resolving these barriers, but the 
“provisions have been substantially watered down” and the package “is 
substantially below what the market needs to ensure a single market in the 
rail sector” (ibid.: 32). As Dehousse and Marsicola (2015: 56) point out, the 4th 
railway package “will certainly be an important stop in this long regulatory 
journey, but not the last one.” Taken together, enormous doubts can be raised 
about whether the current competence distribution can effectively remove 
internal market barriers.171 In contrast, a competence allocation to the 
European level could support the removal of both important obstacles and 
exceptions, as national views and interests may be put into the background.172
However, since removing these obstacles is also possible using a decen-
tralised solution (although the expectations for a successful implementa-
tion remain admittedly limited) and railway transport cannot be treated as 
pure public good, we do not assign the maximum score, but instead assign 
a score equal to 4.
ComPetition
We compare potential merits from policy innovations (‘yardstick competi-
tion’) with the threat of eroding standards (‘race to the bottom’) to assess 
the effects of competition. Starting with the argument of a possible yardstick 
competition, some case studies suggest that member states can indeed learn 
from each other. For instance, the opening of the rail sector in the UK and 
Sweden, which were among the first countries implementing liberalisation, 
serves as an example for other member states – concerning both benefits 
and drawbacks (Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004). Likewise, Italy and the 
Czech Republic have shown that opening the rail sector increases rolling 
stock and creates more jobs, which may induce other member states to imple-
ment similar reforms (Steer Davies Gleave 2014). However, instead of pointing 
towards policy innovations within an existing system, these examples refer 
to best practises in the case of complete regime changes (which were like-
wise not initiated by the member states alone, but requested by the EU).
Examples of yardstick competition within existing systems, in contrast, 
are rather scarce and in most cases limited by enormous sunk costs. Assume, 
for example, that one country ‘invents’ superior rail tracks or installs an 
improved electrification system. The costs for other countries to apply these 
innovations – given the enormous investments in the existing stock – are 
prohibitively high. Furthermore, the innovation would particularly hinder the 
completion of the internal market, as the application would increase barriers. 
Additionally, one could argue that most of the competition takes place in the 
private market. What would be needed, in contrast, is more coordination and 
harmonised European procedures instead of national solutions. 
171  For instance, some member states have voiced scepticism about a European competence for railway passenger 
markets (austrian Federal Economic chamber 2013; Belgium Ministry of Foreign affairs 2013). However, 
they only pick up specific items and do not refer to freight transport.
172  while this argument could in principle be raised for all policy fields, the specific circumstances of railway 
transportation lead us to the following conclusion: Of course, there is the chance for standards to be 
 recognised, and member states may negotiate on a best practise solution. in fact, however, a central standard 
must be decided on, which also implies defining a path towards the implementation of this standard. Given 
the amount of transition costs, member states will maintain their current positions. a European competence 
could set standards and compensation more easily while focusing on the overall picture.
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Concerning the risk of a race to the bottom, safety and environmental standards, 
in particular, could erode if a purely national competence were assigned. 
However, since these standards are already strongly regulated, it is question-
able whether a reallocation to the national level would imply that standards 
would erode. 
Taken together, there are only limited arguments for potential merits from 
‘yardstick competition’ , meaning that a European solution does not seem to 
hamper important policy innovations. Similar arguments can be made 
regarding a possible ‘race to the bottom’ , meaning that the threat of eroding 
standards seems to be less severe than it is with other policy fields. We there-
fore assign an indifferent score equal to 3.
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APPenDix
Spillover Effects
Table 1:  
cost and benefit shares for the computation of spillover effects in transport policy
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
= (2) / (3)
(5)  
= (1) * ((100 
– (4))  / 100)
(6) 
Costs 
(national)
(7) 
Costs 
(eU)
(8) 
Benefits
country rail KM Track 
access 
charge
External 
costs
cost  
coverage 
ratio
costs  
railway 
provision
adj. costs 
railway 
provision
Financing 
of EU 
budget
domestic 
traffic  
(in tonnes)
(share %) (€) (€) (share %) (share %) (share %) (share %) (share %)
austria 1.6 3.26 6.4 50.94 0.80 1.14 2.43 5.15
Belgium 2.1 2.37 6.7 35.37 1.39 1.99 3.16 3.51
Bulgaria 1.9 2.36 16.3 14.48 1.61 2.31 0.34 0.73
croatia - - - - - - 0.18 0.54
cyprus - - - - - - 0.14 -
czech rep. 5.2 3.39 8.5 39.88 3.14 4.49 1.16 4.83
denmark 0.7 0.5 7.2 6.94 0.61 0.87 2.10 0.12
Estonia 0.7 4.63 6.1 75.90 0.17 0.25 0.15 2.88
Finland 3.0 1.85 4.6 40.22 1.77 2.54 1.63 2.27
France 9.8 1.6 7.1 22.54 7.57 10.83 17.59 5.35
Germany 13.8 2.68 9.3 28.82 9.84 14.08 21.00 22.61
Greece 1.0 1.11 13.4 8.28 0.94 1.34 1.44 0.15
Hungary 4.5 2.12 10.9 19.45 3.60 5.15 0.74 2.42
ireland 0.8 9.8 32.1 30.53 0.56 0.80 1.22 0.04
italy 8.1 2.45 5.2 47.12 4.28 6.13 12.66 5.71
latvia 0.7 9.97 6.8 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 3.61
lituania 0.7 7.14 8.2 87.07 0.09 0.13 0.28 2.40
luxembourg 0.2 0.86 19.3 4.46 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.35
Malta - - - - - - 0.06 -
netherlands 1.0 2.46 7.9 31.14 0.69 0.99 3.81 2.31
poland 12.6 3 10.4 28.85 8.94 12.79 3.08 14.69
portugal 0.8 1.19 12.6 9.44 0.77 1.10 1.35 0.63
romania 6.7 3.32 13.1 25.34 5.00 7.16 0.57 3.57
Slovak. rep. 1.2 2.75 14 19.64 0.97 1.39 1.10 2.02
Slovenia 0.7 1 6.4 15.63 0.61 0.88 0.30 0.88
Spain 6.4 0.13 8.2 1.59 6.33 9.06 8.34 1.60
Sweden 5.2 0.63 2.6 24.23 3.95 5.65 3.03 4.20
UK 10.5 1.93 4.6 41.96 6.07 8.68 11.67 7.43
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Economies of scale
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Figure  15:
Maintenance expenditures per rail kilometre in relation to total rail kilometres (mean figures 2008–2011)
Source: Own computation based on OECD and Eurostat. Missing information for Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Malta, Romania, Spain and the UK. A logarithmic function is calculated to detect the best fit.
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Xiv. Case Study 8: 
 Unemployment insurance
introduction
It is a classical prescription of fiscal federalism that the responsibility for 
macroeconomic stabilisation should be assigned to a federation’s central level 
(Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972). The basic argument is that stimulating macro-
economic measures leak out into neighbouring jurisdictions, which renders 
sub-central stabilisation measures ineffective. These problems are particularly 
severe if sub-central jurisdictions are open and do not have an independent 
monetary policy and a flexible exchange-rate system at their disposal.
Discussions about the need for a common stabilisation system for Europe date 
back to the 1970s, starting with the Marjolin Report (Commission of the European 
Communities 1975) and the MacDougall Reports (European Commission 1977a, 
1977b). These reports argued that, with intensified integration, countries become 
more open and must work together more closely for macroeconomic stabilisa-
tion. Furthermore, it is not surprising that ideas for European stabilisation 
schemes have become even more prominent for the EU with the introduction of 
the euro. With the monetary union, the classical fiscal federalism case for central 
stabilisation schemes has been reinforced. Proponents of European stabilisation 
schemes also point out that countries’ leeway in terms of expenditures is 
restricted by rules on the European level, such as the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Stability and Growth Pact and, recently, the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, numerous 
euro area countries have experienced severe limits in their access to capital 
markets in the crisis years following 2010. Thus, the use of fiscal counter-cyclical 
measures, such as raising expenditures or cutting taxes, may be limited or even 
impossible (see, e.g., Meyer 2014; Dullien 2014; Del Monte and Zandstra 2014; De 
Grauwe and Ji 2013; ECORYS, CPB and IFO 2008).173
Of course, the case for a more developed European stabilisation system is 
not as clear-cut as it may seem at first glance, even under the conditions of 
the EMU. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas has always stressed that 
flexible labour markets, adjustable prices and wages, and enhanced labour 
mobility can and should compensate for a fixed exchange rate. Thus, it should 
be an economic policy priority to improve the effectiveness of these alterna-
tive adjustment instruments, which, like labour mobility, have functioned well 
so far for the US, but not for the EU (Allard et al. 2013). Moreover, there might 
be a trade-off between European stabilisation and structural reforms if stabi-
lisation schemes induce a moral hazard problem, that is, if it reduces the need 
to address rigidities at the national level.
Against this ambivalent perspective on European stabilisation schemes, 
we analyse the possible suitability of a European Unemployment Insurance 
(EUI) as a potential new task for the European level. An EUI would shift some 
of the responsibility for providing the unemployed with income protection 
173  The best response to the economic cycle, especially to downturns, is highly debated among economists. 
There is no consensus on whether to implement pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical measures. For our analysis, we 
assume that anti-cyclical measures are needed to achieve stabilisation. For pro-cyclical arguments, the 
interested reader is referred to, e.g., lucas (1987 and 2003) as well as asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996); 
for anti-cyclical arguments, to, e.g., aghion and Howitt (2006) and aghion, Hemous and Kharroubi (2014). 
a good review of the link between the type of intervention and fiscal policy can be found in Manasse (2006) 
and alesina, campate and Tabellini (2008).
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to the European level, and has become prominent in the debate on more 
European stabilisation (see, e.g., Dullien and Fichtner 2012; Dullien 2014; 
Dolls et al. 2015). 
The rising amount of attention being paid to an EUI can also be attributed 
to the severe labour market problems seen since the outbreak of the financial 
and euro area debt crises. Since 2008, the euro area has experienced an overall 
rise in unemployment. As is depicted in Figure 1, the overall unemployment 
rate rose between 2008 and 2013 by about 5 percentage points. The increase is 
even more dramatic when looking at youth unemployment, which has increased 
by about 9 percentage points in this same period. 
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Figure  1:
Average unemployment rates in the euro area (EA) over time
Source: Eurostat.
An increase in unemployment results in lower or unstable household incomes 
and, in addition, to a higher financial burden for governments due to an increase 
in the expenditures for unemployment insurances. This may further accelerate 
a vicious circle of deteriorating government finances, falling real economic 
activities and a destabilising financial system. The establishment and activa-
tion of automatic stabilisers, such as through an EUI, might help to stem the 
negative effects from an exogenous shock which might hit countries asymmet-
rically.174 Hence, an EUI is scrutinised as a potential new European task.
174  automatic stabilisers are instruments in fiscal policy that automatically come into play to mitigate 
 fluctuations in the output due to economic shocks. The most important measures are, for example, 
 progressive income tax schedules with high marginal tax rates or unemployment insurance systems 
 (auerbach and  Feenberg 2000). Furthermore, besides the considered example of the EUi, different new 
 concepts with a  focus on the euro area have evolved recently, such as a smoothing of cyclical shocks 
 (Enderlein,  Guttenberg and Spiess 2013) or a European reinsurance system for national unemployment 
insurances (Beblavý, Gros and Maselli 2015). in general, automatic stabilisers should buffer both economic 
downturns and boom phases. Their implementation should be timely, targeted and temporary to unfold the 
advantages over standard fiscal policies (Elmendorf and Furman 2008). discretionary actions are inherently 
slower and often too late due to political decision-making processes (auerbach and Feenberg 2000).
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Status quo
An unemployment insurance, which stabilises income during times of unem-
ployment, is a typical and essential passive labour market instrument. It is 
largely assigned to the national level of EU countries at present. Systems 
across member states are diverse while sharing some common features (Del 
Monte and Zandstra 2014; Esser et al. 2013). Member states are currently free 
to choose how to design their system and define its elements (e.g. contribu-
tion rates and paid benefits). The EU has legislated regulations to ensure 
minimum standards within national systems. For example, an early regula-
tion (EEC 1408/71) had set rules for social security schemes for persons and 
their families moving within the community. Furthermore, a more recent 
regulation (EC 883/2004) has defined rules for the coordination of social secu-
rity systems, with a particular focus on the free movement across member 
states. It is important to note that these European rules have so far primarily 
served to protect the interests of workers who are mobile within the internal 
market, and that these rules do not transfer significant unemployment insur-
ance competences from the national to the European level. In particular, 
these European rules do not interfere with national rules on, for example, 
the level or duration of benefits (European Commission 2013). In the context 
of the intensified policy coordination through the European Semester, 
member states increasingly also receive advice on their employment policies 
and welfare state systems, with the focus being on fostering smart and inclu-
sive sustainable growth in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. However, these 
recommendations are a non-binding element of soft coordination, and they 
do respect the national sovereignty over these policy fields. 
To conclude, there has hardly been any significant evolution so far towards a 
unitary EUI, and member states have kept a large degree of autonomy to define 
and reform their national systems, which have large systematic differences among 
themselves. However, the EU sets certain general rules which are supposed to 
ensure minimum standards and mostly deal with cross-border issues.175
Counterfactual situation
The counterfactual situation is defined as an EUI which serves as an auto-
matic stabiliser and covers a certain group of unemployed. We concentrate 
on an EUI for euro area countries, as the case for a European stabilisation 
system is strongest for the members of the monetary union. 
Over time, several proposals have been made on EUI variants, but no such 
system has been introduced so far.176 For example, in 1993, the European 
Commission discussed a shock absorber which was supposed to be based on 
an unemployment insurance system. In 2012, the European Commission, the 
European Council and the European Parliament released separate reports 
calling for an updated architecture of the monetary union which also included 
a stabilisation measure (Del Monte and Zandstra 2014). In 2013, the European 
Commission (2013) proposed a common system with a coverage rate of 75 per 
175  The dutch subsidiarity assessment concludes that there is no need for further centralisation or harmonisa-
tion, and that the current system of generally independent national insurances should be maintained (see 
Ministry of Foreign affairs 2013).
176  For an overview, see Beblavý and Maselli (2014).
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cent and a replacement rate of 50 per cent for one year of unemployment. 
Eligibility rules would be the same across all countries. 
In what follows, we will outline the most important features of an EUI for 
the euro area, which we chose as our counterfactual. Our starting point is the 
model by Dullien (2014), which we enhance with additional components. 
The EUI:
•	 insures only short-term unemployment up to a certain threshold 
(e.g. up to one year);
•	 should not replace national unemployment schemes, but guarantees 
a basic insurance for short-term unemployment only;
•	 should set a trigger which is only activated when the number of 
short-term unemployed exceeds the normal/average level to prevent 
the coverage of, e.g., regular seasonal unemployment (see Fernandes 
and Maslauskaite 2013; Beblavý and Maselli 2014);
•	 should not lower the overall level or generosity of transfers in the 
European Union;
•	 should not lead to permanent transfers between economically/
financially stronger and weaker states; 
•	 buffers asymmetric shocks, but should not ensure equal living 
standards in all participating countries; 
•	 does not need to be balanced in each year but over a longer time 
horizon; over time, each country’s expected net benefits should be zero;
•	 stabilises across space (member states) and time (years);
•	 provides payments to the unemployed in crisis countries while boom 
countries, in turn, would pay into the system (Meyer 2014);
•	 respects that national systems will continue to insure the long-term 
unemployed; and
•	 respects that national systems can top up the basic system introduced 
on the European level.
Overview
Score Description
Spillover effects
   5 in a world with open and entangled economies, countries may be tempted to rely on the stabilisation efforts of others as they will benefit partially without bearing the costs. we test whether these 
possibilities are stronger under the current national system or with an EUi. By comparing the costs 
and benefits of each country, we find that free riding is reduced with the introduction of an EUi.
Economies of scale
 3 Economies of scale could appear in the administrative part of the EUi, as a bigger entity might 
be able to save costs in supplying the same service. Unfortunately, there is no data available to 
compute economies of scale. Thus, we must rely on anecdotal evidence. The literature suggests 
hardly any economies of scale. as our counterfactual situation implies a mixed system with existing 
national insurances and an additional European part, there seems to be no scope for realising 
economies of scale.
Preference heterogeneity
 4 we analyse whether national unemployment insurance systems are similar across member states 
using the revealed preferences approach. The analysis indicates that, according to our four measures, 
the schemes are pretty similar in some characteristics and less homogeneous in others. Taken 
together, our analyses show that preferences are homogeneous enough that a European competence 
could generally enhance the national unemployment systems.
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ployment, is a typical and essential passive labour market instrument. It is 
largely assigned to the national level of EU countries at present. Systems 
across member states are diverse while sharing some common features (Del 
Monte and Zandstra 2014; Esser et al. 2013). Member states are currently free 
to choose how to design their system and define its elements (e.g. contribu-
tion rates and paid benefits). The EU has legislated regulations to ensure 
minimum standards within national systems. For example, an early regula-
tion (EEC 1408/71) had set rules for social security schemes for persons and 
their families moving within the community. Furthermore, a more recent 
regulation (EC 883/2004) has defined rules for the coordination of social secu-
rity systems, with a particular focus on the free movement across member 
states. It is important to note that these European rules have so far primarily 
served to protect the interests of workers who are mobile within the internal 
market, and that these rules do not transfer significant unemployment insur-
ance competences from the national to the European level. In particular, 
these European rules do not interfere with national rules on, for example, 
the level or duration of benefits (European Commission 2013). In the context 
of the intensified policy coordination through the European Semester, 
member states increasingly also receive advice on their employment policies 
and welfare state systems, with the focus being on fostering smart and inclu-
sive sustainable growth in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. However, these 
recommendations are a non-binding element of soft coordination, and they 
do respect the national sovereignty over these policy fields. 
To conclude, there has hardly been any significant evolution so far towards a 
unitary EUI, and member states have kept a large degree of autonomy to define 
and reform their national systems, which have large systematic differences among 
themselves. However, the EU sets certain general rules which are supposed to 
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tion, and that the current system of generally independent national insurances should be maintained (see 
Ministry of Foreign affairs 2013).
176  For an overview, see Beblavý and Maselli (2014).
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Internal market consistency
 3 Our analysis reveals potential impediments to the internal market in cases when national systems 
would hamper the free movement of persons and thereby labour. we find that this potential threat 
to the internal market is already resolved by several regulations imposed by the European Union, 
although some flaws still exist. Thus, shifting the current division of competences more towards the 
European Union would not add considerably to a better functioning internal market. 
Competition
 4 Both yardstick competition and the race to the bottom are analysed. Existing evidence suggests that 
the threat of a race to the bottom is unlikely in the case of a European system, while it is more likely 
in the case of national competences. However, empirical evidence points to the merits of system 
competition when member states are responsible. while accounting for this limitations, our results 
slightly point to benefits from a more centralised solution on the euro area level.
Further information
SPilloveR eFFeCtS
Methodology and data source
Spillover effects might arise when the costs and benefits of a policy diverge, 
and when countries face low incentives to invest in a European public good 
because they can join it freely. An unemployment system provides the public 
good of macroeconomic stabilisation, as it stabilises the income of private 
households affected by unemployment. This, in turn, stabilises aggregate 
domestic consumption with positive cross-border spillover effects through 
trade channels. The smaller and more open an economy is, the lower the 
incentives are to engage in stabilisation efforts as a large fraction might 
result in higher imports, which benefits trading partners most.177 At the same 
time, the costs of the fiscal intervention must not be borne by the national 
government alone. Thus, stabilisation can be seen as a public good which 
generates external effects. The standard prediction is an under-provision of 
the public good ‘stabilisation’ when governments rationally trade off 
(national) costs against (national) benefits and disregard pan-European 
effects. With increasing European integration, this problem might even be 
aggravated, as countries will rely more heavily on trade with other countries, 
which makes them even more open (Dullien 2014). In addition, Von Hagen 
and Pisani-Ferry (2002) argue that, with enhanced market integration (e.g. 
the European internal market), spillover effects arise and may hold states 
back from introducing fiscal policies to ensure stability as some part of the 
stabilisation effect crosses borders. In addition, Maselli and Beblavý (2015) 
also give reasons for the existence of spillover effects in the presence of 
economic integration, arguing, for example, that national policies are less 
effective at stabilisation since some part of it crosses the borders due to 
increased imports. Weyerstrass et al. (2006) emphasise that the existing 
interdependence coming from the common currency and the shared mone-
tary policy calls for more coordinated economic policy.
Nevertheless, an EUI may also encourage a specific type of free riding. 
States will have fewer incentives to invest in structural reforms to bring down 
unemployment when a large share of the unemployed is paid by the Union. 
177  For example, European commission (2009) argues that austria relied heavily on the stabilisation efforts of 
other countries in 2009. 
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Exactly this mechanism needs to be taken into account when setting up a 
European solution by restricting the redistribution component and estab-
lishing the possibility to take loans. Thus, this kind of free riding might be 
avoided by designing an appropriate mechanism. One good example is the 
US unemployment scheme, which is located at both the national and the 
subnational levels. In this system, every state can borrow from the federal 
fund to stabilise incomes without free riding on the contributions of others. 
The loans need to be repaid. In addition, contribution rates are automatically 
raised whenever a state does not repay the loans (European Commission 2013). 
Subsequently, we test the possibilities that euro area countries could free 
ride on the stabilisation effort of others in both the national and the European 
case. The idea is to analyse which country profits most from an overall 
increase in spending for stabilisation and compare it to the financial efforts 
that were taken. We exploit the fact that the EU launched the European 
Economic Recovery Plan in 2009 to fight the financial and economic crisis 
by initiating coordinated fiscal actions. The total sum amounted to about 
€200 billion (1.5% of the EU’s GDP), with 15 per cent coming from the EU and 
the bigger part (ca. 85%) being provided by the member states. In addition, 
measures were taken to promote smart investments, such as ones to promote 
green technologies (European Commission 2008). In general, member states 
were responsible for planning, implementing and financing appropriate 
measures. Then the question is whether and how much a single country 
benefits from its own additional effort and from those of all the others. 
National costs are approximated by using information on national fiscal 
packages implemented in 2009 in the course of the European Economic 
Recovery Plan. The OECD provides data on the size of the packages for the 
years 2008 to 2010 as a percentage of 2008 GDP (OECD 2009). In addition, the 
distribution of the measures over the three years is given in per cent. Thus, 
by multiplying the numbers with the 2008 GDP level, we obtain the level of 
each country’s investment in 2009 in absolute figures (in euros). We then 
sum up the values of all the packages and compute each country’s share of 
the euro area total. Unfortunately, we lack some information, especially for 
non-OECD countries.
For the counterfactual situation of a common EUI, the national contribu-
tions are taken from EUI simulations conducted by Dolls et al. (2015).178 To 
approximate a country’s contribution level, we take the average between 
2000 and 2013 to account for the fact that the contribution is sensitive to the 
chosen year and the current economic situation in every country. By defini-
tion, every country needs to contribute to this fund depending on its current 
economic situation. 
The benefit shares for both cases are measured as a country’s share of all 
intra-euro-area exports in 2014. Data on trade between all euro area member 
states is provided by the World Bank and was aggregated by us.179 To obtain 
values in euros instead of US dollars, all numbers are converted using the 
average exchange rate from 2014 supplied by the ECB.180 Since we do not have 
information for Cyprus and Lithuania, we exclude these countries from our 
analysis. We assume that this export share is a reasonable indicator for the 
178  we refer to the basic scenario. For detailed information on the exact setup, see dolls et al. (2015).
179  http://wits.worldbank.org/countryprofile/en/country/nld/Year/2014/TradeFlow/Export/partner/ESp/
product/all-groups.
180  www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html.
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benefits from euro area stabilisation efforts, as it shows how much a euro 
area member country benefits from an increase in euro area trade following 
a stabilisation measure.
We subtract the costs of the fiscal packages from the realised benefits to 
detect potential free riding. We then calculate standard errors for both 
scenarios and compare changes in the standard deviation to measure changes 
in spillover effects.
 
Results
The results from our spillover analysis are shown in Figure 2. The blue bars 
represent the national scenario, while the red bars represent the euro area 
scenario. In general, a negative value indicates that a country has higher 
expenses compared to the realised benefits. However, this does not mean 
that their stabilisation effort did not have any positive effect, as one could 
conclude from the German case. Even though the indicator is negative, it is 
undisputable that Germany benefitted strongly from its own stabilisation 
investments.181 In fact, the focus is on the comparison between the invested 
share of money and the realised gains, always compared to all other euro 
area countries. In the national case, this is especially true for Germany and 
Spain. Even though Germany has the largest share of euro area exports, it 
also bears the biggest part of stabilisation efforts, which exceeds the bene-
fits. In contrast, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and, to a smaller 
degree, Greece have realised higher benefits compared to their stabilisation 
costs. The results reflect that countries which suffered the most during the 
crisis more often realised net benefits. This is due to the small volume of 
fiscal packages in these countries compared to others since financial capac-
ities are low.
When an EUI is introduced, in many cases, costs and benefits seem to be 
more in line than before. The crisis-struck countries Greece, Ireland and Italy 
have experienced much smaller net benefits owing to a more equal distribu-
tion of the financial burden. The net burden of Germany and Spain went down 
moderately or to a high degree. Some countries (e.g. Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Slovakia) have not experienced any change in result. However, we 
can prove that introducing an EUI could have reduced the free riding of euro 
area countries.
The standard deviation is reduced by 47 per cent, indicating that the costs 
and benefits would be more aligned in the case of euro area competence than 
in that of national competence. Therefore, we assign a score of 5, which under-
lines the merits of shifting competences for an EUI to the euro area level.
181  detailed information on all indicators is given in Table 1 in the appendix.
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net benefit (in per cent) = benefit share - cost share  
euro area responsibility national responsibility
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Figure  2:
Free riding on others’ stabilisation efforts (in per cent)
Sources: World Bank, ECB, OECD, Dolls et al. 2015. Own calculation and representation. Data missing for Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Slovenia.
Economies of scale
Economies of scale arise when a greater entity can supply the same output 
at lower cost or a higher output at the same cost. Applied to employment 
policy, the unemployment insurance would be provided more efficiently by 
a centralised European solution than by the national systems. 
Regarding potential cost savings in the administration or distribution of 
benefits to the unemployed, there seems to be consensus that there is no 
scope for economies of scale (see, e.g., ECORYS, CPB and IFO 2008). The authors 
find some economies of scale for monetary policy due to economic integra-
tion, though this isn’t the focus of the present study. Dekker et al. (2003) 
argue that potential cost savings may arise due to enhanced risk-sharing and 
the removal of institutional barriers. However, there is no quantitative analysis 
to approximate the level of cost savings.
Dullien (2014) reasons that no additional institutions should be built on 
the European level as this would undermine their acceptance. Furthermore, 
there are already-functioning administrations in member states which should 
be used. Thus, one would need to establish a system which heavily relies on 
the existing structures with minimal additional EU institutions. This is in 
line with our counterfactual situation, which combines existing national 
unemployment insurances with an EUI on top. However, establishing a new, 
albeit small unit on the European level would imply additional costs. But 
compared to the high number of beneficiaries across Europe, these additional 
costs per capita seem to be negligible. 
To sum up, our counterfactual implies that under a mixed system – of 
continuing national unemployment insurance and a supplementing EUI – no 
economies of scale would materialise. All administrative costs associated 
with the national system would continue to exist. Thus, we assign a score of 
3 to indicate that there would be no economics of scale with a EUI, and that 
costs could even increase.
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PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity
To determine the potential heterogeneity of preferences of euro area citizens 
concerning unemployment insurance programmes, we rely on a system analysis 
of specific key variables of the national unemployment insurances, including 
the duration, eligibility, coverage rate and replacement rate.182 To detect revealed 
preferences, this analysis assumes that voters elect the politician or party which 
offers the most preferable bundle of policies to the voters – in our case, the 
design of the unemployment insurance. Thus, by studying realised policies, we 
may indirectly infer the preferences of national voters. In the end, national 
outcomes will be compared to key findings from other member states.
Data source 
Our research is based on the following three databases: We consulted the 
EU’s Mutual Information System on Social Protection, which offers a database 
called MISSOC. We use information on the eligibility criteria and the duration 
of the payment of unemployment benefits.183 The information is updated 
twice a year by officials in the national ministries or institutions; we were 
able to use information from the latest update (July 2015). The Social Insur-
ance Entitlements Dataset (SIED), which is part of the Social Policy Indica-
tors database (SPIN) of the University of Stockholm, provides us with 
information about the national coverage rates.184 Although the data was 
recently updated (in December 2015), the latest data refers to the year 2010. 
However, throughout the last three decades, the coverage rate has proved to 
be stable, with only minimal fluctuations over time. The net replacement 
rate is drawn from a database called ‘Benefits and Wages: Statistics’ from 
2014, which is published by the OECD.185
Methodology 
For a standardised analysis, we always refer to a single average worker (aged 50 
years or younger) with no children to guarantee comparability throughout the 
countries. In addition, this avoids potential conflicts with family policy and early 
retirement programmes. Furthermore, we focus on short-term unemployment 
benefits; in particular, we merely consider the period before the first reduction 
in payments kicks in. This is our approximation for short-term unemployment 
benefits when there is no clear distinction in the national system. The technical 
details are explained in the Appendix.
The analysis is restricted to the euro area countries which would be part of a 
common unemployment insurance system. Nevertheless, including all EU 
member states gives similar results. 
182  information on the definition of the four criteria is given in the appendix.
183  http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langid=en&catid=815.
184  http://spin.su.se/datasets/sied.
185  http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm.
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Results 
The results of our system analysis are illustrated in two different ways: First, 
we look at network graphics to judge the level of homogeneity across coun-
tries. Second, we underpin the results with a more formal analysis using 
box-and-whisker plots.
The network graphics display our four indicator variables in a clear way, 
which makes it easy to compare the levels across countries. Each member 
state is alphabetically arranged around the circle. In Figure 3, the inner circles 
represent either 0 to 100 per cent (left figure) or 0 to 120 weeks (right figure). 
Small numbers are located near the circle’s middle, while greater numbers 
are located at the outer edges. If the design of national unemployment insur-
ances would be similar in the single indicators, the graphs would display 
smooth lines without many spikes. This is independent of the ordering of the 
countries and the exact level of the variables. The most homogeneous indicator 
seems to be the duration of benefit payments, which generally hovers at 
around 20 weeks. The coverage rate is similar across countries, too. The sole 
exceptions are Ireland and Greece, the outliers at the top. Thus, preferences 
seem to be similar when it comes to these two indicators. The net replace-
ment rate fluctuates more between countries, including outliers at the bottom. 
The most heterogeneous characteristic is the contribution period required to 
be eligible to receive unemployment benefits. Here, countries do not seem to 
have coinciding preferences. 
AT
BE
CY
DE
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
IEIT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PT
SI
SK
coverage rate
(per cent)
replacement rate
(per cent)
contribution period (weeks) duration (weeks)
80
100
0
20
40
60
AT
BE
CY
DE
EE
ES
FI
FR
GR
IEIT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
PT
SI
SK
80
100
120
0
40
60
20
Figure  3:
Network graphic on unemployment insurance characteristics
Sources: European Commission (2015), The Swedish Institute for Social Research (2010), OECD (2014). 
Data missing for Cyprus (replacement rate). Own calculation and representation.
A box-and-whisker plot consists of several parts indicating specific statistical 
information. The coloured box represents the data between the first and third 
quartiles, which is 50 per cent of all data points. In addition, the line inside the 
box depicts the median. The lines (whiskers) outside the box represent data 
points which deviate from the data inside the box, though only slightly. 
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Remarkable outliers are represented by single dots. Figure 4 shows the box-and-
whisker plots for all four indicators of the unemployment system. The duration 
of benefits (right figure) is by far the most homogenous across countries as the 
box is fairly small, meaning that 50 per cent of the data is concentrated within 
a small range. The boxes for the coverage rate (left figure), the net replacement 
rate (left figure) and the contribution rate (right figure) are broader, indicating 
that data points are less close together. The displayed outliers support our find-
ings from the previous graphical analysis. The whiskers are fairly large for 
three indicators (coverage, replacement, contribution) and non-existent for the 
duration period. To conclude, our analysis reveals that about half of the euro 
area countries exhibit similar levels of the indicators, which speaks in favour 
of homogeneity. Nevertheless, some outliers or at least deviations from the 
average are observed, as well. This reveals some level of homogeneity across 
the unemployment systems of euro area countries.
The different figures show that there is quite some variation across countries 
when analysing key characteristics of the national unemployment insurance 
systems. But looking into the graphs in more detail reveals that, in many 
cases, the characteristics of a majority of countries seem to be similar, while 
there are some outliers which drive the results. Interestingly, some indica-
tors are more homogenous (the duration of benefit payments and the coverage 
rate), while others are fairly heterogeneous (the contribution period and 
replacement rate). The findings from our system analysis are partially in line 
with what other studies have found for all EU countries (see, e.g., Esser et al. 
2013; Del Monte and Zandstra 2014; European Commission 2013; and a study 
by the European Commission cited in ECORYS, CPB and IFO 2008). In addition, 
Dekker et al. (2003) find that the spread in expenditures for social security 
systems decreased between 1981 and 1998. 
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Figure  4:
Box-and-whisker plots for unemployment insurance characteristics
Source: European Commission (2015), The Swedish Institute for Social Research (2010), OECD (2014). 
Data missing for Cyprus (replacement rate). Own calculation and representation.
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
195
Overall results
The revealed preferences from our system analysis show that there is still 
heterogeneity in the design of national unemployment insurances. However, 
if countries agree on a common basic insurance which can be nationally 
expanded, greater homogeneity in basic coverage could be achieved (Dullien 
and Fichtner 2012). The supranational insurance would then only cover the 
most basic needs and periods of short-term unemployment. One may also 
note that the basic design of insurances is often similar with regard to the 
dual character, means of funding, or active labour market policies (Del Monte 
and Zandstra 2014). 
To sum up, we assign a score of 4 obtained from the system analysis. Thus, 
we assume that the preferences of euro area citizens are sufficiently homoge-
neous for a European solution to be supported by a majority of them.
inteRnAl mARKet ConSiStenCy
The internal market should ensure a free flow of goods, persons, services 
and capital. Concerning unemployment insurance, it is important to inves-
tigate whether the current distribution of competences is an impediment to 
this guideline. In general, the internal market may foster labour mobility 
and increase well-being due to the removal of institutional barriers (Dekker 
et al. 2003). However, one may think of a reduced mobility among workers 
when their social security contributions cannot be transferred across borders, 
which would make them worse off in times of unemployment. This would 
prevent an efficient allocation of workers across Europe. Having identified 
this potential threat to the internal market, one must investigate whether it 
can be resolved through national coordination or whether it is already fixed 
by, for example, a European regulation.
In 2004, Regulation (EC) 883/2004 was legislated for the purpose of coordi-
nating social security systems. The regulation explicitly states that these 
“rules for coordination of national security systems fall within the frame-
work of free movement of persons” (European Parliament 2004: 2). It is an 
updated and an enlarged version of Regulation (EEC) 1408/71 from 1972, which 
was introduced “to ensure equivalent treatment and protection of social 
security benefits of all EU workers, irrespective of current residence in the 
EU and the employment” (European Commission 2013: 8). The regulation 
states that all periods of employment in one member state must be taken 
into account when a person moves to any other EU member state. Thus, when 
a person becomes unemployed, the current state of residence needs to treat 
all periods under the other insurance system equally as if it were completed 
in the system of the current state. Moving to another member state is facil-
itated by ensuring that previously paid contributions and times of employ-
ment are credited and do not get lost. Additionally, persons are encouraged 
to move to another member state to search for a job since they will receive 
their unemployment benefits from the previous state of residence for another 
three months (and it may even be extended for up to six months). Further-
more, the regulation determines several organisational issues, such as the 
institution responsible for claims (European Commission 2013; European 
Parliament 2004). In general, it is oriented to both the ‘equal treatment 
principle’ and the ‘principle of aggregation of periods’ (European Parliament 
2004). However, one must note that the application of these rules is more 
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replacement rate). The findings from our system analysis are partially in line 
with what other studies have found for all EU countries (see, e.g., Esser et al. 
2013; Del Monte and Zandstra 2014; European Commission 2013; and a study 
by the European Commission cited in ECORYS, CPB and IFO 2008). In addition, 
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Figure  4:
Box-and-whisker plots for unemployment insurance characteristics
Source: European Commission (2015), The Swedish Institute for Social Research (2010), OECD (2014). 
Data missing for Cyprus (replacement rate). Own calculation and representation.
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complicated in practice, as unemployed individuals need to ask for permis-
sion to transfer their benefits to another country. Moreover, the permission 
is only valid for one country, so moving to yet another European country 
requires another new form and application. Thus, even though hurdles to 
mobility have been reduced theoretically, there are still some impediments 
in the practical application (European Commission 2016).
To sum up, from a regulatory point of view, there seems to be no imped-
iment to the mobility of labour anymore. Moreover, enhanced mobility may 
secure incomes and contributes to more stabilisation in times of economic 
struggles. Thus, the current distribution of competences (national with basic 
EU guidelines) seems to be sufficient to ensure the functioning of the internal 
market (see, e.g., Del Monte and Zandstra 2014). Following the results of our 
analysis, we assign a score of 3 to this criterion, as the status quo is already 
highly consistent with the free mobility of workers.
ComPetition
The competition criterion analyses whether there is the threat of a race to 
the bottom or gains induced by yardstick competition. Both aspects are 
discussed below.
Concerning the threat of a race to the bottom, in the case of a uniform 
European unemployment scheme, some commentators worry that countries 
with previously high standards and generous systems might cut back to the 
supposedly lower European level. If this were to happen, the European 
system would not help to stabilise incomes and the economy, but would 
rather contribute to destabilisation (Dullien 2014). However, the working 
hours directive from 1993 might actually lead to the opposite scenario. It 
introduced a guideline for the maximum number of working hours per week 
and a minimum level of paid vacation. An inspection of the average weekly 
hours worked shows that the amount fell by about 1.6 per cent between 2000 
and 2006 (Morley et al. 2010). In addition, analysing the development of more 
recent data shows that the average number of weekly hours worked (including 
paid and unpaid extra hours for full-time workers) was about 41.7 in 2008 
and slightly lower in 2015 (41.4 hours). The maximum is always around 45 
hours per week, which is below the legal maximum of 48 hours per week 
(Eurostat 2016). Thus, there is no evidence that the maximum amount has 
led to an increase in the hours worked due to the regulation. As Dullien 
(2014) argues, a European system is assumed to be a support for social 
security in Europe instead of being the reason for a race to the bottom 
between countries.
In addition, there is also the fear of a race to the bottom in the case of 
national responsibilities, as countries might try to cut back unemployment 
benefits to be less attractive to unemployed persons or those with a high 
risk of becoming unemployed. This could result in social dumping (Fernandes 
and Maslauskaite 2013). In addition, a race to the bottom may occur 
 inadvertently, as states are more eager to cut back social security expenses 
in times of economic struggles, which would contribute to destabilisation 
(Del Monte and Zandstra 2014). Other instruments are often not available, 
as members of the euro area cannot, for example, adjust their exchange rate 
to be more competitive. Thus, cutting back social security expenses is often 
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an on-hand instrument with few alternatives.186 Furthermore, critics argue 
that states might refuse to implement necessary structural reforms to fight 
unemployment. But this argument is weak, as only short-term unemploy-
ment would be insured on the European level, while structural and long-term 
unemployment would still be up to the individual state. Thus, it should be 
in their own interest to implement reforms (Dullien 2014).
A positive effect could be triggered by yardstick competition, meaning 
that states experiment with different systems and learn from each other in 
the case of national competences. A fruitful competition among countries 
for the best unemployment benefit system would speak in favour of national 
competences and against a centralised organisation. Anecdotal evidence on 
yardstick competition on labour market policies in general and unemploy-
ment systems in particular is rich. The history of labour market reform in 
Europe is full of examples in which certain member states have acted as 
reform pioneers (e.g. the United Kingdom in the 1980s, the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands in the 1990s, or Germany in the 2000s, with 
the so-called Hartz reforms). These reform examples have been highly 
controversial, but they have clearly influenced the reform discussions and 
decisions of other countries. Right now, for example, efforts to introduce 
modest labour market liberalisation in countries like France and Italy have 
clearly been influenced by the strong performance of the German labour 
market following the labour and unemployment-benefits reforms imple-
mented since 2003. Thus, we conclude that yardstick competition has a 
particularly high potential for labour market policies. 
After having revised both effects, it seems that a race to the bottom is 
more likely to occur in the case of national competences than in the European 
scenario. However, there is also rich evidence for system competition among 
member states, which would speak in favour of national competences. Intro-
ducing an EUI which respects national independence seems to be best in 
terms of competition. Consequently, we assign a score of 4 to acknowledge 
the merits of a European competence. 
186  Evidence on how states have adjusted their unemployment benefit systems since 2007 can be found in  
del Monte and Zandstra (2014). 
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APPenDix
Spillover Effects 
Table 1:  
indices for costs and benefits (in per cent)
Country iSo Benefits 
nat. and 
euro Area 
(Share of 
euro Area 
exports)
Costs National 
(Share of Fiscal 
Packages) 
Costs euro 
Area 
(Share of 
Average 
Projected 
Costs)
Benefit-Cost- 
Difference 
National
Benefit-Cost- 
Difference  
euro Area
austria aT 0.0410 0.0290 0.0359 0.0120 0.0051
Belgium BE 0.1290 0.0260 0.0345 0.1030 0.0945
Estonia EE 0.0040   0.0014   0.0026
Finland Fi 0.0120 0.0300 0.0238 -0.0180 -0.0118
France Fr 0.1290 0.1120 0.1534 0.0170 -0.0244
Germany dE 0.2670 0.4060 0.3623 -0.1390 -0.0953
Greece Gr 0.0050 -0.0200 0.0207 0.0250 -0.0157
ireland iE 0.0200 -0.0690 0.0141 0.0890 0.0059
italy iT 0.1030 0.0000 0.1331 0.1030 -0.0301
latvia lv 0.0030   0.0012   0.0018
luxembourg lU 0.0050 0.0100 0.0025 -0.0050 0.0025
Malta MT 0.0010   0.0007   0.0003
netherlands nl 0.1550 0.0810 0.0861 0.0740 0.0689
portugal pT 0.0180 0.0150 0.0177 0.0030 0.0003
Slovak rep. SK 0.0190 0.0040 0.0031 0.0150 0.0159
Slovenia Si 0.0080   0.0036   0.0044
Spain ES 0.0770 0.1980 0.1041 -0.1210 -0.0271
Source: world Bank, EcB, OEcd, dolls et al. (2015). Own calculation and representation. data missing for 
Estonia, latvia, Malta and Slovenia.
PReFeRenCe heteRogeneity 
Definition of key variables
 
Coverage rate 
The coverage rate is defined as the number of insured persons as a percentage 
rate of the labour force (15- to 64-years-olds). This definition is in line with 
the literature (e.g. Esser et al. 2013). There is no data available for Croatia. 
Net replacement rate 
In most countries, unemployment benefits are paid as a percentage of the 
last average net salary. However, some member states (including Greece, 
Poland and the UK) use a flat-rate based system independent of the last 
income. To achieve comparability with the rest of the EU, the OECD set off 
this flat-rate amount against the average worker’s salary. Furthermore, for 
reasons of simplicity, we ignore the aspect of income ceilings, which gener-
ally play an important role in calculating the amount of benefits. The data 
contains no information on Cyprus.
Duration 
The duration denotes the number of weeks during which recipients have a 
right to the payments. In most of the countries, total duration equals about 
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five or six months, including periods with reduced benefits. Here, we concen-
trated mostly on the first-tier benefits (before cuts in payments kicks in) to 
focus on short-term unemployment measures. We are aware of the fact that 
this gives a downward pressure tendency to this variable, since the majority 
of programmes continue for many weeks after the first reduction kicks in. 
Nevertheless, we decided on this method to achieve a higher comparability, 
considering that some countries do not have distinct programmes for short- 
and long-term unemployment. In Belgium, for example, it is theoretically 
possible to receive basic benefits for an indefinite period of time. 
Eligibility 
In many countries, eligibility for benefits is connected to a specific  qualifying 
period, such as a minimal number of contributing weeks to the insurance, 
called the ‘contribution period’ (Esser et al. 2013). According to Palme et al. 
(2009), this is a reasonable approximation for the programme’s eligibility 
conditions. For the sake of simplicity, we refrain from comparing the time 
period in which the countries allow the payments to happen (the so-called 
‘reference period’). Cyprus reported no information on eligibility.
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Xv. Results
In this section, we present an overview of the scoring results for the indi-
vidual indicators and of the final results of the weighted scoring method 
based on various indicator weightings. 
Starting with the individual scoring results for the various indicators, in 
particular the analysis of the preference heterogeneity indicator reveals that 
the preferences of European citizens regarding different policies are highly 
aligned. With the exception of the result for agricultural policy, which is 
indifferent towards a national or a European competence, all scores point 
towards a European competence allocation. In other words, the preferences 
of European citizens are sufficiently homogenous to consider a reallocation 
of competences (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6:  
Summary of scoring results for all indicators
weight 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 2.00 weakly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.60 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 4.20 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.60 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.20 weakly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.60 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.40 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.80 weakly EU
 A similar, albeit weaker result is found for the ‘internal market consistency’ 
and ‘competition’ indicators. None of the ‘internal market consistency’ 
indicator scores points towards a national competence allocation.187 We assign 
an indifferent score of 3 in four cases (agricultural policy, development aid, 
post-secondary and tertiary education policy, and unemployment insurance), 
which implies that we do not find obstacles to the internal market which 
need to be resolved via a competence reallocation. This stands in contrast to 
the analyses of asylum and refugee policy, corporate taxation and defence 
policy, which all reveal internal market deficiencies that strongly point 
towards a European competence. 
187  we are aware of the inherent pro-European bias of this indicator. nonetheless, we assume that a study on the 
division of competences between the EU and its member states should include the status quo of the internal 
market and the possible implications of a competence reallocation. note, however, that our results are not 
affected by this indicator. That is, if we exclude the ‘internal market consistency’ indicator from our analyses, the 
decision on whether a specific policy should be located at the European or the national level does not change.
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Concerning the ‘competition’ indicator, only the case study for agricultural 
policy points towards a weakly national competence. The opposite holds true 
for defence policy, which would tremendously benefit from less  intra-European 
competition.
In contrast, the results for the ‘spillover effects’ and ‘economies of scale’ 
indicators are rather heterogeneous. For both indictors, the scores vary 
between a clearly national competence (e.g. in the case of agricultural policy 
for both indicators, or of post-secondary and tertiary education in the case 
of economies of scale) and a clearly European competence, such as in the case 
of asylum and refugee policy and unemployment insurance (‘spillover effects’ 
indicator) or development aid (‘economies of scale’ indicator).
Concerning an initial tendency towards a reallocation of competences, in 
particular the case studies for asylum and refugee policy, corporate taxation 
and defence policy point towards a European competence. In all these case 
studies, no indicator score is smaller than 4, meaning that each individual 
indicator points towards a weakly or even clearly European competence for 
all of these policies.
The application of the weighted scoring method allows the calculation of 
a single score per investigated policy. Using these scores, we take the final 
decision on the allocation of competences according to the scale presented 
in Figure 7:
Figure 7:  
Overview of final scoring decisions for the optimal competence allocation
decision score is in the interval:
[1, 1.8] [1.8, 2.6] [2.6, 3.4] [3.4, 4.2] [4.2, 5]
clearly 
national
weakly 
national
indifferent weakly
European
clearly 
European
 
note: if a score lies on the threshold between two decisions, we assign the lower level.
As both the scores and the threshold values are to some extent arbitrary, we 
stress that we are not primarily interested in exact scoring figures. That is, 
whether a policy is assessed with a score equal to 4.21 (which would result 
in a clearly European competence) or with a score equal to 4.19 (which points 
to a weakly European competence) is of secondary interest for the overall 
policy conclusion. However, the indicator scoring allows us to compare the 
results for various policies and to get deeper insights into which policies 
should be on top of the European agenda for a competence reallocation. 
Furthermore, the thresholds allow for insights on how the suggested compe-
tence allocation depends on the applied weighting scheme. 
In the baseline scenario, we apply an equal weighting scheme for all 
 indicators (i.e. all indicators are weighted with 20 per cent). The results of 
this analysis are presented in Figure 8 (with the policies arranged in alpha-
betical order).
Xv. Results
In this section, we present an overview of the scoring results for the indi-
vidual indicators and of the final results of the weighted scoring method 
based on various indicator weightings. 
Starting with the individual scoring results for the various indicators, in 
particular the analysis of the preference heterogeneity indicator reveals that 
the preferences of European citizens regarding different policies are highly 
aligned. With the exception of the result for agricultural policy, which is 
indifferent towards a national or a European competence, all scores point 
towards a European competence allocation. In other words, the preferences 
of European citizens are sufficiently homogenous to consider a reallocation 
of competences (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6:  
Summary of scoring results for all indicators
weight 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 2.00 weakly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.60 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 4.20 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.60 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.20 weakly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.60 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.40 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.80 weakly EU
 A similar, albeit weaker result is found for the ‘internal market consistency’ 
and ‘competition’ indicators. None of the ‘internal market consistency’ 
indicator scores points towards a national competence allocation.187 We assign 
an indifferent score of 3 in four cases (agricultural policy, development aid, 
post-secondary and tertiary education policy, and unemployment insurance), 
which implies that we do not find obstacles to the internal market which 
need to be resolved via a competence reallocation. This stands in contrast to 
the analyses of asylum and refugee policy, corporate taxation and defence 
policy, which all reveal internal market deficiencies that strongly point 
towards a European competence. 
187  we are aware of the inherent pro-European bias of this indicator. nonetheless, we assume that a study on the 
division of competences between the EU and its member states should include the status quo of the internal 
market and the possible implications of a competence reallocation. note, however, that our results are not 
affected by this indicator. That is, if we exclude the ‘internal market consistency’ indicator from our analyses, the 
decision on whether a specific policy should be located at the European or the national level does not change.
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Figure 8: 
Baseline results (equal weights)
weight 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 2.00 weakly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.60 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 4.20 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.60 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.20 weakly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.60 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.40 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.80 weakly EU
According to the final decision score, in particular asylum and refugee policy 
as well as defence policy should be allocated to the European level. Further-
more, the policies of corporate taxation, development aid and unemployment 
insurance reveal a weakly European tendency. The opposite holds true for 
agricultural policy and post-secondary and tertiary education, where the 
indicators rather support an allocation of these policies to the national level. 
In the case of railway freight transport policy, the results are indifferent 
towards a clearly national or a clearly European competence. 
Robustness tests with larger weights on the quantitative indicators are 
shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The former puts a stronger emphasis on the 
quantitative indicators ‘spillover effects’ , ‘economies of scale’ and ‘prefer-
ence heterogeneity’ , which are equally weighted with 25 per cent. The 
remaining indicators, ‘internal market consistency’ and ‘competition’ , are 
equally weighted with 12.5 per cent. In contrast to the baseline scenario, the 
decision only changes for development aid, where a European competence is 
now clearly favourable (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9:  
Robustness test (emphasis on quantitative indicators)
weight 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.125 0.125 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 1.88 weakly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.63 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 4.13 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.50 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.38 clearly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.50 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.38 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.88 weakly EU
An Figure 10, we present results based on equal weights for the quantitative 
indicators only. The ‘spillover effects’ , ‘economies of scale’ and ‘preference 
heterogeneity’ indicators are equally weighted with 33 per cent. Again, there 
are only minor changes compared to the previous results. In particular, 
agricultural policy changes from a weakly national to a clearly national 
competence. 
Figure 10:  
Robustness test (only quantitative indicators)
weight 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 1.65 clearly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.62 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 3.96 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.29 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.62 clearly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.31 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.30 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.96 weakly EU
Figure 8: 
Baseline results (equal weights)
weight 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 score decision
agricultural policy 1 1 3 3 2 2.00 weakly national
asylum & refugee policy 5 4 5 5 4 4.60 clearly EU
corporate taxation 4 4 4 5 4 4.20 weakly EU
defence policy 4 4 5 5 5 4.60 clearly EU
development aid 4 5 5 3 4 4.20 weakly EU
post-secondary & tertiary education 2 1 4 3 3 2.60 weakly national
railway freight transport policy 2 4 4 4 3 3.40 indifferent
Unemployment insurance 5 3 4 3 4 3.80 weakly EU
According to the final decision score, in particular asylum and refugee policy 
as well as defence policy should be allocated to the European level. Further-
more, the policies of corporate taxation, development aid and unemployment 
insurance reveal a weakly European tendency. The opposite holds true for 
agricultural policy and post-secondary and tertiary education, where the 
indicators rather support an allocation of these policies to the national level. 
In the case of railway freight transport policy, the results are indifferent 
towards a clearly national or a clearly European competence. 
Robustness tests with larger weights on the quantitative indicators are 
shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The former puts a stronger emphasis on the 
quantitative indicators ‘spillover effects’ , ‘economies of scale’ and ‘prefer-
ence heterogeneity’ , which are equally weighted with 25 per cent. The 
remaining indicators, ‘internal market consistency’ and ‘competition’ , are 
equally weighted with 12.5 per cent. In contrast to the baseline scenario, the 
decision only changes for development aid, where a European competence is 
now clearly favourable (see Figure 9).
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Xvi. Conclusions
In this section, we summarise the main findings of our study and present 
brief synopses of the investigated policies. The detailed case studies are then 
presented in the following section.
Taken together, the analysis has shown that, in particular, the compe-
tences for defence policy, asylum and refugee policy, and development aid 
should be located on the European level. In all these case studies, and 
irrespective of the applied weighting procedure, the final decision score is 
larger than 4. Similar, albeit weaker conclusions can be drawn for the 
 corporate taxation and unemployment insurance policies. While the policy 
score of the former is larger than 4 (with exception of the robustness test 
based on only quantitative criteria), the policy score of the latter is smaller 
than 4 but larger than 3.2, which is the threshold value for a European 
 competence. Accordingly, these policies should not be at the top of the 
European agenda for a competence reallocation, but nonetheless should be 
considered once a package for competence reallocations towards the EU level 
is put together.
In contrast, our analysis indicates that agricultural policy as well as 
post-secondary and tertiary education should be allocated to the national 
level. In particular, the absence of economies of scale and worse spillover 
effects in the case of a European competence render this result.
Finally, the analysis of railway freight transport policy is indifferent 
towards a national or a European competence. In other words, we cannot 
recommend a clear competence allocation to either the national or the supra-
national level.
A summary of these conclusions is presented in Figure 11.
Figure 11:  
Summary optimal allocation of policies
Policies Optimal allocation
asylum & refugee policy EU
defence policy (European army) EU
corporate taxation (harmonised tax base) EU
development aid EU
Unemployment insurance EU
railway freight transport indifferent
agricultural policy (income protection) national
post-secondary & tertiary education national
 
Agricultural policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the few purely European 
policy fields. In our analysis, we focus on the first pillar of the CAP: direct 
payments. Direct payments aim to compensate farmers for low incomes 
 realised on the market. We contrast the current situation of a European 
competence with a hypothetical situation of integrating direct payments into 
existing national welfare systems. The results of our analysis show that direct 
payments should be located on the national level.
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In particular, all indicators either point to a national provision or are indifferent. 
We find significant spillover effects, implying that national contributions are 
poorly aligned with the benefit that member states receive from the CAP. Our 
analysis shows that spillover effects can be limited substantially in the 
scenario with national competences for direct payments. When looking at the 
targeting of direct payments, we find significant inaccuracies leading to 
diseconomies of scale. National competences for agricultural policy can help 
to adjust direct payments to socially optimal levels, which vary across member 
states. Furthermore, the preferences of citizens exhibit modest variation in 
opinions among member states, implying no inclination regarding the location 
of the policy field. However, when looking at competition, locating agricul-
tural policy on the national level would enable positive yardstick competition 
between member states as well as foster more efficient policy mixes on the 
level of the member states.
Asylum & refugee policy
The handling of the increasing number of asylum-seekers and refugees in 
recent years has revealed the shortcomings of the European system. Within 
the EU, member states are responsible for the reception and accommodation 
of asylum-seekers and refugees. There are many regulations and directives 
that determine baseline principles which should ensure comparable  standards. 
However, there are huge disparities among member states in all fields of 
reception and accommodation. We contrast a new system of European asylum 
policy with the status quo. 
Our analysis comes to the conclusion that this policy field should be located 
on the EU level. In particular, it reveals that a common European policy would 
reduce incentives to free ride on other member states by refusing to accept 
any person in need, as they will be hosted by others. The comparison of costs 
that occur in receiving and hosting a refugee differ considerably among 
member states even when taking into account price differences. This would 
speak in favour of a European solution to realise potential cost savings which 
would occur if services were provided centrally. Moreover, such a central 
solution would be supported by a majority of voters, as Europeans seem to 
agree when it comes to migration-related issues. In addition, the internal 
market can only be supported and maintained if member states agree on a 
single system; otherwise, the threat of closed borders would be high under 
the status quo. Lastly, the analysis shows that, in the absence of effective 
sanctions and binding standards, competition might lead to a race to the 
bottom in the quality standards of refugee-hosting efforts instead of to 
positive effects from yardstick competition. This supports our conclusion 
that this policy field should be located on the EU level.
Corporate taxation
Unlike indirect taxation, direct taxation – including corporate taxation – is almost 
entirely a matter of national concern and one with a low degree of harmonisa-
tion at the EU level. We compare the current scenario with a counter factual 
scenario involving a harmonised tax-base definition and the apportionment of 
corporate profits among member states according to a formula. The competence 
of tax-rate setting would remain at the national level.
The overall result of our analysis strongly points to the merits of partially 
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is put together.
In contrast, our analysis indicates that agricultural policy as well as 
post-secondary and tertiary education should be allocated to the national 
level. In particular, the absence of economies of scale and worse spillover 
effects in the case of a European competence render this result.
Finally, the analysis of railway freight transport policy is indifferent 
towards a national or a European competence. In other words, we cannot 
recommend a clear competence allocation to either the national or the supra-
national level.
A summary of these conclusions is presented in Figure 11.
Figure 11:  
Summary optimal allocation of policies
Policies Optimal allocation
asylum & refugee policy EU
defence policy (European army) EU
corporate taxation (harmonised tax base) EU
development aid EU
Unemployment insurance EU
railway freight transport indifferent
agricultural policy (income protection) national
post-secondary & tertiary education national
 
Agricultural policy
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the few purely European 
policy fields. In our analysis, we focus on the first pillar of the CAP: direct 
payments. Direct payments aim to compensate farmers for low incomes 
 realised on the market. We contrast the current situation of a European 
competence with a hypothetical situation of integrating direct payments into 
existing national welfare systems. The results of our analysis show that direct 
payments should be located on the national level.
 
208
locating corporate taxation on the EU level. In particular, all indicators for 
this policy field point to the EU level. Existing spillover effects among 
member states under the status quo can be significantly reduced by 
relocating corporate tax policy to a higher federal level. We detect econo-
mies of scale for companies, which would benefit from lower tax compli-
ance costs in the counterfactual scenario. In contrast, however, we detect 
no economies of scale for fiscal authorities administering a higher number 
of taxpayers when assessing per-unit administration costs. 
The analysis of preference heterogeneity reveals that public opinion on 
taxation is highly aligned across member states, which is a prerequisite for 
harmonising corporate-taxation agendas. Locating corporate taxation on 
the EU level would also abolish potential obstacles which currently inter-
fere with the internal market. In particular, the different tax treatments 
for purely domestic and multinational companies are inherently at odds 
with the principle of the internal market. Finally, concerning tax competi-
tion, although we do not expect it to vanish as a result of centralising corpo-
rate taxation among member states, we do think it can be reframed in a 
fairer setting for both member states and companies.
Defence policy
We contrast the status quo of 28 national armies with the counterfactual situ-
ation of a fully integrated European army with unified decision-making and 
a centralised provision of military equipment. Our analysis indicates that the 
competence of defence policy should clearly be located on the EU level.
Defence policy is the typical example of a public good, which consequently 
implies the presence of spillover effects and chances for member states to 
free ride on military protection provided by other member states. And, 
indeed, the quantitative analysis of benefit- and burden-sharing between 
member states shows that a European competence would better align 
benefits and costs for member states and thereby decrease the extent of 
free riding. Besides the ‘spillover effects’ indicator, the other indicators 
also point to a European solution. We are able to detect economies of scale 
in the provision of military services that could be achieved if defence were 
provided on the EU level. The preferences of European citizens regarding 
the role of the army are highly homogeneous, which also supports a 
European competence. As the market for defence goods is currently exempted 
from the internal market, there are 28 national markets with national 
regulations intended to protect national defence industries. As a result, 
internal market consistency could be improved if the competence were 
shifted to the EU level. Concerning the role of competition, undersized 
markets for the armament sector and decreasing military expenditures 
counteract yardstick competition. Limited funding does not allow for the 
adoption of best practice defence goods from other countries. Accordingly, 
there is a strong case for an integrated European army to enable real compe-
tition and thereby higher quality in the armament sector.
Development aid
Although the EU and its member states share responsibility for develop-
ment aid under the status quo, a large fraction of aid is still managed on 
the national level. We contrast this situation with a counterfactual in which 
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we assume that national development aid is terminated, and that all Euro-
pean development aid is instead solely financed and managed by the EU. If 
such a situation were true, the EU would benefit tremendously in various 
respects, as our analysis clearly points towards the benefits of having a 
European competence for this policy.
Spillover effects are present if a member state does not pay for develop-
ment aid in foreign countries but receives benefits stemming from devel-
opment aid paid by other countries. According to our analysis, such free 
riding could be reduced by shifting from a national to a European compe-
tence for development aid. Furthermore, there is a tremendous potential to 
achieve economies of scale, as our analysis suggests that aid concentration 
increases with donor size while relative administration costs decrease 
disproportionally with an increasing size of the donor. The results from the 
‘preference heterogeneity’ indicator are also in favour of a European compe-
tence, as the preferences of European citizens regarding the need to help 
people and regarding the willingness to financially assist people in devel-
oping countries are highly homogeneous. Concerning competition, national 
solutions are also disadvantageous because yardstick competition increases 
aid fragmentation. In contrast to these pro-European findings, the national 
competences do not hinder the internal market, as both the member states 
and their implementing organisations adhere to the EU’s public procure-
ment rules, which block the preferred selection of national contractors.
Post-secondary & tertiary education
The analysis of post-secondary and tertiary education focuses on the 
financing of higher education. While both decision-making and budgets are 
located on the national (or even the subnational) level under the status quo, 
our counterfactual of a European competence assumes a modern competi-
tion model that is centrally financed but decentrally implemented (‘money 
follows students’). According to this model, the EU would finance higher 
education in a competitive way out of the EU budget, but each individual 
institution providing higher education would be responsible for the  strategic 
focus of the fields of study and the number of student places provided. The 
result of the analysis points towards a national competence. In other words, 
based on our indicators, we cannot recommend a competence reallocation 
from the national to the EU level. 
In particular, the ‘spillover effects’ and ‘economies of scale’ indicators 
point towards a national competence allocation. The free-riding index 
increases when moving from a national to a European competence. Further-
more, we find neither evidence of nor compelling theoretical arguments for 
the presence of economies of scale in the provision of post-secondary and 
tertiary education by the higher federal level. In contrast to these 
 pro-national results, the preference heterogeneity analysis reveals that the 
preferences of European citizens regarding the admission and selection of 
students by universities as well as regarding the role of student fees are 
sufficiently homogeneous to enable an allocation of this policy to the EU 
level. Finally, the ‘internal market consistency’ and ‘competition’  indicators 
are indifferent towards a national or a European competence. While the 
continued absence of harmonised procedures for recognising academic 
 qualifications is a hindrance to the completion of the internal market, such 
obstacles do not render a decentralised solution infeasible. In other words, 
locating corporate taxation on the EU level. In particular, all indicators for 
this policy field point to the EU level. Existing spillover effects among 
member states under the status quo can be significantly reduced by 
relocating corporate tax policy to a higher federal level. We detect econo-
mies of scale for companies, which would benefit from lower tax compli-
ance costs in the counterfactual scenario. In contrast, however, we detect 
no economies of scale for fiscal authorities administering a higher number 
of taxpayers when assessing per-unit administration costs. 
The analysis of preference heterogeneity reveals that public opinion on 
taxation is highly aligned across member states, which is a prerequisite for 
harmonising corporate-taxation agendas. Locating corporate taxation on 
the EU level would also abolish potential obstacles which currently inter-
fere with the internal market. In particular, the different tax treatments 
for purely domestic and multinational companies are inherently at odds 
with the principle of the internal market. Finally, concerning tax competi-
tion, although we do not expect it to vanish as a result of centralising corpo-
rate taxation among member states, we do think it can be reframed in a 
fairer setting for both member states and companies.
Defence policy
We contrast the status quo of 28 national armies with the counterfactual situ-
ation of a fully integrated European army with unified decision-making and 
a centralised provision of military equipment. Our analysis indicates that the 
competence of defence policy should clearly be located on the EU level.
Defence policy is the typical example of a public good, which consequently 
implies the presence of spillover effects and chances for member states to 
free ride on military protection provided by other member states. And, 
indeed, the quantitative analysis of benefit- and burden-sharing between 
member states shows that a European competence would better align 
benefits and costs for member states and thereby decrease the extent of 
free riding. Besides the ‘spillover effects’ indicator, the other indicators 
also point to a European solution. We are able to detect economies of scale 
in the provision of military services that could be achieved if defence were 
provided on the EU level. The preferences of European citizens regarding 
the role of the army are highly homogeneous, which also supports a 
European competence. As the market for defence goods is currently exempted 
from the internal market, there are 28 national markets with national 
regulations intended to protect national defence industries. As a result, 
internal market consistency could be improved if the competence were 
shifted to the EU level. Concerning the role of competition, undersized 
markets for the armament sector and decreasing military expenditures 
counteract yardstick competition. Limited funding does not allow for the 
adoption of best practice defence goods from other countries. Accordingly, 
there is a strong case for an integrated European army to enable real compe-
tition and thereby higher quality in the armament sector.
Development aid
Although the EU and its member states share responsibility for develop-
ment aid under the status quo, a large fraction of aid is still managed on 
the national level. We contrast this situation with a counterfactual in which 
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the internal market could be achieved by increasing cooperation among 
member states, as well. A similar conclusion is drawn for competition, as 
current or increased collaboration seems sufficient to gain advantages from 
competition.
Railway freight transport 
Transport policy – and therefore policy regarding railway freight trans-
port  –  belongs to the field of competences shared between the EU and its 
member states. However, national considerations have historically prevailed 
over international ones, and many member states still own the national rail 
operator and organise rail transport on a national basis. We therefore contrast 
the status quo of national rail transport with the counterfactual situation of 
a single EU-financed railway system without technical or operational barriers. 
The result of the analysis is indifferent towards a clearly national or a clearly 
European competence. That is, based on our indicators, we cannot recom-
mend a competence reallocation from the national to the EU level.
In particular, the analysis of the ‘spillover effects’ indicator renders this 
result. As railway transport cannot be treated entirely as a public good, railway 
transportation could also be handled via private markets. Taking this caveat 
into account and comparing the status quo with the counterfactual, we find 
that free riding would increase if the competence were reallocated from the 
national to the European level. In contrast to this result, the ‘economies of 
scale’ , ‘preference heterogeneity’ and ‘internal market consistency’ indica-
tors weakly point to a European competence. There are enormous potential 
cost savings based on fixed cost degression and the harmonisation of technical 
standards. Furthermore, both the analysis of Eurobarometer questions 
regarding competition in the rail market and an analysis of revealed prefer-
ences for various transport modes point to rather homogenous preferences 
among European citizens. Finally, the internal market could benefit from a 
competence allocation to the EU level, as domestic transport is currently not 
subject to competition in many member states and heavy rail transport is 
exempted from public tendering. While these obstacles could also be resolved 
via bilateral negations between member states, the negotiation process 
between the EU and its member states to date casts doubts on the efficiency 
of this procedure. The ‘competition’ indicator is indifferent towards a national 
or a European competence. While there might be some examples of policy 
innovations between different systems (e.g. concerning the liberalisation of 
the rail market), examples of yardstick competition within systems are rather 
scarce and in most cases limited by enormous sunk costs.
Unemployment insurance
We analyse whether a common European unemployment scheme offers a 
reasonable complement to the current system of independent national 
systems. The analysis is executed for the euro area countries only, as the 
advantages of such a scheme are strongest for members of the monetary 
union. Considering different indicators, our results point towards the merits 
of a European solution.
Concerning spillovers, one assumes that macroeconomic stabilisation 
should be carried out by the central level, as every intervention spills over 
to other jurisdictions. This is especially true in the case of open economies 
HOw EUrOpE can dElivEr | Optimising the division of competences among the EU and its member states 
211
with permeable borders. In addition, a common monetary policy eliminates 
adjustment tools available for countries with an independent currency (i.e. 
monetary policy and exchange rates). However, to a certain extent, a system 
of flexible labour markets and adjustable prices and wages can offer some 
adjustments even when there is a fixed exchange rate. Furthermore, a central 
stabilisation scheme might foster moral hazard and lower investments in 
reforms. The analysis shows that incentives to free ride on the stabilisation 
efforts of others are reduced in the case of a European system equally financed 
by all states. Potential cost savings from economies of scale are not  detectable. 
The comparison of national systems reveals that these are relatively homoge-
neous in their design, so – based on a revealed preference argument – the 
preferences of citizens are assumed to be quite homogeneous. Transactions 
on the internal market are hardly directly affected by the  existence or 
non-existence of a European unemployment scheme.  Nevertheless, labour 
mobility could improve. A race to the bottom in national systems is more 
likely compared to the European case, as countries might try to cut back 
unemployment benefits so as to be less attractive to unemployed persons or 
those with a high risk of becoming unemployed. However, one should not 
ignore the potential benefits resulting from yardstick competition of national 
systems, which have been proven in the past. 
the internal market could be achieved by increasing cooperation among 
member states, as well. A similar conclusion is drawn for competition, as 
current or increased collaboration seems sufficient to gain advantages from 
competition.
Railway freight transport 
Transport policy – and therefore policy regarding railway freight trans-
port  –  belongs to the field of competences shared between the EU and its 
member states. However, national considerations have historically prevailed 
over international ones, and many member states still own the national rail 
operator and organise rail transport on a national basis. We therefore contrast 
the status quo of national rail transport with the counterfactual situation of 
a single EU-financed railway system without technical or operational barriers. 
The result of the analysis is indifferent towards a clearly national or a clearly 
European competence. That is, based on our indicators, we cannot recom-
mend a competence reallocation from the national to the EU level.
In particular, the analysis of the ‘spillover effects’ indicator renders this 
result. As railway transport cannot be treated entirely as a public good, railway 
transportation could also be handled via private markets. Taking this caveat 
into account and comparing the status quo with the counterfactual, we find 
that free riding would increase if the competence were reallocated from the 
national to the European level. In contrast to this result, the ‘economies of 
scale’ , ‘preference heterogeneity’ and ‘internal market consistency’ indica-
tors weakly point to a European competence. There are enormous potential 
cost savings based on fixed cost degression and the harmonisation of technical 
standards. Furthermore, both the analysis of Eurobarometer questions 
regarding competition in the rail market and an analysis of revealed prefer-
ences for various transport modes point to rather homogenous preferences 
among European citizens. Finally, the internal market could benefit from a 
competence allocation to the EU level, as domestic transport is currently not 
subject to competition in many member states and heavy rail transport is 
exempted from public tendering. While these obstacles could also be resolved 
via bilateral negations between member states, the negotiation process 
between the EU and its member states to date casts doubts on the efficiency 
of this procedure. The ‘competition’ indicator is indifferent towards a national 
or a European competence. While there might be some examples of policy 
innovations between different systems (e.g. concerning the liberalisation of 
the rail market), examples of yardstick competition within systems are rather 
scarce and in most cases limited by enormous sunk costs.
Unemployment insurance
We analyse whether a common European unemployment scheme offers a 
reasonable complement to the current system of independent national 
systems. The analysis is executed for the euro area countries only, as the 
advantages of such a scheme are strongest for members of the monetary 
union. Considering different indicators, our results point towards the merits 
of a European solution.
Concerning spillovers, one assumes that macroeconomic stabilisation 
should be carried out by the central level, as every intervention spills over 
to other jurisdictions. This is especially true in the case of open economies 
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